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PIETAS

A Journal of Tradition, Place, and Things Divine

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by Lewis Fallis

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Unionist Discourse between the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
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

C. S. Lewis photo courtesy C. S. Lewis Foundation/Public Domain

C. S. Lewis is both the subject of one of our feature articles and one of the twentieth century's most thoughtful defenders of Christianity. In the *Screwtape Letters*, the demon Screwtape gives advice to his nephew-apprentice Wormwood on securing souls for hell. Screwtape discusses the weakness of piety without action:

> The great thing is to prevent [man's] doing anything. As long as he does not convert it into action, it does not matter how much he thinks about this new repentance. Let the little brute wallow in it. Let him, if he has any bent that way, write a book about it; that is often an excellent way of sterilising the seeds which the Enemy plants in a human soul. Let him do anything but act. No amount of piety in his imagination and affections will harm us if we can keep it out of his will. As one of the humans has said, active habits are strengthened by repetition but passive ones are weakened. The more often he feels without acting, the less he will be able ever to act, and, in the long run, the less he will be able to feel.[1]

[1] C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1942), 69–70.

Lewis's words strike a similar tone to those in David Hein's recent book, *Teaching the Virtues* (reviewed in this issue):

> Just as in the ancient world the good Roman citizen practiced *pietas*, incorporating in his life not only reverence toward the gods but also proper respect toward parents, kinsmen, country, so in the modern world, and particularly in our schools, ought we to embody dutifulness toward the natural order, practicing piety personally, civically, and even academically. (167)

In his discussion of the moral virtue of courage, Hein directs us to Lewis's explanation in *The Screwtape Letters* "for why God created 'a dangerous world'" (92):

> God made a cosmos 'in which moral issues really come to the point.' In such a world, human beings are provided with occasions of real challenge and with opportunities to grow into their full stature.
>
> In the face of these trials, 'courage is not simply one of the virtues, but the form of every virtue at the testing point.'" (92)

Lewis interwove a teaching of moral virtue, of the role of reason and pious duty to God, into a creation story. Joshua Paladino, one of our feature authors this issue, will present a provocative take on Lewis's view of natural law after a brief introduction to our feature articles.

Any serious treatment of the relationship between the virtues of contemplation and action, as well as piety in the Western tradition, must include Moses ben Maimon (1138–1204). Commonly known as Maimonides, he was both a philosopher and lawgiver of the Mishneh Torah. Our issue begins with Lewis Fallis's careful and provocative reading of book three of Maimonides's great philosophical work, *The Guide of the Perplexed*. Fallis teases out Maimonides's rhetorical and pedagogical aims in his account of the reasonableness of the Jewish Law (and thus between reason and revelation), as well as their implications for religious and political law. To do this he draws attention to the dialectical aspects of a discussion between Maimonides and his student or interlocutor, Joseph. "Such an analysis," writes Fallis, "can help us understand Maimonides's only apparently contradictory teaching and its ultimate degree of congruence with the teaching of the Jewish tradition."

Our second featured article moves from the Jewish to the Christian tradition. Charles C. Yost turns to the thought and writings of Demetrios Kydones and Manuel Kalekas. He

challenges the prevailing academic focus on the anti-unionist discourse following the Schism of 1054. A treatment of pro-union authors, he argues, is necessary to provide a more complete view of medieval or Byzantine realities. Their henotic ideology provided both a coherent, evolving argument for union and a balanced and conciliatory understanding of the differences between the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches. It was only with "the critical influence of Latin, and specifically Thomist, ecclesiology," that unionist discourse took on a distinctly pessimistic and Byzantine quality. By the fourteenth century its writers were characterized by a profound sense of alienation from their homeland.

The Christian Church's challenge to inner unity only followed its subversion of pagan codes of virtue. Aaron C. Thurow provides a scholarly and insightful, even revisionist, interpretation of the Pearl Poet's Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Using a series of dichotomies, he analyzes chivalry as a guide to virtue in a fallen world. The Pearl Poet, by revealing chinks in the armor of Sir Gawain's seeming perfection, shows the limits of the chivalric code. Moral perfectionism and the standard of honor fade in the light of certain death. This examination of the moral life, argues Thurow, leads the reader to another, more difficult code informed by a conscientious awareness of one's own past failures. Moreover, it challenges the reader to consider a distinctly Christian view of the cosmos informed by the Augustinian mystery of the incarnation.

One of the great twentieth century defenders of Christianity—who did so by radicalizing its teachings—was C. S. Lewis. Lewis is rarely regarded as a political theorist, yet in our final feature article, Joshua Paladino demonstrates how his literary works are deeply intertwined with political themes. Rather than separating morality from politics, Lewis often linked moral decay with political dysfunction—particularly warning against the rise of technocratic governance in the postwar era. Paladino reexamines Lewis's legacy through both his writings and contemporary scholarship, arguing that Lewis consistently expressed counterrevolutionary opposition to the expanding bureaucratic elite and the dominance of scientific education. His critiques extended to technocracy, the concept of the state of exception, the moral authority claimed by humanitarian justice, and evolving gender roles in both marriage and society. Advocating resistance against the modern state, Lewis envisioned a new ruling class that would reject the prevailing norms of humanitarian justice and scientific democracy in favor of retributive justice and traditional moral values.

Also in this issue, David Beer reviews Thomas P. Harmon's *The Universal Way of Salvation in the Thought of Augustine*. Allen Mendenhall reviews Bernard J. Dobski's *Mark Twain's Joan of Ark*. Kevin Slack reviews David Hein's *Teaching the Virtues*, and William Batchelder reviews David Rieff's *Desire and Fate*.

We now turn to Paladino's revisionist take on C. S. Lewis's conception of the natural law, as well as the myth, a "not unlikely tale," he introduces to convey it.

* * *

A "NOT UNLIKELY TALE": C. S. LEWIS ON THE NATURAL LAW

C. S. Lewis presented his Creation myth, his "not unlikely tale" about man's Creation and Fall, in *The Problem of Pain*.[2] It details both man's natural condition as being in complete obedience to his will and spirit, and also his fallen state in which the natural law replaced the law of spirit. Lewis's account begins with an evolutionary phase, where:

> God perfected the animal which was to become the vehicle of humanity and the image of Himself. He gave it hands whose thumb could be applied to each of the fingers, and jaws and teeth and throat capable of articulation, and a brain sufficiently complex to execute all the material motions whereby rational thought is incarnated. (65)

The pre-human creature's bodily and mental attributes developed before its spirit formed, and its "physical and psychical processes were directed to purely material and natural ends" (65). God created the true man when he filled him with "a new kind of consciousness which could say 'I' and 'me'" (65). Man could also know God, make value judgments about "truth, beauty, and goodness," and "perceive time" (65). Certain physical and mental traits, combined with the spiritual endowment, made the perfect man, who was "then all consciousness" and had under his control "those functions which to us are almost part of the external world, such as digestion and circulation" (65). Lewis summarized the first human's life: "His organic processes obeyed the law of his own will, not the law of nature" (65). These pre-Fall humans could choose their appetites, stay awake (in a sense) while they consciously enjoy sleep, repair their tissues at will, decide their lives' length, command the beasts, and

[2] C. S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947).

otherwise exercise a mystical or magical control over their own bodies and the world around them. In addition to their perfect self-conscious control of their own bodies and minds, they existed harmoniously with God: "In perfect cyclic movement, being, power, and joy descended from God to man in the form of gift and returned from man to God in the form of obedient love and ecstatic adoration" (66). The human spirit, with God's help, controlled the human organism. Humans did not obey laws inherent in nature; they obeyed God's spiritual laws, and nature in turn obeyed them.

Lewis argued that humanity's disobedience forced God to discontinue this relationship, to stop ruling man directly, and to substitute the law of spirit for the law of nature. Formerly, God ruled man's spirit, and man's spirit ruled his body and mind, but man cannot rule his body and mind unless God empowers him to do so. Having rejected God's rule, man necessarily rejected his only power of self-rule and thus subjected himself to Nature. Lewis wrote:

> I doubt whether it would have been intrinsically possible for God to continue to rule the organism *through* the human spirit when the human spirit was in revolt against Him. At any rate He did not. He began to rule the organism in a more external way, not by the laws of spirit, but by those of nature. (69–70)

Previously governed by reason and will, man subjected himself to the environment and chance. Some descriptions of the Fall present it as a mere change in man's mental habits, as a reduction in his fortitude against sin, or as a darkening of the conscience; Lewis agreed but added the biological idea that the Fall "was a loss of status as a *species*. What man lost by the Fall was his original specific nature" (70). *Homo sapiens* did not retain their nature but became less wise, less moral, less virtuous. Instead, the original creature, *homo spiritualis*, became a lesser being, *homo sapiens*, a creature who lives between beast and spirit. It was "a radical alteration of his constitution, a disturbance of the relation between his component parts, and an internal perversion of one of them" (71). In losing his species-status, man necessarily became subject to a new, lower law.

God empowered spiritual man to obey the law proper to his nature, and this obedience originally required no struggle (except against the first temptation); now, a new law binds natural man—the law of nature—but it is not proper to his true nature, so even perfect obedience to the natural law cannot ensure his perfection and his attainment of the highest

goods. But Lewis did not believe that humans could obey even the natural law. Summarizing St. Paul, he wrote that "perfect obedience to the moral law, which we find written in our hearts and perceive to be necessary even on the biological level, is not in fact possible to men" (54). God's original Creation harmonized a perfect nature, a perfect spiritual law, and perfect obedience to that law, but humans in the fallen world have imperfect natures, know an imperfect natural law, and act out an imperfect obedience to that law. Perfect obedience to the natural law, even if theoretically possible, would still produce an imperfect creature because the natural law does not direct man to obey God as its first axiom; instead, it directs man to secondary goods—food, water, shelter, safety, procreation—that then create the conditions within which obedience to God becomes possible.

Concluding chapter 9 of *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis wrote: "The thesis of this chapter is simply that man, as a species, spoiled himself, and that good, to us in our present state, must therefore mean primarily remedial or corrective good" (76). The natural law, though deficient, aids man's restoration by making him aware of and directing him toward a higher good. For Lewis, the law of nature prepares man to acknowledge and return to the law of spirit.

Joshua Paladino

* * *

Many thanks to both our authors and peer-reviewers, without whom this journal would not be possible.

The Ciceronian Society

Love and Fear in Maimonides's *Guide of the Perplexed*

Lewis Fallis

In book three of The Guide of the Perplexed*, Maimonides presents his account of the aims, presuppositions, and reasonableness of the Jewish Law, and thereby his account of the harmony between reason and revelation. To understand the twists and turns of his account, and its implications for religious and political law more broadly, we need to analyze Maimonides's shifting rhetorical strategies and didactic goals, since the discussion is undertaken with a view to the education of Joseph, his primary student or interlocutor. Such an analysis can help us understand Maimonides's only apparently contradictory teaching and its ultimate degree of congruence with the teaching of the Jewish tradition.*

Among the philosophic disagreements contributing to political discord, few if any match the intransigence, intensity, and significance of the perennial debate between reason and revelation. And among the attempts to synthesize or demonstrate an ultimate harmony between reason and revelation, few if any match the nuance and depth of Maimonides's attempt in *The Guide of the Perplexed*. Although the third and final book of *The Guide* begins with a somewhat anticlimactic exposition of Maimonides's long-promised "Account of the Chariot" (an exegesis of Ezekiel's epiphanic vision in the Bible), the remainder of book three presents *The Guide*'s teaching about law, providence, immortality, the life of reason, and the correct relationship to the divine. The sections on providence and law, in book three, must be read as a single strategic unit. Maimonides's discussion of providence sets up his discussion of Law by tethering hopes for immortality to the Law as the vehicle of intellectual apprehension and providential protection. By bookending the discussion of Law with discussions of love and fear as the twin aims of Law, Maimonides puts in clear terms the decision incumbent upon Joseph (his primary reader or interlocutor), or upon any reader caught between the comforts of piety and the agonies of perplexity.

Animals and Death

Maimonides's discussion of providence in book three opens with frequent references to matter. Matter is a difficulty for providence in that it is an evil (431[1]) and causes an incapacity

[1] Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

to apprehend God (436–37); given that God created matter, these facts might seem to call into question the existence of a divine and benevolent plan for us. But matter is also a difficulty for providence in that it would seem that the body would have to be transcended in order to receive providence's greatest gift, immortality. It is this second theme which is the focus of chapter eight and at least a tacit theme of the entire section on providence.

Throughout chapter eight, Maimonides inflates the reader's hopes for immortality. Matter is labeled the cause of corruption and passing-away (430–31). Matter is "in no way found without form" (431), and none of "the forms in question" can exist without matter (431); but it is unclear which forms are in question. Perhaps man's form is so noble that it can deserve independent existence. A living being's death occurs "solely because of matter and not because of its form" (431). The first virtue consequent upon man's form is "the apprehension of his Creator" (431). Man's form is noble, "the *image of God and His likeness*" (431). Some individuals "aspire always to prefer that which is most noble and to seek a state of perpetual permanence according to what is required by their noble form" (432). The bodily and the vulgar are disparaged to a great and even ridiculous extent—a slave would rejoice in being ordered to carry dung, clapping his hands and joyfully soiling his face with it (432, cf. 434)—so as to exalt, by implicit contrast, apprehension and the elite. This exaltation inflates the reader's hopes that he, as an excellent man, can transcend the despicable level of the many.

Disobedience is linked with filth and bestiality (432, 434), whereas "union with the divine intellect" seems to be possible for those who become least animal and most form-like. Contemplation of the divine "is what is required of man; I mean to say that this is his end" (433). Whether such contemplation is a duty or simply a fulfillment remains ambiguous.[2] In

[2] Throughout this article, I side with the mode of interpretation endorsed by Lerner in his compelling critique of Marvin Fox; see Ralph Lerner, "Review of *Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy* by Marvin Fox," *The Journal of Religion* 71, no. 4 (October 1991): 627-28. The apparently "syncretistic" claims of Maimonides must be understood in the light of his rhetorical strategies. Compare Leo Strauss, "How to Begin to Study *The Guide of the Perplexed*," in *Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings*, ed. Kenneth Green, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 543–45, and Joshua Parens, *Maimonides and Spinoza: Their Conflicting Views of Human Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 10. Consider also Strauss's helpful reorienting of Maimonides scholarship in "The Literary Character of *The Guide of the Perplexed*," in *Leo Strauss on Maimonides*, 347–48: "It is not an exaggeration to say that for [Maimonides] philosophy is practically identical with the teaching as well as the methods of Aristotle, 'the prince of the philosophers,' and of the Aristotelians. And he is an adversary of philosophy thus understood. It is against the opinions of '*the* philosophers' that he defends the Jewish creed. And what he opposes to the wrong opinions of *the* philosophers is not a true philosophy, and in particular not a religious philosophy, or a philosophy of religion, but 'our opinion, i.e., the opinion of our law,' or the opinion of 'us, the

any event, the Law is held out as an avenue to intellectual union with the divine and to immortality: "the commandments and prohibitions of the Law are only intended to quell all the impulses of matter. It behooves him who prefers to be a human being in truth, not a beast having the shape and configuration of a human being, to endeavor to diminish all the impulses of matter" (433–34). Such a transcendence of animality, darkness, confusion, and matter promises to the reader a transcendence of death.

The next three chapters continue the same theme. Human matter is "dark and turbid," preventing the apprehension of God (436). Chapter ten's offhand examples of privations link blindness to death and sight to life: Maimonides refers to "every privation and the corresponding habitus—as, for instance, blindness and sight, death and life" (438). Darkness is linked to evil (438), and death is mentioned six times in just a few pages, during what might have been a purely theoretical discussion of privation. Chapter eleven offhandedly links ignorance to blindness and wounds—"Just as a blind man, because of absence of sight, does not cease stumbling..." (440)—and knowledge to sight and the absence of harms (441). Through his carefully chosen examples in these chapters, Maimonides creates a half-conscious web of associations in the reader's mind. If sight means life, and knowledge is sight, then by a subconscious transitive equation the reader will begin to hope that intellectual apprehension might lead to immortality.

Chapter twelve abruptly squashes these hopes. To rebut the argument that the existence of evil disproves providence, Maimonides claims that these evils mean nothing because man is insignificant; "all the existent individuals of the human species and, all the more, those of the other species of the animals are things of no value at all in comparison with the whole that exists and endures" (442). Human worth is still ambiguous here—how can we be worth nothing, if the animals are worth still less than we?—but it is clear that we are not a matter of divine concern or intervention, nor capable of existence and endurance beyond our deaths. Man's insignificance is a "grave" subject (442). The reader's hopes for immortality, which Maimonides himself had built up, are suddenly not only dashed but depicted as brash,

community of the adherents of the law,' or the opinion of the 'followers of the law of our teacher Moses.' He obviously assumes that the philosophers form a group distinguished from the group of adherents of the law and that both groups are mutually exclusive" (compare 372–73, 387). For a discussion of the complexity of Maimonides's motives in writing the *Guide*, consider also Lerner, *Maimonides' Empire of Light: Popular Enlightenment in an Age of Belief* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 75–76.

narcissistic, and stupid. "Every ignoramus imagines that all that exists exists with a view to his individual sake" (442). As the Bible makes clear, man is a worm. In his "vain thought" that he might not be a "mortal being" (444), the reader was implicitly putting himself above all of humanity, for only the death of individuals makes possible "the coming-to-be relating to the species" (443). Suddenly the soul is only a "corporeal faculty" (445), certainly incapable of permanence. Suddenly the elitism of chapter eight, which had there been paired with the possibility of rising above the vulgar and the bodily, is inverted, and Maimonides poses as a radical egalitarian. God established a "very evident" equality between human beings. No example of this "weak living creature" or any other animal "is distinguished from another individual of the same species by having a special faculty possessed only by him" (447). Suddenly the reader feels himself placed on a par with the vulgar, who were said to enjoy smearing dung on their faces. There may exist, accidentally, a deficiency in an individual, but if there are any superiorities, those follow "necessarily from the differences in the disposition of the various kinds of matter," and are thus no grounds for lofty claims of greater desert for the transcendence of matter. Only the majority of cases matter. "As we have made clear," Maimonides notes, "no attention should be paid to anomalies" (448). The escape hatch of elitism is abruptly closed.

This sudden deflation of the reader's hopes must put him on edge, and in searching for other escape hatches he may catch sight of two. After discussing the evils consequent upon the transient nature of matter or material bodies, Maimonides moves on to a second type of evil (inflicted by men) and states that these "also come from us. *However*, the wronged man has no device against them" (444, emphasis added). To the desperate reader this may imply that there *is* a device against the first class of evil. Also, in reference to Maimonides's sudden radical egalitarianism, the slight qualification that all individuals of the same species are "equal *at their creation*" (448, emphasis added) may provide hope that self-improvement could warrant transcendence. These slivers of light are slim, but perhaps Maimonides leaves them open in order not to completely debunk but rather to pressurize the reader's hopes. This pendulum of hope and despair must intensify longing acutely.

But chapters thirteen through sixteen, despite a few beacons of light, continue the generally downward trajectory. The philosophers, though they assert man's importance to some extent, also close the door on providence, it being "impossible that the individuals

composed out of [our inferior matter] should endure" (450). What exists is good by reference to God's purpose, not to "our purpose," or if to ours then only "for a time" (453). The Bible and philosophy combine to form a one-two punch against man's significance; though man is "the most perfect and most noble thing that has been generated from this [inferior] matter ... if his being is compared to that of the spheres and all the more to that of the separate beings, it is very, very contemptible" (455). Chapter fourteen emphasizes the "great and terrifying distance" between man and the spheres, terrifying because of the implied "remoteness of the apprehension of the deity" (456). The vast distances of the cosmos are used to prove the absurdity of man's thinking that the created things "exist for his sake" (457). The philosopher joins the argument only to further quell hopes with the anti-providential paradox that "it would have been most disgraceful if what is nobler served as an instrument for the existence of what is most base and vile" (458). Chapter fifteen reveals a glimmer of light in that Maimonides is unsure what is possible and impossible regarding the nature of matter (460). Perhaps permanence is possible. Chapter sixteen reintroduces the theme of animals, once again as code for the wretched unprotected: God might neglect all human beings just as a man, "for instance, neglects the governance of the cats in his house or of even more contemptible beings" (462). This suggestion is never entirely refuted, except on the assumption that such disdain "would create in Him evil" (462)—even though Maimonides has refuted (442, 457–58) and is about to refute (462–63) the error of "considering what exists from the point of view of the circumstances of human individuals" (462–63). If we must abandon the strictly human perspective to understand the truth, then perhaps God's indifference or disdain for us would be not evil but simply a fact.

Five (or Six) Views on Providence

Chapter seventeen represents the peak of the discussion of providence. Five views are presented. The Epicurean view ascribes all events to chance, holding out no hope for intervention or immortality. The Aristotelian view holds that providence[3] "ends at the sphere of the moon" and that while the species' endurance is assured, the endurance of individuals

[3] If it is correctly so labeled; Maimonides's use of terms here is slippery. Things that endure or observe "a certain orderly course" are said by Aristotle "to subsist through governance; *I mean to say* that divine providence accompanied it" (466, emphasis added). Aristotle claims that impermanent things exist by chance "and not through the governance of one who governs; *he means thereby* that they are not accompanied by divine providence" (466, emphasis added).

is impossible (465). Maimonides claims that, according to Aristotle, neither the death of "people at their prayers" nor the death of a prophet is any different from the deaths of ants, mice, and flies (466). Neither devotion nor virtue, then, allows man to overcome his bestial insignificance and transience. The third opinion, that of the Ash'arites, denies chance entirely, claiming constant divine intervention. Problems arise, in that absolute divine control denies human agency and might seem to undermine the coherence of Law as commanding and prohibiting, rewarding and punishing (467). To say that everything depends upon the divine will also goes against the "inborn disposition" (468, 470) that prohibits belief in a God not bound by intuitive standards of justice (467). The fourth position on providence begins with the inexplicability of God's justice and ends up claiming that all suffering and merit will be compensated and rewarded in the afterlife. This opinion unacceptably equates the human and the animal. The Jewish view on providence differs from the fourth opinion in that it stresses both human and animal agency, binds God by the standard of justice without being explicit about the afterlife, and restricts divine justice and providence to human beings rather than also to animals (469). It is unclear exactly how the Jewish Law can answer the objections that "impelled" each proponent of the other opinions "by strong necessity to say what he did" (468), except by recourse to the inexplicability of God's justice: "we are ignorant of the various modes of deserts" (469).

Maimonides then begins to explicate his *own* opinion on providence. His first departure from the opinion of the Jewish Law seems to be that Maimonides does not mention free will. But an even greater departure comes to sight as Maimonides, "impelled" to explain why God would watch over man but not the other insignificant animals, claims that providence is graded according to the degree of one's receiving the divine intellectual overflow (472). Providence "can only come from an intelligent being"; it is logical to assume that the degree of one's protection would be consequent on the degree to which one is similar to this being. But if "providence is consequent upon the intellect" and if "everyone ... will be reached by providence to the extent to which he is reached by the intellect" (474), then providence is not at all egalitarian. In fact, such a criterion of providential protection, by giving a *why* to providence, casts doubt on the category "human" as a determining factor. Providence becomes individually "graded," as chapter eighteen makes clear, the radical implication being that it is a "light thing" (475) to kill ignorant human beings, while God protects only those

with excellent intellects. In searching for a reason that God might protect human beings and not animals, Maimonides finds a reason for the Jewish outlook on providence by borrowing from a philosophic outlook which gets further and further from Judaism itself. Maimonides subtly points to the fact that the Bible may not mean by righteousness intellectual perfection and the "capacity of making [one's] soul pass from one moral quality to another" (476). But by this point, the reader may be too much invested in the subject to rebel; his hopes of overcoming animal mortality will have to be abandoned if he returns to an unreasoned embrace of categorical human providence. The options seem to be either to follow Maimonides, or to take a principled stand identifying with the majority of human beings.

Two Versions of Virtue

Chapters nineteen through twenty-one function to push the reader further from the standard theological view and toward the philosophic outlook. God's knowledge has nothing in common with our knowledge (483); this cuts against the hope for intellectual union with God. Similarly, His purpose and His providence have nothing in common with the way we use these terms, casting some doubt on our ability to believe in them (cf. I.50). Lingering doubts surface about the standard Jewish view's ability to deal (any better than the Ash'arite view) with the question of free will (482, 485). The remaining avenue for intellectual progress and thus providential protection seems to be philosophy or science: "we know all that we know only through looking at the beings" (485).

Chapter twenty-two begins the discussion of Job. Here Maimonides calls attention to the distance between *his* version of the virtue which warrants providential protection and the Bible's. Job is called a righteous and perfect man by the Bible, but "knowledge is not attributed" to Job. In an uncharacteristic move, Maimonides calls this fact "marvelous and extraordinary" (487). Quite explicitly, then, he emphasizes a gap between his understanding and the Bible's. This awakens the reader to a big problem: if the Jewish view on providence has been provided with a foundation borrowed from a more philosophic outlook (explaining why God would care for men but not for animals, the reason being reason itself, or the intellect), but if that philosophic outlook *opposes* the Jewish conception of virtue, then can such a structure stably stand? We are confronted here with a problem similar to that plaguing the proof of God in Book Two. If one provides a foundational proof of the Jewish God on

the terms or grounds of philosophy, is this not more of a wrestling match than a coherent structure? And if one provides the Jewish view of providence with foundational logic that happens to be a philosophic understanding of virtue, do we not have the same problem?

If the reader now wants to abandon the philosophic conception of virtue (as intellectual apprehension), he will be abandoning the reasoning that was used to make sense of the Jewish view of providence, an avenue particularly unappealing given Maimonides's newly-revived and constant emphasis on immortality: "the sons of God are more permanent and lasting" than Satan; "the term soul is applied to the thing that remains of man after death" (488); "Satan, the evil inclination, and the angel of death are one and the same" (489). Sin is linked to death, error to perishing (489), and (by implication) truth to life and virtue to the transcendence of mortality. But "good inclination is only found in man when his intellect is perfected" (490). The tension between the philosophic and the Jewish conceptions of virtue becomes more acute: exactly what *is* the virtue that delivers proximity to and protection by God?

In chapter 23, the ambiguity as to Job's perfection or lack thereof grows. Job is, in his friends' opinion, "the most perfect individual, who was the most unblemished of them in righteousness" (491). And yet Job at first misunderstands God completely, taking the Aristotelian position on providence and only later progressing into the understanding that he cannot be troubled in any way by death (492–93). Then Maimonides reveals that it is, in fact, *Elihu* who is "considered by them as superior ... the most perfect among them in knowledge" (494). Job is suddenly demoted, as are his other three friends. *Their* opinions—even that of Eliphaz, an opinion which was "in keeping with the opinion of our Law"—are now called by the wise and superior Elihu "senile drivel" (494).

Here, for the second time, Maimonides reminds us that he is twisting the biblical story to fit his earlier categorization of the views on providence: if one reads the story, one "wonders" and thinks the speeches are repetitious, neither intellectual nor much differentiated from each other (495, cf. 491). But this is not the case, Maimonides assures us. In fact, Elihu adds the notion of the resurrection of the dead based on virtue. A man may be "raised from his fall ... saved and restored to the best of states ... two or three times" (495). Maimonides alters the biblical citation of Job 42:6 to better emphasize the transcendence of mortality. He also twists Elihu's reference to the death of kings and nobles and wealthy men,

calling this one of many "subjects belonging to the circumstances of animals" (495). The hope to overcome animality lingers.

By the end of the chapter, it becomes clear that the upshot of—even the "foundation" for—the faith in providence is the claim that the use of the words *providence*, *governance*, *act*, and *purpose* are purely equivocal when it comes to God. His providence has nothing in common with our notion of the term. We can understand nothing about it, and it is "obligatory to stop at this point and to believe that nothing is hidden from Him" (496). One must not seek reasons or understanding here, but merely believe. If man knows that God's providence has nothing in common with our notion of providence, and is thus radically inexplicable, "every misfortune will be borne lightly by him. And misfortunes will not *add* to his doubts regarding the deity ... but will, on the contrary, add to his *love*" (497, emphases added). The character of this love is left ambiguous: is it fiery? Cool? Directed toward the deity, or toward the beings, which are the only source of knowledge? Perhaps the "inference to be drawn from natural matters" is the same inference Aristotle drew (against a certain type of divine intervention, cf. 466). Perhaps some principles of the Law become "safe" (476) not by becoming certain but by becoming in a sense non-threatening.

LOVE AND FEAR

Maimonides ends the section on providence, and sets up the section on Law, with the enigmatic chapter 24, which introduces a sudden host of questions with its paragraph on the fear and love of the Lord.

As a whole, chapter 24 offers an explanation of the subject of Trial, attempting to explain away the tension between an omniscient God to Whom no new knowledge ever comes (480) and the Bible's ostensible claim that certain hardships were necessary in order that God *discover* human beings' love or fear of Him. "Now I will resolve all these difficulties for you," says Maimonides; he then claims that the aim of each of the "trials" referenced in the Bible was simply to publicize proper action or belief for the masses, and "not: in order that God should know that, for He already knew it" (498). Maimonides makes good on his promise to resolve all difficulties, but his interpretation is, to say the least, tenuous.

The story of Abraham's near-sacrifice of Isaac serves to publicize a special lesson: "the limit of *love* for God, may He be exalted, and *fear* of Him—that is, up to what limit they must

reach" (500). Abraham proved his righteousness by overcoming his love for his son because of the strength of "his fear of [God], who should be exalted, and because of his love to carry out His command" (500–501).[4] But already Maimonides has slipped or shied away from claiming that love *of God* motivated Abraham; it was fear of God, but love *to carry out His command*. Maimonides next emphasizes Abraham's cool calculation and lack of passion, before reaffirming that one of his motives was love of God (501). Maimonides claims that Abraham was not motivated by fear of punishment or personal harm; yet we must wonder what other shape the fear of God might take. Is not all fear in some way specific and personal?

Abraham attempted to kill Isaac "solely because of what is incumbent on the Adamites—namely, to love Him and fear Him" (501). If we set aside the odd character of a love emerging out of duty, the end of this paragraph leaves us with two questions. First, why was it so necessary that Abraham actually attempt to kill his son? The angel tells him, "*For now I know that thou fearest* God: meaning that through the act because of which the term *fearing God* is applied to you, all the Adamites will know what the limits of *the fear of the Lord* are" (501). But the main problem of the chapter re-emerges: why was the *act* required for the angels or for God to understand Abraham's inner character? And if the act was solely important for publicity, in order that the Adamites learn something, then why was that aim so important? Isn't true virtue simply the self-sufficient apprehension of God, an apprehension perhaps understood as (or at least evidenced by) love and fear of Him?

The second problem appears when the word love drops out altogether: the Torah itself mentions that "the final end of the whole of the *Torah*, including its commandments, prohibitions, promises, and narratives, is *one* thing only—namely, fear of Him" (501, emphasis added). What has happened to love? Is the love of God somehow a subset or byproduct of fear? Or does the Law not aim at love? Can a Law that aims only at fear be a Law that helps one overcome animality and matter, by obtaining what had seemed to be the one truly human virtue—the intellectual apprehension which provides providential protection? Isn't fear a passion of *embodied* beings? How can becoming extremely fearful

[4] Maimonides imports love into the story of the binding; the Bible speaks only of fear. The only love mentioned is Abraham's love for Isaac, which must be righteously overcome. Regarding the solidity of Maimonides's case in favor of the biblical emphasis on love, consider also Lerner, *Maimonides' Empire of Light*, 74.

make a man the *likeness* of God (434, 471) and enable him to achieve intellectual union with the divine? Can love and fear truly coincide? All these questions must weigh on Joseph as Maimonides turns to the section on the Law.

APPREHENSION AND LAW

Chapter 25 divides actions into four classes and asserts that the actions of God must all be noble, defined for the purposes of Law as "useful." Those who would forbid the ascription of reasons to God's actions (in favor of sheer willfulness) are dismissed. The latter half of the chapter claims a great kinship or even equivalence between the philosophic view and the Jewish view. Both views claim that God wills only what is possible, wills only what is wise, and acts in an unimpeded way: "This is the opinion of all those that adhere to the Law and also the opinion of the philosophers, and it is also our own opinion" (505). Maimonides here seems to separate himself from both the first and the second group. Further, it becomes clear that the philosophic view and the view of the Law are not, in fact, quite so compatible. The prophets "explicitly stated" that "the particulars of natural acts are all well arranged and ordered and bound up with one another, all of them being causes and effects." Maimonides's evidence for this is simply the line, "How manifold are Thy works, O Lord! In wisdom hast Thou made them all" (505). Yet is such an amalgamation of views tenable? We find that the whole of the Torah is "founded" upon the belief in God's wisdom, but perhaps especially upon the inscrutability of that wisdom: "We are ignorant of many of the ways in which wisdom is found in His works" (506). It is not clear that the philosophers would assume—without making an effort to challenge—the unintelligibility of nature.

Neither is it clear that the believer himself can hold such a stance when it comes to a specific subset of God's works, namely the Law. Accordingly, chapter 26 shifts its language: "all the Laws have a cause, though we ignore the causes for *some* of them and we do not know the manner in which they conform to wisdom" (507, emphasis added). Many of God's works were inexplicable, but only some of His laws. The laws cannot be quite so mysterious, for they must guide us in life.[5] Though the objections to a rationalist inquiry into the Law

[5] Late in the section on the Law, we find that this distinction between *many* inscrutable works and *some* inscrutable laws has at some point broken down: "what is hidden from us in both classes [both the created things and the commandments] is much more considerable than what is manifest" (605–606).

grow more vocal in this chapter, Maimonides presses onward. The proper playing field for a conversation between piety and philosophy seems to be the Law rather than the world of events, for every event can be understood, through reinterpretation or creative pairing with other events, as providentially designed or guided. Providence may be non-falsifiable, especially with the escape hatch of inscrutability; but that escape hatch is much smaller in the case of the Law, which must claim to direct human life in a wise and somewhat intelligible manner.

Man and Society

Chapter 27 announces the aims of the Law. The chapter's focal point, however, shifts like a pendulum from society, to the individual, then back to society, along the way crystallizing certain problems for the Law.

The Law aims at both the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body. But the welfare of the soul consists in the *multitude's* "acquiring correct opinions according to their respective capacity." If the multitude's nature does not suffice for "apprehending that subject matter as it is," will the opinions still be correct? Will not the apprehension of the elite, especially, be poorly led—or even misled—by parables directed at the multitude?

The welfare of the body consists in (1) the abolition of mutual wrongdoing, and (2) the acquisition of moral qualities useful for life in society. One might guess that the first aim is more negative (centered on avoidance of the bad), while the second aim is more positive (seeking a good)—and yet the *first* aim is "tantamount to every individual among the people not being permitted to act according to his will and up to the limits of his power, but *being forced to do that which is useful to the whole*" (510, emphasis added). Does the abolition of mutual wrongdoing itself include devotion to the common good? Or is it simply that, from the perspective of the Law, the absence of an effort devoted to the common good is in itself a wrong? If the aim of abolishing mutual wrongdoing is more positively-directed than it might first appear, then perhaps the aim of encouraging moral qualities is more negatively-directed than it might first appear. In any event, the moral qualities are a subset of the welfare of the body. And if the opinions useful to society are not correct but rather necessary for the welfare of the body, does the Law put the higher (thought) in service of the lower (bodily welfare) (cf. 275, 458)?

Here Maimonides begins to shift to the individual's good as a focal point. The soul's welfare is now said to be "the procuring of correct opinions" simply. And yet the welfare of the body is "prior in nature and in time"; the welfare of the soul can only be achieved *after* the achievement of the welfare of the body, which is more "certain." One wonders if the welfare of the body (which requires that *every* individual—even every child constantly arriving on the scene—should be made tame and/or moral) will ever be accomplished fully, so that the Law can finally move on to the second and less certain aim. The shift into a focus on the individual gathers steam. Health and necessities, such as food, become the primary meaning of the bodily "perfection" (née welfare). The multitude are left behind, and the individual *uses* the political community for the procuring of *necessities* as a mere stepping stone in order to obtain his "ultimate perfection," to which "there do not belong either actions or moral qualities" (511). It is clear that, in Maimonides's view, although the first perfection must be achieved before the second, many aspects of the first are in fact cast off by the perfect individual after (or in) his quest to achieve the second. At this stage, the aspects of bodily perfection are reduced to a bare minimum: the avoidance of pain, hunger, thirst, heat, and cold. This intellectual perfection is "the only cause of permanent preservation" (511). Abruptly, Joseph's hopes for immortality are rekindled. But how to get there? How exactly can one become perfect?

Just as one begins to wonder how this account of the true perfection, which involves no actions, can apply to a lawgiving prophet, Maimonides pointedly mentions Moses and descends back into the social perspective. The Law of Moses brings us both perfections, assumedly those of the soul and the body, but these perfections are relabeled or redefined as the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing (moral qualities drop out) and the "acquisition of a noble and excellent character." No mention is made of correct opinions. In a moment "sound beliefs" and "the giving of correct opinions" will be lumped in with the first perfection; again, the higher appears to serve the lower.

Here an ambiguity arises: through the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing and the inculcation of noble character, "the preservation of the *population of the country* and *their* permanent existence in the same order become possible" (511). At this, the reader must be taken aback. Whose "permanent preservation" were we talking about just a moment ago? Was it not the perfect individual's? Or was his intellectual perfection merely "the cause of"

the multitude's permanent preservation, through proper lawgiving? Does intellectual perfection not provide the thinker himself with immortality? The ambiguity grows, as fear of the Lord (and not love) is emphasized: we are commanded to follow the statutes and to fear the Lord "for our good always, that He might preserve us alive" (511). This sounds once again like personal immortality, but the first-person plural pronouns are ambiguous: *our* good as a community, or *our* good as individuals? Maimonides quickly quotes the sages, who shift the focus slightly to the preservation of the world; he then shifts the quotation even further in this direction. His own interpretation seems to take "for our good always" to mean "the attainment of *a world in which everything is well and [the whole of which is] long.* And this is lasting life" (512). Corporeal preservation, meanwhile, only lasts a "certain duration." Maimonides thus renders extremely ambiguous the promise of personal immortality. And yet chapters 17 and 18 had claimed that providential protection and immortality were only warranted by intellectual perfection, a perfection that (as the beginning of chapter 27 claimed) is unattainable for the multitude. How can the preservation of society be warranted by the intellectual perfection of a single man? Does he devote himself to the common good without any personal reward? Wouldn't Maimonides call that a case of the high serving the low? Does society in a sense take advantage of this perfect man? At this point the reader must be disoriented, given the arc of the chapter. After beginning with a focus on society and the multitude, Maimonides swung the pendulum toward a promise of individual perfection and immortality, only to swing back in the other direction.

Necessary and Correct Opinions

Chapter 28 lowers the reader's expectations further. At first, a clean differentiation is made between correct and necessary opinions. The Law only communicates the former in a "summary way." It "also" communicates necessary opinions, which are assumedly incorrect; among them is listed the fear of God. The love of God, on the other hand, is a preserve of the very tiny philosophic elite who are capable of grasping "the whole of being as it is" (512). The love the many feel for God is not "valid," for it is not founded upon this apprehension.

As a whole, chapter 28 pendulums back and forth between differentiating and conflating necessary and correct beliefs. After the strong initial differentiation, we then find the phrase "*other* correct opinions" immediately after what seemed to be necessary yet false opinions—

implying that those opinions were not false after all (512). Eventually, the necessary opinions come to be labeled correct, though some of them (fishily) ought not to be believed on account of themselves but on account of their usefulness in abolishing reciprocal wrongdoing or inculcating morality (513). The necessary and the useful are conflated twice more—Maimonides references "an opinion" and "a belief" without mentioning the multiple classes within these general terms—before they are strongly differentiated once more at the chapter's close: the commandments are indubitably related "*either* to the welfare of a belief *or* to the welfare of the conditions of the city" (513, emphases added); *"In some cases* a commandment communicates a correct belief, which is the one and only thing aimed at ... *In other cases* the belief is necessary" (514, emphases added). By swinging the pendulum in this way, from differentiation to conflation and back, Maimonides (1) mirrors and inverts the movement of the preceding chapter, which moved from the perspective of the multitude to that of the elite and back, and (2) perhaps mirrors the ambiguity of Law itself, which is less sure (yet must always claim to be sure) about the truth of the opinions it teaches than about their necessity.

Chapter 29 depicts the origins of the Jewish Law as a reaction against ancient Sabian ways. Midway through the chapter, Maimonides reminds the reader that "to come near to this true deity and to obtain His good will ... the only [things needed are] *love of Him and fear of Him* and nothing else" (518). If only the Law can guide the reader toward these passions, intellectual proximity to or union with God (which enable providential protection and immortality) can be achieved. And yet the previous chapter had implied that the fear of God, or at least fear consequent upon the belief in God's anger, was one of the necessary yet *false* beliefs. Can the Law simultaneously direct one toward false and true beliefs? Does the Law aim at love as much as it aims at fear?

In this chapter, Maimonides begins to use the tactic of elitism in a new way. In previous chapters, he had used elitism as a controllable valve allowing in greater or lesser hope for eternal life. In this chapter, he uses elitism to turn the reader against aspects of his own tradition. First, he insults the reader, by warning him that he must "take great care not to be confused" by believing the story the Sabians tell about Adam—even though it turns out that it takes "very little reflection" to see that this story is "absurd" (520). After wounding the reader's pride for a moment, Maimonides flatters him: "a man like you does not have to

have his attention drawn to this point." Warnings are only necessary for "inexperienced people" or "the multitude" who "frequently incline to regarding fables as the truth" (520). With this one-two punch of insult and flattery, Maimonides wounds (so as to spring-load) then boosts the reader's ego in the direction of elitism. But this elitism is itself a twofold trap.

First, if an elite man like the reader needs no warnings to avoid believing in Sabian "ravings," then the Law, being a contrarian effort to wipe out those beliefs (521), is emphatically not directed toward the reader. The stories of the Torah are designed for the sake of the multitude, people apparently foolish enough to believe in easily recognized absurdities. Can such a contrarian Law aim at correct apprehension and love, or must it mislead the elite in its efforts to guide, or prevent the slippage of, the multitude?

Second, elitism becomes a trap in that it forces Joseph to see his own law through the lens of contemptuous skepticism. By hinting repeatedly that the Sabian beliefs are not so different from those of the Jews—they believed, for instance, in a branch that writhed like a snake when thrown to the ground (519), and in a tree so unnatural that fire could not burn it (516)—Maimonides forces upon the reader a certain skepticism about his own tradition. The Sabians could believe in "notions to which the souls of the vulgar incline and by which they are captivated," "extraordinary ravings laughed at by the intelligent" (519), because "these were the religious beliefs upon which they were brought up" (519). Once appearing in a foreign guise, unprotected by the love of one's own, traditional beliefs may seem less credible. The reader is prevented from re-embracing his own beliefs by his new attachment to the elitism Maimonides has foisted upon him. Once again, the stakes are high: either follow Maimonides toward providential protection or become one of the rabble.

Law as a Mere Means

But in chapters 31 and 32, the reader rebels. Thinking of the Law as a mere means has created a "sickness in his soul," for multiple reasons. First, to think of the Law merely as something "useful in this existence" (524) denies the possibility that the very inexplicability of the Law points to a life beyond this one. Second, if seeking reasons for the Law culminates in the view that the Law was designed for the multitude, rather than for correct apprehension, the reader would rather claim that the Law has no reasons at all or is entirely inexplicable than come to see the Law as bad for him personally. Third, as Maimonides makes clear

repeatedly, much of the Law was only useful "in those times" when Sabian ways existed. Now that the Law has "effaced" even the memory of idolatry and "firmly established" the foundations of the Jewish faith, much of the Law is no longer necessary. Maimonides's claim that the Law is a wily and gracious ruse "similar" to the wily design of our anatomy points to the problem: the Law is similar, but not the same, for the useful features and habits of our bodies either remain useful or are in most cases discarded. Tendons continue to move limbs, and effectively so; but babies only breastfeed "*until* their limbs gradually and little by little become dry and solid" (525, emphasis added). In the context of this analogy, the thought of *permanent* attachment—of continued adherence to a Law designed to conquer problems conquered long ago—must create an image in the reader's mind partly responsible for his "feeling of repugnance toward this notion" (527). Fourth, why would God give us a Law meant to *wean* us off Sabian practices rather than "procuring in us the capacity to accept" his first intention? But Maimonides takes this objection by the reader and expands it into a critique of law as such. Law itself is a ruse (528). Why would God not simply intervene, giving us the capacity to believe in the correct opinions and to perform the proper actions? Why does He need a Law (with rewards and punishments) at all?

Maimonides's answer to his own broadened version of the objection is unsatisfying. First of all, the answer—that God "does not change at all the nature of human individuals by means of miracles" (529)—is circular, for the only reason God "has never willed to do [this], nor shall He ever will it," is that such an intervention would render Law useless. In other words, Maimonides grounds the necessity for the Law on a principle itself grounded upon the assumed necessity of the Law. Second of all, the answer is false, as is pointed to by Maimonides's reference to Exodus merely a paragraph before. God *does* in fact change the nature of human individuals, as He did when He hardened the hearts of Pharaoh and the other Egyptians (Exodus 14).[6]

The reader must be confused by this lack of a real response as to why God would need a ruse to carry out His first intention. Also confusing, however, is the lack of clarity as to what

[6] Compare the Book of Mormon's version of the relevant passages: "The Joseph Smith Translation reports 'And Pharaoh hardened his heart, that he hearkened not unto them.' (JST, Ex. 7:13.) In fact, the translation is corrected systematically in all nine occurrences in this particular context. (See JST, Ex. 4:21; JST, Ex. 7:13; JST, Ex. 9:12; JST, Ex. 10:1, 20, 27; JST, Ex. 11:10; JST, Ex. 14:8, 17)" (George Horton, "Insights into Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy," *BYU Religious Studies Center*).

the first intention *is*—especially since ignorance regarding the first intention, and inability to distinguish it from the second intention, are worthy of blame (531). Initially, the first intention is "the apprehension of Him, may He be exalted, and the rejection of *idolatry*" (527). Then the first intention becomes "proper belief" which arises out of practices (528). Then suddenly practices become *part of* the first intention, which is: "that we should believe in this Law and that we should perform the actions prescribed by it" (528). Then, just after actions have seeped into the first intention rather than being merely a means to it, they quietly go away again: the sacrifices "pertain to a second intention, whereas invocation, prayer, and similar practices and modes of worship *come closer* to the first intention and are *necessary for its achievement*" (529, emphases added). Here, the practices are apparently not a part of the first intention. The first intention "consists only in your apprehending Me and not worshipping someone other than Me" (530). The negative goal (from the first definition, which was twofold) comes back in, but correct apprehension seems once again primary.

But only a paragraph later, the focus on actions returns, only to dissolve into its surroundings: suddenly, the *abolition of mutual wrongdoing* "is, as we have explained, the first intention: I mean the belief in correct opinions, namely, in the creation of the world in time" (531). Proper action is equated with or turned into correct opinion, and then correct opinion is limited to the belief in the creation of the world in time. But immediately the actions come back in, persistent as ever: "Besides the correctness of the beliefs, the intention also included the abolition of mutual wrongdoing among men" (531).

By wavering so frequently, Maimonides points to a tension between the Law's claims and its true focus. The Law claims to convey correct opinions, and yet it must perhaps focus on actions, harm, and wrongdoing above all else: even when the most effective way to control actions, harm, and wrongdoing involves the propagation of false yet necessary opinions. The reader must long for a Law that aims solely at correct apprehension, as this is his ticket to providential protection; but the focus on actions continually returns. Earlier in the chapter, Maimonides had referenced "a prophet in these times who, calling upon the people to worship God, would say: 'God has given you a Law forbidding you to pray to Him, to fast, to call upon Him for help in misfortune. Your worship should consist solely in meditation without any works at all'" (526). Given the fact that Maimonides (1) has refuted the (instantaneous) response of God to the prayers of the wronged (514), (2) has claimed that

true perfection involves no actions (511), and (3) has claimed that he himself has, at times, gained access to "something similar" to prophetic revelation (488), we might assume that the mention of this hypothetical modern-day prophet is in fact a subtle cameo by Maimonides himself. But if it is true that the Law inevitably focuses on actions in addition to, at the expense of, or instead of correct apprehension, how can it lead to intellectual union with God? Is Maimonides himself employing a gracious ruse, causing Joseph to wander in the desert of perplexity until his soul becomes courageous (528) enough for the truth?[7]

Chapter 33 drops the subject of courage in favor of the Law's perspective, which seems to favor "gentleness and docility; man should not be hard and rough, but responsive, obedient, acquiescent, and docile" (532). We are led to wonder if the Law must focus on the lowest common denominator. For in the first place, the Law must use extreme measures to combat the unrestrained nature of the multitude. "The ignorant" follow their desires, and "the ignoramus regards pleasure alone as the end to be sought for its own sake. *Therefore* God [gave us laws that] *destroy* this end and turn thought away from it in *every* way. He forbids *everything* that leads to lusts and to mere pleasure" (532, emphases added). Such measures, which respond to the deficiencies of the vulgar, may be unnecessarily and even harmfully extreme for the naturally moderate. As chapter 34 will state more plainly, the pursuit of general utility may produce damages to individuals: "only the universal interests, those of the majority," are considered in statutes. Unlike medical treatment, the Law is not particularized for different individuals (534). And in the second place, the Law in Maimonides's presentation seems to do even its self-appointed task somewhat crudely. Although the Law claims to purify the inner before the outer, the Law's "first purpose is to

[7] Why would a writer deliberately choose as his addressee a person with significant limitations? As Strauss suggests, Maimonides's choice of Joseph as his primary addressee functions as a kind of formal constraint forcing or enabling him to write in a moderate manner, while allowing other possible addressees to "overhear" and ponder his words (see Strauss, "How to Begin to Study *The Guide of the Perplexed*," 502, 508–509). See also "The Literary Character of *The Guide of the Perplexed*," where Strauss writes that "the method employed by Maimonides in the *Guide* may come as near as is humanly possible to the method of oral teaching" (353), as well as Lerner: "One is well advised to think and speak of Maimonides' audiences in the plural. Only rarely does Maimonides limit his concern to the one whom he is ostensibly addressing" (*Maimonides' Empire of Light*, 5). See Lerner, "Averroes and Maimonides in Defense of Philosophizing," in *The Trias of Maimonides*, ed. Georges Tamer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 230–31, as well as Lerner, *Naïve Readings: Reveilles Political and Philosophic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2016, 184. Given this complex method of writing or teaching, interpretation of the text becomes more complicated; if the *Guide* is somehow "a substitute for conversations or speeches," then "producing a clear statement of the author … is tantamount to raising a question; his answer can be ascertained only by a lengthy discussion, the result of which may again be open, and is intended to be open, to new 'difficulties'" (Strauss, "The Literary Character of *The Guide*," 352–53). For a further description of Maimonides's goals with Joseph, consider Parens, *Maimonides and Spinoza*, 25, 187.

restrain desire" (533). Can mere restraint truly be said to be a "purification of the inner" (533)? Or is the Law again primarily concerned with outward actions rather than inner opinions or dispositions?

The First Inversion of Causality: Action and Thought

Chapter 34 represents a low-water mark for the reader; the Law seems a poor guide toward knowledge. But chapter 35 revives the reader's optimism. By dividing the commandments into fourteen categories, Maimonides gives the reader hope that he can at least retain devotion to the Law on a class-by-class basis. He might focus less on those classes that are useful mainly for the restraint of harmful actions and more on the classes that aim at an elite relationship between man and God. By carving up the commandments, Maimonides himself may help the Law overcome its problematic one-size-fits-all character. More hopeful still, it turns out that only classes five, six, seven, and "a portion of the third" are directed at relations between men, while "all the other classes deal with the relation between man and God" (538). One wonders if Maimonides is not exaggerating here—how is it that even the fourth class, which "comprises the commandments concerned with giving alms, lending, bestowal of gifts, ... [commandments] equally useful in turn to all men" (536), is in fact exclusively concerned with the relationship between man and God, and has a bearing on the relations between man and man "only after many intermediate steps and through comprehensive considerations" (538)? By downplaying the social utility of Law, Maimonides spurs the reader to believe that the Law can direct him toward something noble and exalted.

Accordingly, chapter 36 begins on a hopeful note. The Law seems to understand that "if knowledge is not achieved, no right action and no correct opinion can be achieved" (539). The commandments comprised in the first class "are the opinions that we have enumerated in *Laws of the Foundations of the Torah"* (539). If the commandments are the correct opinions, this class aims directly at intellectual apprehension. But how can commandments *be* opinions? In a moment Maimonides alters the verb: the commandments in this class demand actions, which in turn "necessitate" beliefs. This is still fairly reassuring (though the terms "knowledge" and "opinion" seem to have dropped out, in favor of "beliefs"). Yet how exactly do actions necessitate beliefs? How does fasting, for instance, or the avoidance of swearing in vain, implant proper and specific knowledge into minds? The verb then changes

again: actions "firmly establish" correct opinions. But how? By the end of the chapter, the claim is that a set of commanded actions "are meant to establish this correct and very useful opinion" (540).

This gradual slippage of certainty brings slowly into focus the ambiguous relation between action and thought. The Law hopes to regulate not only the outer, but also the inner. But it has control over only the outer. It can only mandate and punish what is visible. So it must claim to control and implant thoughts through the control of actions. But actions cannot truly cause thoughts with any great certainty. (At best, habitual actions can create prejudices in favor of the general assumptions that underlie them; at worst, the actions will be rote and meaningless.) In fact, the certainty or necessity may be much greater going the *opposite* direction: from thoughts to actions, rather than from actions to thoughts. Accordingly, Maimonides mentions that the belief that events occur by chance "contributes to *necessitating* their persistence in their corrupt opinions and unrighteous actions" (540, emphasis added). And later: "an individual cannot but sin and err, either through *ignorance*—by professing an opinion or a moral quality that is not preferable in truth—or else because he is *overcome* by desire or anger" (540, emphases added). The connection between ignorance and being overcome, between opinion and desire, may be closer than Maimonides lets on. But the Law must not give credence to this direction of necessitation. In fact, it replies to those with incorrect opinions about chance, "I shall add for you unto this supposed chance its most grievous and cruel portion" (539). To admit that opinions cause actions with greater necessity than actions cause opinions—to admit what is perhaps the natural direction of causality—might cast into some doubt the effectiveness or the premises of the Law.

These would seem to be enough sources of perplexity for one chapter, but Maimonides adds another: by stressing the "utility" of veneration (539), and by later mentioning how "very useful" is the opinion that one may repent and thus be divested of sins (540), Maimonides calls the truth of these opinions into question. This is especially true given the fact that he has shown himself to be in the habit of, at times, conflating utility with truth, and, at other times, associating utility with falsehood. To stress the usefulness of veneration and repentance is to unnerve the reader. If they are so useful, can we be sure they are true? This effect, in fact, may begin to call Maimonides's enterprise here into question. Is it not a bit impious from the outset to attempt such a *dissection* of the Law? Is there not a tension

between reverence and utility-seeking? In other words, can a Law still be exalted once its usefulness (or, worse still, ineffectiveness) is unveiled? Perhaps Maimonides casts doubt on the Law precisely by attempting a sincerely rationalist defense of it. Perhaps those who sought to leave undisturbed a thick barrier of inexplicability around the Law were not as dismissible as Maimonides earlier implied.

Chapter 37 continues the theme of the Law's apparent inversion of natural causality, as seen when one Law confronts another. The Jewish Law, confronting the customs of the Sabians, forbids the grafting of one tree upon another "so that we shall keep far away from the causes of idolatry" (548). At first, then, the Law seems to understand that the causes of idolatry are beliefs—i.e., that opinions are primary, and lead to the actions of star worship—but that it must attempt, somewhat crudely, to legislate belief by forbidding certain associated actions. But soon the Law appears to slip into the error of the multitude, who "often believe that accidental matters are essential causes" (545). By the end of the chapter, the Law is forbidding Amorite usages "because of their *leading* to idolatry" (549), i.e., forbidding customs "because they *lead to* idolatry, as we have explained" (550, emphasis added). The Law, not content with admitting that it must support true belief or inner virtue only roughly, through the legislation of actions, instead begins to claim that the outward actions it can legislate are themselves the *causes* of inner virtues, vices, and beliefs. Two new problems emerge here.

First, the Law seems to overreach, banning *all* actions even remotely associated with the beliefs it seeks to negate. In seeking to turn people "to another direction far away" from the idolaters, the Law commands burning *all* things related to the sowing of barley with grapes: "For all the customs of the nations that were thought to have occult properties were prohibited, even if they did not at all smack of idolatry" (549). The Law commands that "everything produced by a tree in this course of three years whose fruits are edible should be burnt" (547). The Law forbids mingling of *all* diverse species, "*I mean* the grafting of one tree upon another" (548, emphasis added). By combating specific practices with general and eternal prohibitions, the Law threatens to become outdated as associations change. New actions may come to be associated with impious beliefs, while the old actions become

innocent, and yet the Law is still categorically forbidding the eating of certain edible fruits; thus the ancestral Law becomes "*chains about thy neck*" (544; Proverbs 1:9).[8]

Second, the Law ultimately conveys the idea that actions, and not thoughts, are the locus of good and bad. Although thoughts may be the real or deeper problem, the Law, since it can only legislate the outer, tends to claim that the outer is more important, and is even a cause of the inner. Can the Law then succeed in guiding one to correct intellectual apprehension? Can it avoid misleading the elite?

The Second Inversion of Causality: Damage and Character

Chapters 40 and 41 depict a new facet of the Law's inversion of natural causality: that which emerges with the Law's effort to punish. Chapter 40 begins by differentiating "acts of injustice" and "acts causing damage" (555). Which is the Law's top priority? At first, the Law seems mainly concerned with preventing damage, i.e., harm or injury, but Maimonides promises that these laws also "*contain* considerations of justice to which I *will* draw attention" (555, emphases added). But the Law's method of preventing injury is somewhat troubling: we are "held" responsible "so that" we will change our actions. It becomes clear that in this chapter, Maimonides is presenting a utilitarian and rationalist account of the Law. The Law's priority does not seem to be justice, if justice is understood as the punishment and prevention of vice in the soul, but only social utility. Men may be considered "free from responsibility" solely because an act happens to be one that "seldom" causes damage. But why would the culprit's guilt increase with the harm of the negligence, or with the typical frequency of such acts? A perfectly virtuous man may be responsible for half the damage caused by an animal he owns (555), and yet certain vices may be largely overlooked because they "concern only thoughts" (556). Returning lost things is "useful because there is reciprocity" (556). Rather than aiming at correction or virtue, the Law acquiesces to and "works with" the passions of the multitude, such as anger and schadenfreude, aiming at "calming the soul of the revenger of blood" (556) and assuming that it is human nature that men find "consolation in the fact that someone else has been stricken by a similar misfortune or by one that is greater" (557).

[8] See Strauss, "How to Begin to Study *The Guide of the Perplexed*," 506, 506n13, on Maimonides's view of rational commandments or prohibitions.

Chapter 41 intensifies the tension between a concern with injustice and a concern with harm. It begins with a glimmer of hope for the reader: in the case of murder, "necessarily there must be a soul for a soul ... For among the crimes of man there is none greater than this" (558). Here the Law seems to be responding to some natural and eternal truth about desert. But then the Law seems to leave behind a concern for true justice (understood as giving what is deserved) or virtue to focus on social utility. The "more frequent the crime is and the easier it is to commit, the greater the penalty for it must be, *so that* one should refrain from it. On the other hand, the penalty for a thing that happens seldom is lighter" (559, emphasis added). But these concerns are extrinsic to the wrongdoer's character. For a moment the law seems to care about wish or intent (559), but it quickly veers back into a focus on harm: penalties must increase in direct correlation with the greatness of the crime (understood only as "harm"), the frequency of the crime's occurrence, the strength of the incitement, and the "ease with which the action can be committed in secret" (560). To punish vices which consist in "words only" or that "result in little damage" would be crazy: "people would have their backs flogged all the time" (561). The Law does not care about those vices. For a moment, again, the Law seems concerned with intent or virtue of soul (when it comes to errors by decision-makers on points of Law), but it turns out that this focus, too, is determined by social utility. Members of the Great Court of Law must be "held" to have been mistaken inadvertently (564), presumably to enshrine their authority.

But abruptly the Law begins to attempt a true focus on souls rather than harms. Suddenly, its old criteria are inverted. Now, punishments must *decrease* in severity when it comes to crimes committed easily or frequently (564–65). Sex with a betrothed bondmaid "is regarded as a light matter because it occurs often" (565). Great temptations now call for leniency rather than severity.

It seems that the Law has two concerns: a concern for social utility (and damage), and a concern for individual virtues and vices of soul. One might think the latter emerged out of the former, and that, since vices often lead to harms, virtue and vice cannot be ignored. Yet this concern for souls cannot be fully embraced either, as the Law has neither the ability nor the inclination to concern itself with vices that do not cause harms.

The Law claims to assimilate itself to, or to perfect, what is natural (571). Yet does the severity of a given punishment in fact match properly the intrinsic guilt of a given crime, or

is that severity the result of the Law's seeking social utility and codifying what brings it about? The degree to which individuals are "held responsible"—Maimonides's new favorite refrain—for their crimes, and punished, seems to be determined by the damage and typical frequency of those crimes. A Law concerned with souls would, Maimonides implies, be more lenient toward crimes with strong incitements. But the Law, insofar as it is primarily concerned with social utility, must at times take the opposite tack. Harmful deeds flow from dispositions, and yet the law must claim that the character of a person's soul is *determined by* the harm (or benefit) their actions cause. It must call the effect (deed) the cause, and the cause (disposition) the effect. The unveiling of the usefulness of the punishments enforced by the law may shed light on the question of their origin, as divine or conventional (cf. 590 with 566 on the "divine estimation of penalties ... as He, may He be exalted, has made clear: *According to his wickedness*").

In these two chapters, Maimonides presents (for the most part) a rationalist vision of Law as concerned primarily with social utility. To do so, he must in fact twist the Bible, reinterpreting the explicit punishment of beasts (556, 557) and whitewashing the concepts of bloodguiltiness (557), pollution (558), and 'movable' as well as inadvertent sin (563, cf. 591 with 597). For instance, the breaking of a heifer's neck to atone for the "bloodguiltiness" of an unsolved murder is explained by Maimonides as an effort to discover the identity of the real killer by gathering people together. In reinterpreting every commandment as strictly rational and utilitarian, Maimonides raises the question whether the Law aims at the good of individuals, particularly individuals like Joseph. Are its precepts dictated by social utility, rather than by individual virtue? But if Joseph seeks to disagree with Maimonides's rationalist utilitarian account—if he seeks to embrace the traditional law as good for him, as aiming at virtue and justice—he must embrace, on their original grounds, all the precepts Maimonides has reinterpreted as rational and utilitarian. In other words, he must accept as correct and exalted the "absurd" punishment of beasts (556) and the idea that a raped woman has "no sin *worthy of death*"—rather than, as Maimonides would have it, "no sin whatever" (563). But this re-embrace of tradition has been blocked by the lens of skepticism Maimonides put over the reader's eyes in chapter 29. In other words, the reader has only two choices: either embrace Maimonides's new account of a rational and utilitarian Law that will not be good for the reader personally but only for the welfare of the many; or, embracing tradition on its

own terms, believe in ideas akin to the Sabian notion that a wind passing over a menstruating woman can make a second individual unclean (595).

The Love of One's Own and the Problem of Justice

Chapter 42 seems to contradict part of the Jewish Law's claim to unbiased righteousness. Chapter 39 had claimed that the Law's "righteous statutes and judgments" promoted moral qualities that are "not moral qualities pertaining to the Pagans who considered pride and partisanship with regard to any chance individual, irrespective of his being the wrongdoer or the wronged, as praiseworthy virtues" (554). The Jewish Law is the embodiment of true and divine justice, which is post-partisan and objective.

And yet in chapter 42 we discover that this Law is still, emphatically, the *Jewish* Law: "man ought to take care of his relative and grant very strong preference to the bond of the womb. Even if his relative should do him an injustice and a wrong and should be extremely corrupt, he must nevertheless regard his kinsman with a protective eye" (569, cf. 601–602). The Law seems to allow inhumanity to foreigners; at the end of the previous chapter, the Law showed its "pity" and compassion for the women of enemy nations by allowing them the solace of weeping after being kidnapped and raped. The Law is presented as being concerned with virtue not for its own sake but rather as a means to social utility—understood emphatically (and necessarily) as the utility of *this* society.

A second yet related difficulty is revealed in chapter 43. One of the "pivots of the Law" is that merit, even the merit of the fathers, is rewarded, especially with prosperity and ease: the Jews go over "to dwell in richly ornamented houses in the best and most fertile place on earth, thanks to the benefaction of God and His promises to our fathers, inasmuch as they were perfect people in their opinions and in their moral character" (572). And yet Maimonides has stressed repeatedly, in previous chapters, that such a reward may undermine virtue. Previously, God's beneficence consisted in the granting of *hardship* as a means to courage, for it is well known that "life in the desert and lack of comforts for the body necessarily develop courage whereas the opposite circumstances necessarily develop cowardice" (528). And earlier: "prosperity does away with courage, whereas a hard life and fatigue necessarily produce courage—this being the *good* that, according to the story in question, will come *at their latter end"* (500, underlining added). The strange phrasing here

epitomizes the problem. Is courage a good, an end in itself? But then what about its reward? If the reward does away with courage, it destroys the greatest perfection or flourishing and is in fact a punishment. And yet, for the reward (not to exist, or) *not* to do away with courage may also seem objectionable. What is pointed to here by Maimonides is the difficult question of whether virtue is a means or rather an end in itself.

The Third Inversion of Causality: Action and Veneration

Chapters 45, 46, and 47 are three of the most far-reaching chapters in the *Guide*. In chapter 45's discussion of the temple and the sacrifices, Maimonides unveils "to what extent the Law fortifies the belief in the greatness of the *Sanctuary* and the awe felt for it" (577). What is aimed at "is that the Temple and its servants should be regarded as great by all" (579). The consistent refrain in chapters 45 and 46 becomes "in order that [X] be held in great esteem." Every action is undertaken in order to "induc[e] the belief that the anointed object is great, sanctified, and distinguished beyond other things" (580). Without the burning of incense in the sanctuary, the place would have smelled like a slaughterhouse (579). Without the washing of its intestines, the sacrifice would have been "regarded as repugnant and disgusting" (583).

Of course, all of this focus on the utility of causing things to be "held in great esteem" must stir in the reader an uncertain feeling that these actions (and the feelings in which they result) are in fact not natural but rather "imposed conventions" (590), i.e., that the sentiment of an uninitiated outside observer would in fact be closer to the truth. Maimonides's phrasing suggests another inversion of causality: Normally one treats something with veneration as a result of the opinion that it is venerable. The Law, inverting this, first demands the actions of veneration to *create* the belief that the revered thing is venerable. The Law seems in a sense to use the rational faculty against knowledge. The doer of commanded deeds, or the witness of the sanctuary's exalted treatment, assumes that there *must* be a reason that he and others treat this place with such respect. His rational faculty, seeking a cause, backfills a belief necessary for the legitimation or justification of the actions that he and others are already committing. This occurs on the basic assumption that the Law, which initially created reverence for itself, would not command something without grounds.

What applies to veneration and purity applies also to dirtiness and pollution. In chapter 47, it becomes clear that the Law uses what might be called "malleable uncleanness" in order

to ease or intensify feelings of sin whenever those feelings are less or more useful for society. Sacrifices of atonement "were commanded *so that* the deliberate transgressor should not think that he has not committed a great sin in rendering the Sanctuary of the Lord unclean; but on the other hand he will know that his sin has been atoned for by means of the he-goat" (596, emphasis added). As he did at the end of chapter 46, Maimonides here (at the end of chapter 47) intentionally allows his analysis to break down in order to call attention to certain features of the Law. He now claims to find certain practices inexplicable (597). The Law claims to respond to and assimilate itself to what is naturally or supernaturally true. It claims to enforce pre-existing, eternal truths about what is pure and venerable, polluted and unclean. And yet Maimonides's account raises questions about whether the Law's prescriptions are responses to nature or rather inventions based on social utility, and about whether the Law, which appears to be an effect of certain truths about the natural or supernatural world, is in fact the cause of those opinions.

Chapter 50, along with the end of chapter 49, summarizes what has been a questioning of the Law's ability to contribute to intellectual apprehension. The Law is in certain ways hidebound, caught up with curing "diseases, which today—thank God—we do not know anymore" (612). Through its allegiance to the multitude over the elite, the necessary over the correct, the Law falls short of guiding men to correct apprehension on account of its treatment of (1) mere means as ends in themselves, (2) action, harm, and benefit as the focal points of virtue, (3) partisanship as justice, and (4) veneration, purity, pollution, and guilt as intrinsic to the world rather than "imposed conventions" (590). Maimonides has cast doubt on the view that simply through Law man might become virtuous in a uniquely human way. Thus he concludes that the stories in the Torah are of necessary utility, either for minimizing social harm or for giving "a correct notion of an opinion that is a pillar of the Law" (613).

LOVE AND FEAR REVISITED

Chapter 51 serves as a culmination to Maimonides's depiction of providence. The chapter opens with a claim that it will not present anything new, but Maimonides subverts that claim even in the summary of the chapter's contents. This chapter will guide the reader toward the worship that is the end of man and make known to him "how providence watches over him

in this habitation until he is brought over to the *bundle of life*" (618), i.e., eternal life. Finally, the reader will gain direct access to immortality, or at least the road toward it.

Maimonides dives into his 'parable of the palace.' Furthest from God and providence are those with no doctrinal belief: "the status of those is like that of irrational animals" (618). Separation from God warrants being abandoned to chance and "devoured like the beasts" (626). Maimonides warns several times against the reliance on traditional authority, which will not lead into the palace of God. The multitude are merely "ignoramuses who observe the commandments" (619). The revealing of some new key to providence, beyond the Law, must be imminent.

At first it seems that through a certain sequence, we have reached the ruler's inner chambers. But then Maimonides pulls back, addressing the reader directly and with affection, and after returning inexplicably beyond the walls of the house, takes a *new* sequence or path inside. The old sequence was from believing true opinions based on traditional authority and studying the law (outside the habitation), to speculating "concerning the fundamental principles of religion" (in the antechambers), to achieving demonstration "to the extent that that is possible, of everything that may be demonstrated" and ascertaining "in divine matters, to the extent that that is possible, everything that may be ascertained" and coming "close to certainty in those matters in which one can only come close to it" ("in the inner part" of the habitation, with the ruler). The *new* sequence is from studying the mathematical sciences and the art of logic (outside the house searching for the gate) to understanding the natural things (in the antechambers) to having "achieved perfection in the natural things and [having] understood divine science" (with the ruler in one habitation, having entered "in the ruler's place *into the inner court*"). It seems there are not one but *two* paths into the ruler's chambers. The account presenting the second path is more personally directed toward Joseph. In the second path, mathematics and logic and science seem to replace the study of the law and the speculation concerning the principles of religion. The second path leads to greater apparent certainty regarding its final conclusions, while the first path culminates in a qualified (yet in some sense complete?) knowledge or understanding.[9]

[9] Compare Lerner, *Naïve Readings*, 215, on the possibility of "alternative paths toward perfection or, arguably, an identification of the two."

The first few sentences of the next paragraph introduce two ambiguities which endure throughout the rest of the chapter.

> There are those who set their thought to work after having attained perfection in the divine science, turn wholly toward God, may He be cherished and held sublime, renounce what is other than He, and direct all the acts of their intellect toward an examination of the beings with a view to drawing from them proof with regard to Him, so as to know His governance of them in whatever way it is possible. These people are those who are present in the ruler's council. This is the rank of the prophets (620).

First, why is it that after having renounced what is other than God, and having turned "wholly toward Him," these men direct their attention toward the beings? And why do they still need "proof with regard to Him" if they have attained perfection in the divine science? The same ambiguity continues throughout this paragraph and the next. Even "after they have achieved knowledge of Him," men "think of Him and of being with Him," as if they are not with Him or even close. David exhorted Solomon in his *endeavors* to apprehend and worship God *after* apprehension had been achieved (621). The bond between man and God is "made weaker and feebler if you busy your thought with what is other than He" (621). So why turn one's mind to the beings?

The explanation of this paradox perhaps comes into focus as Maimonides elaborates two contradictory types of worship as if they were merely two stages along the same path. The first and more perfect type considers the commandments to be "training," regards with scorn the rote and thoughtless mumbling of prayers without "reflecting either upon the meaning of that action or upon Him," and culminates in being always in the presence of God, but only through a conscious and rational effort to understand the beings, which are our only access to knowledge (485). The second path involves years of mechanical repetition of prayers—"you should empty your mind of everything"—and seems to culminate only in brief bedtime musings after days filled with preoccupation with worldly things (623). A dual message may in part explain the tension between a seemingly fruitless obsession with God and a rational inquiry into the beings. The former message is for the many: the subject of the chapter is "to confirm men in the intention to set their thought to work on God alone after they have achieved knowledge of Him" (620). The latter and quieter message involves a suggestion that

attempts to contemplate God directly are not promising or are merely imaginative, and that true knowledge will come only through contemplation of the beings.

The second problem of the cited passage is more difficult to resolve. How is it that men who renounce all that is other than God and turn their attention solely to the beings still have the time and desire to become prophets and legislators for the many? Does God still protect them when they turn their intellectual apprehension away from Him? After waffling a bit, Maimonides sticks with his original stance on providence: God in fact does abandon prophets to chance to whatever extent they empty their minds of Him and turn to legislation (625).

Here a final facet of Maimonides's use of elitism as a tactic becomes clear. By emphasizing the vulgarity of the masses throughout the *Guide*, Maimonides clarifies the problem of virtue. How can the high or most virtuous be put in the service of the low? Providential protection decreases "proportionate to the duration of the period of distraction or to the vileness of the matter with which he was occupied" (625). To call the many vile is to point toward the suggestion that the "disposition to be useful to people" (635) cannot be the aim or greatest fulfillment of life, especially if that activity makes the high "an instrument" for the welfare of the low. From the perspective of Maimonides's God, action and legislation are deficiencies when compared to contemplation, as we can see from the example of the withdrawal of providential protection from the prophets. The apprehension of God or the beings is an end in itself, and the commandments are training. Moses should have been "putting questions" to and "receiving answers" from God (620). But the Bible makes clear that Moses's apprehension was a *means* to legislation: "stand here by me, *that I may speak to you all the commandments"; "For I have known him, to the end that he may command"* (624; Genesis 18:19). For the Bible, apprehension is a means to Law. For Maimonides, Law is a stepping stone to apprehension, which is an end in itself.

By the end of chapter 51, the first problem of the cited passage, which had seemed resolvable, re-emerges with greater force. It becomes clear that we are dealing not only with two types of perfection or virtue, but with two types of love. The biblical love of God is in fact not, as Maimonides claims love must be (512, 621), consequent upon apprehension, but is rather passionate and even mindless, such that "no thought remains that is directed toward a thing other than the Beloved" (627). Under the spell of such passionate love, the soul leaves

the body and becomes eternal. At last, "salvation from death" is explicitly elaborated. And yet, to the disappointment of Joseph, such salvation has been reserved to three human beings in all of history, none of whom seems any longer philosophic.

Chapter 52 returns to the dichotomy of love and fear. Now that we have come to see that biblical love (as the passionate emptying of mind) and philosophic love (as apprehension of the beings grounded in wonder) are different, the king who always accompanies man is "the intellect" itself (629, cf. a foreshadowing of this at 620 bottom). The "end of the actions prescribed by the whole Law" is to bring about a single passion: fear. The end of the *opinions* taught by the Law is, on the contrary, love. But if the Law can only impart general opinions (through commanding habitual actions), and if the fear of God primarily takes the form of obedience to commandments which in certain ways impede love understood as apprehension, then one is led to consider the possibility of going beyond the Law and aiming directly at intellectual virtue, love as philosophic apprehension of the beings. The final chapter of the *Guide* reinforces this teaching. Most of the commandments serve no other end than the attainment of moral virtues, "but this species of perfection is likewise a preparation for something else and not an end in itself" (635). The true human perfection is "the acquisition of the rational virtues." The final pages of the *Guide* present us with a contradiction: (1) morality is the disposition to be useful to people, (2) what is truly great is intellectual apprehension, (3) namely, intellectual apprehension of God, (4) namely, of God's actions, (5) namely, of God's *moral* actions, His "judgment and righteousness"[10] (637).

The incoherence of this exoteric conclusion points us back two paragraphs, to the true final message of the *Guide.* The emulation of the one true God, and intellectual union with Him, cannot take place through moral actions. Given Maimonides's understanding of morality, God would not seek to be useful to, nor would He have obligations to, His inferiors. The acquisition of the rational virtues is "in true reality the ultimate end; this is what gives the individual true perfection, a perfection belonging to him alone; and it gives him permanent perdurance; through it man is man" (635, compare 432 and 488). The overcoming of material or animal nature—the ascent longed for by Joseph and other readers of the *Guide*—is achievable insofar as man perfects his rational faculty and focuses on

[10] Toward His inferiors.

intellectual apprehension of the beings. But only perdurance, not permanence in the strict sense, is ultimately possible. Maimonides, like Socrates before him, was intentionally deceptive when he tethered what we could call the erotic hopes of youths to philosophy. He strung the reader along, on an often painful journey, with the hope for immortality as bait. But by the end of this journey, the prize of a greater understanding of death, of the beings, of morality, of divinity, of the providential plan, and of one's place in the world, proves more than enough to ascribe to Maimonides, not injustice or cruelty, but the divine virtue of beneficence, or loving-kindness.

Old Rome versus New Rome:
Unionist Discourse between the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Centuries

Charles C. Yost*

In assessing the Schism of 1054, historians have tended to focus more on the anti-union rather than the pro-union authors, and in doing so they often neglect medieval or Byzantine realities. This article will highlight this unfairly neglected discourse of union, hoping to show the henotic ideology as a coherent, though not a static, argument for union as well as urge a more balanced understanding of the relations between the two Churches in the later Middle Ages. With the critical influence of Latin, and specifically Thomist, ecclesiology, unionist discourse took on a distinctly pessimistic and Byzantine quality. The irenic and conciliatory idiom of union in the thirteenth century was complicated during the fourteenth-fifteenth century by the unionists' profound sense of alienation from their homeland, and this article will pay especial attention to the thought and writings of Demetrios Kydones (c. 1324–1398) and Manuel Kalekas (d. 1410).

I. Introduction

On August 9th of the year 1500, the Ottoman Turks broke through the defenses of the city of Methone—a Greek city located on the extreme southern coast of the Peloponnese—and put its Christian garrison to the sword. Since the thirteenth century, this Greek city had been under the control of the seafaring Republic of Venice, for whom its name was "Modon." Modon was but one of the many eastern Mediterranean possessions that had fallen to the maritime empire in the aftermath of 1204 and the Latin conquest of Constantinople. But the world had changed much since those days. Constantinople, lost to the Latins in the Byzantine reconquest of 1261, was lost forever to Christendom with the Ottoman conquest of 1453. Nevertheless, the Aegean was not yet a Turkish lake. The Lion of St. Mark, the banner of the Venetian Republic, still waved over islands, cities, and fortresses scattered through the Eastern Mediterranean, including the islands of Crete, Cyprus, the archipelagos of Ionia and Naxos, and the fortresses of the Peloponnese; tens of thousands of Greek Christians throughout this world of water and sunshine owned no lord beside the distant *Signoria* of

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Venice, and in spite of the burdens they sustained for it—the taxes, submission to Venetian feudatories, and the imposition of religious union with the Roman Church—the tolling of church bells and annual cries of "Christ is risen!" showed that Christendom yet endured in what had been the Byzantine East.[1]

But as the turn of the century showed, this Indian summer of Christendom—where a medieval republic perpetuated the life of a medieval union—was perched perilously in the shadow of the growing Ottoman power that would define the early-modern Mediterranean. In 1499, new hostilities had broken out between the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Bayezid II, and the Republic of Venice. If the Turkish conquest of Modon is hardly mentioned in grand narratives of the rise of Ottoman power, for the Venetian Senate in the year 1500 Modon was a vital interest that must be defended to the death.[2]

And so it was. In the end, among the corpses, was that of an extraordinary man who had finished, in spectacular fashion, an adventurous career. He had been the archbishop of Modon, a Greek born and raised on the island of Crete in the tumultuous mid-fifteenth century. If we credit the report published by the Venetian Senate in the aftermath of the conquest, this Greek ecclesiastic had played a key role in encouraging the Christian garrison to resist the Turks to the end. He had died with his cross in his hands. The archbishop's name was Joseph Plousiadenos and his legacy consisted not only in a glowing report of the Venetian Senate for gallantry,[3] but an entire literary corpus—as of yet scarcely known outside of specialist circles—which represents the crowning consummation of a medieval and Byzantine discourse that remains among the most misunderstood and maligned phenomena in Christian history, even to the present. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the excavation of this discourse.

[1] On Venice's possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Freddy Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au moyen age: Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial véniten (XII–XV siècles)* (Paris: De Boccard, 1959).
[2] On this war and the fall of Modon to the Turks, see Gaetano Cogo, "La guerra di Venezia contro i Turchi (1499–1501)," *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* 18 (1899): 5–76; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 51.
[3] On Joseph/John Plousiadenos, see Despotakis, *John Plousiadenos (1423?–1500): A Time-Space Geography of his Life and Career* (Leuven/Paris/Bristol: Peeters, 2020), especially p. 104 on his death in 1500. See also Manoussos Manoussacas, "Recherches sur la vie de Jean Plousiadénos (Joseph de Méthone) (1429?–1500)," *Revue des études byzantines* 17 (1959): 28–51, esp. 47–51; "Ἀρχιερεῖς Μεθώνης, Κορώνης, καὶ Μονεμβασίας γύρω στὰ 1500," *Πελοποννησιακά*, 3–4 (1960), 97–100, 136–37. See also Charles C. Yost, "Neither Greek nor Latin, but catholic: Aspects of the Theology of Union of John Plousaidenos," *Journal of Orthodox Christian Studies* 1.1 (2018): 43–59.

This discourse is the ideology of *henosis* (ἕνωσις): union. Among the more obvious legacies of medieval Christendom is the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches that has persisted to the present in the division between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches. Conventional accounts of the history of this division have (wrongly) placed its origin to the year 1054, when confrontation and mutual excommunications exchanged between the legates of Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael Keroularios allegedly resulted in the lapse of communion between the two ancient patriarchates of Rome and Constantinople. Of course, the true story of the division is in fact far more complex, tentative, and ambiguous than might be suggested by textbook timelines. In a sense, 1054 as the date of division is both too early and too late: while serious causes of alienation had emerged centuries prior to the encounter of 1054, that encounter itself left relatively little immediate impression in either the imperial archives of Constantinople or in the perceptions of the papacy. Specialist scholars have argued, with greater credibility, that the rupture only really emerged in the classical era of the Crusades (1096–1291), and specifically in the conquest of Constantinople by crusaders in 1204. It is nevertheless unwise even to load the year 1204 with some sort of magical inevitability whereby the division remained final ever after.[4]

And it is equally possible for the historian to tell another story. Dialectically interwoven with the history of schism is the history of union, for from the moment that there was some sense of a rift, there never lacked voices speaking in favor of reconciliation. At the heart of this compelling, though still little regarded, history of union is the discourse mentioned above: the *henotic* or *unionist* discourse created and perpetuated by Byzantine intellectuals, churchmen, and humanists who argued courageously, and often at personal loss, for the need for unity with their Western Christian brethren. Though vocal "unionists" were only ever a

[4] The standard account of the "Schism of 1054" is so frequently and casually encountered that it scarcely requires citations. The reader is invited to google "Schism of 1054" and peruse the results, including entries in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Wikipedia, *National Geographic*, and the *EWTN* ("*Eternal Word Television Network*"—a Roman Catholic network) online library. For an example of atextbook (otherwise admirable!) that continues to present 1054 as the date of the break, see the timelines in Judith M. Bennett and C. Warren Hollister, *Medieval Europe: A Short History*, tenth ed. (Boston/Burr Ridge/Dubuqe: McGraw Hill, 2006), 193, 196. But see Aristeides Papadakis, "Revision in History: The Schism of 1054," *American Ecclesiastical Review* 157 (1967): 29–35, and (more recently) Yost, "Doubting the Conventional Narrative about the Schism of 1054," *The Imaginative Conservative*, October 31, 2020. The classic scholarly account of the schism is still Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XIth and XIIth Centuries* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955). But see also Henry Chadwick, *East and West: The Making of a Rift in the Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003); Papadakis and John Meyendorff, *The Christian East and the Rise of the Papacy: The Church AD 1071–1453* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1994).

minority group within the Eastern Church, their influence is out of proportion with their numbers—and in large part this is so because many of these unionists occupied elevated positions within the Byzantine Church and State and cultivated extensive circles of learned contacts linked by epistolary exchange, not only in the Empire, but in Italy and the greater Latin West as well. Moreover, if pro-union Byzantine churchmen were a minority, they were scarcely more so than the inveterately anti-Latin authors fanning the flames of division.[5] The decision of historians, recent or not so recent, to focus more on the anti-union authors rather than the pro-union authors reflect the confessional commitments and priorities of the historians themselves more than medieval or Byzantine realities.

By highlighting this unfairly neglected discourse of union, this essay urges a more balanced understanding of the relations between the two Churches in the later Middle Ages. This article, which will focus on a major thread of this discourse, strives to flesh out (at least in part) henotic ideology as a coherent, though not a static, argument for union. It will give special attention to developments in the critical fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which I see as a watershed moment for henotic discourse. While asserting the overall coherency of the unionist tradition between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, this article will emphasize how this tradition was decisively inflected, in response to convulsions of Byzantine Church and State in the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries, into a negative assessment of Constantinopolitan Church and Greek Christian civilization. If the unionist discourse began in the thirteenth century in an irenic and conciliatory idiom–and never altogether lost this quality so long as the dream of union endured–it became complicated from the fourteenth century onward by the unionists' profound sense of alienation from their homeland in view of the contemporary crises it endured. Without intending to dispute the critical influence certainly exerted on unionist thought by Latin (specifically Thomist) ecclesiology, it may be in this increasing pessimism and bitterness of later unionist discourse that we can see how very "Byzantine" it was after all.

[5] Taking this specifically non-confessional approach to the unionists is still in its infancy. See the seminal essay by Yury P. Avvakumov, "Caught in the Crossfire: Toward Understanding Medieval and Early Modern Advocates of Church Union," in *Stolen Churches or Bridges to Orthodoxy? Pathways for Ecumenical and Interreligious dialogue*, ed. Vladimir Latinovic and Anastacia K. Wooden (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 19–40.

II. THE UNIONIST TRADITION ON ITS OWN TERMS

The bishop Joseph, beside whose corpse this essay began, represents the culmination of the Byzantine tradition of unionism. In fact, his writings—both as original author and as scribe-copyist—provide the key linkage between the medieval tradition of pro-union thought and its expressions in the modern world, particularly in the Slavic world in the era of the Union of Brest (1596). Unionism as a learned tradition in earnest began in the later thirteenth century, in the era of the first "union" council at Lyons (1274) and during the patriarchate of John XI Bekkos (1275–1282)—the seminal thinker in the unionist tradition. John Bekkos, who has been wrongly labeled as a *Latinophron* ("Latin-Minded") theologian for his defense of the controversial teaching of the Western Church on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father *and* the Son (*"Filioque"*), was deposed and imprisoned for his convictions in 1282, then condemned a second time in 1285 at a synod in the Blachernae Palace in Constantinople. The irenic discourse initiated by Bekkos and his associates received new life in the mid-fourteenth century—an age of intellectual and spiritual ferment in Byzantium—particularly as a result of the translations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas made by Demetrios Kydones (c. 1324–1398).[6] Demetrios, who occupied a prime ministerial position during the regimes of Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos (r. 1347–1353)[7] and, for a time, Emperor John V Palaiologos (r. 1341–1391)[8]—and who served as tutor to John's son and heir, Manuel II Palaiologos—cultivated a circle of like-minded Byzantines who read the writings of Thomas Aquinas with enthusiasm and used his thought not only to argue in favor of ecclesiastical union, but as a key weapon in their arsenal against the controversial teachings of the contemporary theologian Gregory Palamas (c. 1296–1359).[9] Thereafter, opposition to "Palamism"—the theory that there is a real distinction in God between His immanent energies and His transcendent essence—became a key component of unionist discourse. For the followers of Kydones, such as the Chrysoberges brothers, but especially Manuel Kalekas (d. 1410) who fled Constantinople under duress in 1391 and eventually became a Dominican himself, the "heretical" teachings of Gregory Palamas became a principal reason for

[6] Frances Kianka, "Kydones, Demetrios," in *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* ("*ODB*"), 3 vols., ed. Alexander Kazhdan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 2.1161.
[7] Alice-Mary Talbot, "John VI Kantakouzenos," *ODB* 2.1050–1.
[8] Talbot and Anthony Cutler, "John V Palaiologos," *ODB* 2.1050.
[9] Papadakis, "Palamas, Gregory," *ODB,* 3.1560.

disqualifying the separated Church of Constantinople as a "true Church" and for entering the communion of the infallible Roman Church.[10] From this point, the unionist idiom becomes heavy with denunciations and invectives such as can only be uttered by native sons disappointed in their fatherland. And even as unionist discourse became more and more inflected by an unmistakable savor of bitterness and alienation toward "the Greeks," it also leaned ever more heavily upon constructions of an idealized West marked by the signs of power and certainty for which they looked in vain in their troubled homeland.

Nevertheless, irenic strands within the unionist discourse endured, as shown by events and figures in the fifteenth century. The subsequent careers of Kydones's students run up to the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1437–1439), the premier union achievement of the Middle Ages, which saw the formal (though in many places ephemeral) recovery of unity between the papacy and the Byzantine Church at the very twilight of the Byzantine Empire.[11] The most articulate and vocal of the pro-union Byzantines at this council was Bessarion, metropolitan of Nicaea, who became, in the aftermath of the council, a cardinal of the Roman Church and ultimately the unionist titular patriarch of Constantinople. Bessarion himself was a major figure in fifteenth-century Italian intellectual culture and attracted his own circle of followers, key among whom was a Cretan priest named John Plousiadenos.[12] This priest, formerly opposed to the union brokered at the Council of Florence during his youth, became its most ardent defender from the 1460s forward. His fractious ecclesiastical career has been recently much elucidated by Eleftherios Despotakis and the excavation of his worldview—expressed in theological treatises, polemical letters, and liturgical poetry—is in process.[13] But it was this protégé of Cardinal Bessarion who served as the primary copyist of the proceedings of the Council of Florence and wrote the most extensive defenses of that

[10] For details on this, see Yost, "Anti-Palamism, Unionism, and the 'Crisis of Faith' of the Fourteenth Century," in *Knighthood, Crusades, and Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Time of King Peter I of Cyprus*, ed. Angel Nicolaou-Konnari and Alexander D. Beihammer (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2023), 517–49.

[11] The classic work is Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

[12] On Bessarion, see Gill, *Personalities of the Council of Florence and Other Essays* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1964), 45–54; Ludwig Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist, und Staatsmann: Fund und Forschungen*, 3 vols. (Paderborn, Germany: F. Schöningh, 1923–1942; reprinted Aalen, 1967). On Bessarion's interactions with John Plousiadenos and other Cretan priests united to Rome, see Zacharias N. Tsirpanles, *Τὸ Κληροδότημα τοῦ καρδιναλίου Βησσαρίωνος γιὰ τοὺς φιλενωτικοὺς τῆς Βενετοκρατουμένης Κρήτης (1439–17ος αἰ.)* (Thessaloniki, 1967).

[13] See Despotakis, *John Plousiadenos*; "Some Observations on the Διάλεξις of John Plousiadenos (1426?–1500)," *Byzantion: Revue internationale des études byzantines* 86 (2016): 129–37. See also Yost, "Neither Greek nor Latin"; "Trampling the Lion and the Dragon: John Plousiadenos (d. 1500) on the Prophetic Power of the Roman Church," *Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies* 101/2 (2026—forthcoming).

Council. Hence, he is the primary transmitter of the legacy of Florence, and thus late-stage unionist discourse, to the modern world. John Plousiadenos is also identical to that bishop who, under the name Joseph (his name in religion), died at the siege of Modon in the year 1500.[14]

Since my more detailed treatment of the thought of John Plousiadenos, the culmination of the medieval unionist tradition, will be treated in greater detail in a forthcoming article, this essay will focus on the unionist discourse on its own terms as articulated by its major representatives, including Demetrios Kydones and Manuel Kalekas, during the particularly decisive fourteenth-fifteenth century watershed. In the past, historians and theologians have assessed Byzantine appeals for union with Rome as the theological arguments of isolated individuals—and have often dismissed these arguments as insubstantial or simply derivative of Latin theology. The unionists themselves, whether they garner admiration or contempt, have usually been seen as idiosyncratic weirdos who do not belong within the "authentic" Byzantine religious landscape.[15] Now over the course of the last couple of decades, a number of studies have appeared that contest, in some cases undermine, or at the very least complicate, these standard views on the unionists.[16] As important as these studies are, they have usually focused on individuals: they have done more to extricate this or that particular figure from the pejorative and dismissive rubric of the *Latinophron* rather than address the

[14] On Plousiadenos's fundamental role as a transmitter of the legacy of Florence to the early modern world, see Gill, *Personalities*, 131–43, and esp. Gerhard Podskalsky, *Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft (1453–1821): Die Orthodoxie im Spannungsfeld der nachreformatorischen Konfessionen des Westens* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 82–85.

[15] For instance, see Papadakis, *Crisis in Byzantium: The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997); Papadakis and Meyendorff, *Christian East*, 318, 385; Tsirpanles, *Κληροδότημα*, 28; Basileios L. Dentakes, *Ιωάννες Κυπαρισσιώτης ο σοφός και φιλόσοφος* (Athens: 1965), 32; John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979), 106, 188, 204. For examples of historiographical evaluations of unionist patriarch John Bekkos, see Alexandra Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft mit Konstantinopel; Patriarch Johannes XI. Als Verteidiger der Kirchenunion von Lyons (1274)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005), 33–39 and Peter Gilbert, "Not an Anthologist: John Bekkos as a Reader of the Fathers," *Communio* 36.2 (2009): 259-304. For critical perspectives on unionist historiography, see above all Yury Avvakumov, "Caught in the Crossfire: Toward Understanding Medieval and Early Modern Advocates of Church Union," in *Stolen Churches or Bridges to Orthodoxy?* Vol. 1, *Historical and Theological Perspectives on the Orthodox and Eastern Catholic Dialogue*, ed. Vladimir Latinovic and Anastacia K. Wooden (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 19–40.

[16] See especially Judith Ryder, *The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones: A Study of Fourteenth-Century Byzantine Politics, Religion, and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft*; Gerhard Podskalsky, *Von Photios zu Bessarion: der Vorrang humanistisch geprägter Theologie in Byzanz und deren bleibende Bedeutung* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003); Marcus Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas: Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

unionist type as such and the phenomenon of unionism in general.[17] We are lacking in more general studies of the unionist discourse as a whole within the context of its broader parameters and its development within those parameters.[18] But without taking this broader view, the unionists—however impressive each individual may be in his own arguments—still appear as a category of isolated cranks sticking out against a background that is assumed to be monolithically "Orthodox" and, therefore, "anti-union." While this article cannot hope to elucidate the entirety of this fascinating tradition, it will at least endeavor to arrive at a more synoptic view of the phenomenon by connecting a few of the more salient dots between "henotic" thinkers and by considering how this tradition developed across time. By so proceeding, its aim to present this discourse on its own terms, and so show that it was endowed with at least as much coherence as the "anti-union" and "anti-Latin" discourse that has often been assumed to be the "default" setting of religious sentiment in Byzantium. Moreover, I hope that a more holistic understanding will enable us to appreciate unionism as an authentic expression of the Byzantine mind, with its own legitimacy as a field of inquiry.

Setting aside present concerns in favor of those of the past may yield strange results, but it is the first imperative of the discipline of history. Previous assessments of the East-West

[17] While Podskalsky, *Von Photios zu Bessarion* and Plested, *Orthodox Readings*, are exceptions in that they are concerned not with individuals but groups, neither is concerned with *unionists* as such. For attempts to take a more holistic view, see Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, "Conversions constantinopolitaines au XIVe siècle," in *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome: Moyen-age, Temps modernes,* 105/2 (1993): 715–61; Tia M. Kolbaba, "Conversions from Greek Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism in the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 19 (1995): 120–34. However, both of these authors treat their subjects in anachronistic terms of "conversion" or even "conversion" from "Roman Catholicism to Greek Orthodoxy," thus taking for granted, and even retro-projecting, modern concepts of denomination and denominational identity that ill-fit the pre-confessional era. See Yury P. Avvakumov, "The 'Uniate' Identity and the Construction of 'Eastern Orthodoxy': Reflections on the Confessionalization Process in the Christian East," *The Catholic Historical Review* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2022): 1-44. My thanks to Prof. Avvakumov for sharing this piece with me.

[18] Important exceptions are John Monfasani, "The Pro-Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy," in *Byzantine Theology and its Philosophical Background,* ed. Antonio Rigo (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011), 160–86; Yury P. Avvakumov, "Caught in the Crossfire" could be seen as an inspiring *prolegomenon* to unionist studies, such as this present essay attempts to do in a more granular way.

schism[19] and unionist perspectives[20] have tended to emphasize the theological grounds for the division (e.g., papal primacy, the dreaded *Filioque* clause, etc.). Without denying the importance of theology in historical study, the modern preoccupation with dogmas and theological systems in the abstract—a preoccupation itself reflective of scholarly confessional commitments—has marginalized or even occluded other issues that were vitally important to the unionists themselves. These issues involve considerations of culture and politics. To a far greater extent than has been acknowledged previously, these considerations played a key role in the development of unionist thought during the decisive fourteenth-fifteenth century, when comparisons between the "sibling cultures" of Elder and New Rome became a central thread of unionist discourse.[21] Focusing on such comparisons, in which calculations of cultural dignity and political power weigh heavy, will not only enable us to understand this tradition of thought on its own terms (rather than ours), but should also enable us to fix unionist thought firmly within the tumultuous world of late Byzantium by emphasizing its development in response to contemporary political and theological crises.

[19] Exhaustive treatment of theological issues is offered, for example, in the relatively recent publications of A. Edward Siecienski, including *The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); *The Papacy: Sources and History of a Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); *Beards, Azymes, and Purgatory: The Other Issues that Divided East and West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022). An overview of the historiography on schism—vacillating between "theological" interpretations and "political" interpretations is offered by Kolbaba, *The Byzantine Lists: Errors of the Latins* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 1–8. The most important work on the issue of the unleavened bread, which goes far beyond mere theological analysis to the wide-ranging ramifications of the dispute for the emergence of tolerance in the West, is Avvakumov, *Die Enstehung des Unionsgedankens: Die lateinische Theologie des Hochmittelalters in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ritus der Ostkirche* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2002). Also see Kolbaba, "Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious 'Errors': Themes and Changes from 859 to 1350," in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World,* ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy P. Mottahedeh (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Researh Library and Collection, 2001), 117–44. See also Aristeides Papadakis, "The Byzantines and the Rise of the Papacy: Points for Reflection 1204–1453," Yury P. Avvakumov, "The Controversy over the Baptismal Formula under Pope Gregory IX," and Chris Schabel, "The Quarrel over Unleavened Bread in Western Theology, 1234–1439," all of which feature in *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500,* ed. Martin Hinterberger and Christopher D. Schabel (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 19–42, 69–84, and 85–128 respectively.

[20] A flagrant example would be the treatment of Bekkos in Papadakis, *Crisis in* Byzantium, 88–93. See also Papadakis's review of Riebe's *Rom in* Gemeinschaft, *Speculum* 83.3: 739–741.

[21] For the concept of "sibling cultures," see Deno John Geanakoplos, *Interaction of the "Sibling" Byzantine and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance (330–1600)* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976). Certainly, John Meyendorff emphasizes the role of Hellenism as an "ultimate criterion of wisdom" in the religious attitude of "Latinophrones" such as Demetrios Kydones: see his *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes,* 2nd edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979), 106f.

III. A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF PATRIARCH JOHN BEKKOS (R. 1275–1282)

Although the unionist discourse begins in the thirteenth century, the tradition of comparison between the sees of Rome and Constantinople only begins, in earnest, in the fourteenth century. For instance, it is largely absent from the writings of Patriarch John Bekkos (r. 1275–1282)[22] favoring union. Absent from his appeals to the Greeks who were his countrymen and ecclesiastical subjects was any appeal to the cultural or intellectual superiority of the Latins.[23] Quite the contrary, he forbade, under terrible anathema, any approach to union that involved scorning Greek rites or customs in favor of those of the Latins, or assessing the Latin Church as "more pious" or holy than that of the Greeks: "For anyone who has come to this ecclesiastical peace, as one despising our customs and teachings, and as reckoning the Roman Church to be any bit more pious than ours, let him be cut off from the Kingdom of Christ, and be ranked along with the traitor Judas and his fellows, and the crucifiers of the Savior."[24] Clearly, Bekkos is here conceptualizing some sort of preference for Rome on the part of would-be unionists as betrayal. Although Bekkos is somewhat unclear about the nature of this preference (it has to do with attitudes toward pious customs and the assessment that Rome is holier than Constantinople), it does not seem improbable that the patriarch saw this betrayal as consisting in Latinizing behavior or assimilation into the Roman Church (e.g., adoption of the Latin rite).[25]

As far as Bekkos's attitude toward Latin Christian theological culture is concerned, he was largely ignorant of it.[26] Aside from an opportunistic attack on his adversary and successor Patriarch Gregory II of Cyprus for his origin and upbringing in Latin-occupied Cyprus,[27] there is little evidence that Bekkos harbored any animosity toward Latin Christian culture. On the other hand, Alexandria Riebe has convincingly argued that the unionist patriarch was

[22] Talbot, "John XI Bekkos," *ODB* II, 1055; Papadakis, "Lyons, Second Council of," *ODB* II, 1259.
[23] See Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft*, 130–216; and see Yost, "Alexandra Riebe. *Rom in Gemeinschaft mit Konstantinopel*, besprochen von Charles C. Yost," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 105.2 (2012): 872–76.
[24] John Bekkos, *On the Union*, in Patrologia Graeca ("PG"), ed. Jacques Migne, 141:20C–21A: "Πᾶς γάρ τις, ὃς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν ταύτην ἦλθεν εἰρήνην, ὡς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ δογμάτων κατεγνωκὼς, καὶ ὡς τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν Ἐκκλησίαν πρεσβεύειν διεγνωκὼς εὐσεβέστερόν τι τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἔκπτωτος εἴη τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ βασιλείας, καὶ τῷ προδότῃ Ἰούδᾳ, καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ σταυρωταῖς τοῦ Σωτῆρος συντεταγμένος."
[25] Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft,* 142–48, 195–97, 198–216, 217–310; Yost, "Alexandra Riebe"; Joan Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; reprinted 2010), 228, 236.
[26] Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft*, 217–310; Hussey, *Orthodox Church*, 228, 236.
[27] This is related in Papadakis, *Crisis in Byzantium,* 38ff.

(to use Joan Hussey's adverb) "passionately" committed to his own.[28] This attachment can even be seen in Bekkos's confession of faith to Pope John XXI, wherein the patriarch boldly asserts the legitimacy of the mode of the sacraments in the tradition of the Byzantine rite, even though it may diverge from Latin praxis.[29]

Bekkos did not offer a direct comparison between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople. But he did ruminate on the fate of Byzantine rule and Greek Christianity on the eastern frontiers of the empire in the face of Islamic conquests:

> Ah, whence will be given to me fountains of tears that I should bewail—even if unworthily in comparison to the magnitude of the grief—but that I should bewail, nevertheless, the hellish night that has taken hold thence upon our territory, the punishment of our inheritance that has thence invaded the breadth of the Roman [i.e., Byzantine] lands. Wherein our inheritance has been mutilated not only unto the decapitation of our bodily authority by the destruction of many cities and lands, far-flung islands and entire peoples, but has even been punished unto religion itself—if, indeed, the punishment of religion is Muhammed and Mehmed reveling within the holy precincts, and celebrating their rites (alas, the desecration!), where the supreme mystery of Christian mysteries was once celebrated—for to such an extent has the evil of this schism harmed us, and the long time of evil, as is clear not only to us who suffer, but to all the nations of the earth.[30]

Thus Bekkos's pathetic characterization of the humiliation of the Greeks bereft of their empire in the East by the hordes of Islam, of wretched Eastern Christianity prostrate before Muslim overlords, to whom even the holy places and mysteries are vulnerable. In Bekkos's view, the Greeks had suffered this fate as a direct consequence of schism. The patriarch's "lament" is thus a cautionary-tale for those Greeks who—for now—remain free: they will be spared only if they embrace union with the West, from which they may expect military

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[28] Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft,* 142–48, 195–97; Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 236.

[29] John Bekkos, *Letter to Pope John XXI,* ed. Augustinus Theiner and Franciscus Miklosich, *Monumenta spectantia ad unionem ecclesiarum graecae et romanae* (Vienna, 1972), 27–28 (doc. #7).

[30] See Bekkos, *On the Union,* PG 141:16B–17A: "Ὢ πόθεν μοι δοθήσονται δακρύων πηγαὶ, ὡς ἂν ἀποκλαύσωμαι, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀξίως, καὶ τῷ τοῦ πάθους μεγέθει ἀνάλογον, ἀποκλαύσωμαι δ' οὖν ὅμως τὴν ἐντεῦθεν καταλαβοῦσαν τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένην σκοτόμανιαν, τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπελθοῦσαν τῷ πλάτει τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν σχοινισμάτων ζημίαν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λάχους, οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς σωματικῆς ἀρχῆς ἀκρωτηριασμῷ, πολλῶν πόλεων καὶ χωρῶν, νήσων τε μακροδιαστάτων, καὶ ἐθνῶν ὁλοκλήρων ἀφαιρέσει κολοβωθέντος, ἀλλά τε δὴ καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν εὐσέβειαν ζημιωθέντος, εἴ γε τῆς εὐσεβείας ἐστὶ Μωάμεθ καὶ Μουχούμετ, ἔνδον τῶν ἱερῶν σηκῶν ὀργιάζοντες, κἀκεῖσε, βαβαὶ τοῦ μύσους! ἐνθιασεύοντες, ὅπου πρὶν τὸ μέγα τῶν Χριστιανικῶν μυστηρίων ἀπετελεῖτο μυστήριον. Ὅτι γὰρ καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου ἡ τοῦ σχίσματος τούτου κακία, τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐλυμήνατο ὁ πολὺς τῆς κακώσεως χρόνος, οὐ μόνοις ἡμῖν τοῖς παθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀπανταχοῦ γῆς ἔθνεσι δῆλον κατέστησεν." See also Riebe, 143 and n. 39 and her presentation of the text in question (from the edition of Laemmer) and her German translation.

assistance as a consequence of union.[31] This sad vision of the Greek Church beneath the Islamic yoke will remain a central element in later unionist characterizations of Greek Christianity. However, as we shall see below, in later discourse this bleak image of the Greek Church, besides maintaining the function it served for Bekkos as cautionary-tale against schism and moral imperative for union, will take on a new role: that of negative mirror-image of Elder Rome against which the superiority of the latter is clearly distinguished.

IV. THE COMPARISON BEGINS: DEMETRIOS KYDONES AND THE POWER, DIGNITY, AND FREEDOM OF THE ROMAN CHURCH

In Demetrios Kydones's first Socratic-style *Apologia pro fide sua*,[32] which he wrote "in the early to mid-1360s, in a period when he occupied a central position in politics and when relations with the West were of great importance,"[33] an explicit comparison between Elder and New Rome is initiated not by Kydones himself but, allegedly, by his Greek interlocutors.[34] After Kydones ruffles some feathers by looking into the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit *ab utroque*—an unwelcome question as far as his countrymen are concerned—Kydones presents his interlocutors as defending the Greek position not with theological rationales, but by having recourse to the grandeur of the city of Constantinople—in very concrete terms evocative of political and economic power—as opposed to the comparative inferiority of Rome in those same regards:

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[31] See esp. Riebe, *Rom in Gemeinschaft,* 142–48.

[32] For the title of this work, see Judith Ryder, "Divided Loyalties? The Career and Writings of Demetrius Kydones," in *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500,* ed. Martin Hinterberger and Christopher D. Schabel (Leuven, 2011), 243–262, and especially Giovanni Mercati, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV* (Vatican City, 1931) as cited in the following two footnotes. Another fruitful avenue, which constraints of space and time do not allow me to pursue here, would be to consider Kydones's comparison alongside that offered by Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1350–1415). Chrysoloras's assessment is strikingly different from that of his contemporary (see Talbot, "Chrysoloras, Manuel," *ODB* I.454).

[33] Ryder, "Divided Loyalties," 44–45, 255–256(direct quote on p. 256). On Kydones more generally, see Ryder, "Divided Loyalties" (and see her interpretation of Kydones's *Apologia* here) and *Career and Writings*, *passim*; see also Plested, *Orthodox Readings,* 63–72; Hermann Tinnefeld, *Die Briefe des Demetrios Kydones: Themen und literarische Form* (Wiesbaden, 2010); Demetrios Kydones, *Démétrius Cydonès. Correspondance,* 2 vols., Studi e testi, vols. 131, 208, ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz (Vatican City, 1947–1960), 1.iii–xvi; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, "Démétrius Cydonès. I. De la naissance à l'année 1373," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 36 (1970): 361–372; Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, "Démétrius Cydonès. II. De 1373 à 1375," *Orientalia Christian Periodica* 37 (1971): 5–39; Frances Kianka, "Byzantine-Papal Diplomacy: The Role of Demetrius Cydones," *International History Review* 7 (1985): 175–213; Frances Kianka, "The Letters of Demetrios Kydones to Empress Helena Kantakouzene Palaiologina," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 46 (1992): 155–164; Frances Kianka, "Demetrios Kydones and Italy," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 99–110.

[34] See Mercati, *Notizie*, 359–403 (doc. #III: "Apologie della propria fede," 1: "Ai Greci Ortodossi" = *Apologia*).

> Therefore [one of my interlocutors] marveled at the wall of [Constantinople-]New Rome and considered it to be so much greater than that of Old Rome, and there was the beauty and number of the churches therein, and another said the harbor was better than any other anywhere on earth by virtue of its safety, and numbered all those who had established themselves there from all over the world; but they even went on with respect to [Constantinople's] positioning, as though it had been founded on the most beautiful spot in the world and was like unto the eye of the universe, and altogether a long discourse was stretched out about the advantages of the city. And the Elder [Rome] was said to be lesser in all of these things, and that on account of them one should not adhere to her nor even call her "Rome," decaying as she was on account of old age, but rather follow New Rome as though she were established on the height, and to have recourse to her as teacher with respect to the divine things, which have been confirmed by the decrees of the presiding emperors and, in agreement with them, the four patriarchs, against whom contradiction is manifest war against God and the Truth.[35]

If we believe Kydones, his adversaries derived their sense of confidence in Constantinople as Church and magisterium, whose teachings have been certified by "the emperors and the four [Eastern] patriarchs," from the economic vitality (i.e., the harbor and the ships) and the imperial grandeur of New Rome, especially compared to Elder Rome, advanced in her dotage and decrepitude. Initially, Kydones appears to dismiss this sort of comparison as essentially un-Christian and absurd. According to this logic, Kydones contends, his interlocutors must prefer the pharisees' Jerusalem to humble Bethlehem, where God was born; or again, to the temple and Ark of the Covenant of Jerusalem, they must prefer the "citharas and tambourines and the golden blasphemy" of Babylon the Great. But then he yields what appears rhetorically as "the benefit of the doubt" to his adversaries—"assuming that the grandeur and majesty of the city does actually matter..."—from which he launches into not only an assertion of Rome's superiority to Constantinople in size and in the extent of its walls, but a claim about the historical derivation of Constantinople's imperial glory from Elder Rome:

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[35] Kydones, *Apologia*, 367–370: "Ὁ μὲν οὖν κύκλον τῆς νέας Ῥώμης ἐθαύμαζε καὶ τοῦ τῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἀπέφαινε μείζω πολλῷ, καὶ τὸ κάλλος δὲ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ νεὼν διηγεῖτο, καὶ τὸν λίμενα δὲ ἔλεγε πάντας τοὺς ὅπου ποτὲ γῆς ἀσφαλείᾳ νικᾶν καὶ τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν καταίροντας πανταχόθεν ἠρίθμει· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν θέσιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῆς γῆς ἵδρυται καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀφθαλμῷ παρείκασται, προσετίθει, καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πλενοεκτημάτων μακρὸν κατέτεινε λόγον· τὴν δὲ πρεσβυτέραν τούτοις πᾶσιν ἔλεγεν ἠλαττῶσθαι, καὶ δεῖν διὰ ταῦτα μὴ προσέχειν ἐκείνῃ μηδὲ Ῥώμην ἔτι καλεῖν ὑποδεδωκυῖαν σαφῶς διὰ γῆρας, ἕπεσθαι δὲ τῇ νέᾳ ὡς ἂν ἐπ' ἀκμῆς ἑστηκυίᾳ, καὶ ταύτῃ διδασκάλῳ χρῆσθαι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, βασιλέων τε τῶν ἐγκαθημένων ψήφοις κεκυρωμένα καὶ τεττάρων πατριαρχῶν συνεπιψηφιζόντων, οἷς ἀντιλέγειν σαφῆ πρός τε Θεὸν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν πόλεμον εἶναι." (Quote on p. 370).

> The splendor of empire came thence [from Old Rome] to us; for there [in Old Rome] was someone first named 'Emperor of the Romans,' and he ruled everything under the sun and subjected all nations to the splendid yoke of that City, which has branded the whole world, like a slave, by her generals, and has given both her monarchy and her name in place of a crown to those that ruled within her, so that if [Constantinople] New Rome is considered worthy of some respect, from [Old Rome] did it come to [New Rome] that she be so esteemed and honored, from [Old Rome] did [New Rome] receive the imperial dignity, the senate, and her great name, to [Old Rome], justly ... should [New Rome] yield superiority, just as colonies do to their metropolises.[36]

From this point forward, we see that what may have at first appeared as a rhetorical sideline now emerges as a main line of attack of Kydones's argument, wherein the historical derivation of Constantinople's majesty from Rome, and hence the inferiority of the former to the latter, is but the secular analogue mirroring exactly Constantinople's relationship to Rome *as churches,* since, Kydones continues:

> Anyone could say the same things regarding the priesthood in both [Rome and Constantinople]; for if [Constantinople] holds much of Asia in obedience, and stretches out to the Sea of Azov and the Bosporus, and even holds a part of Europe, [Rome]—[as is evident] to him who sails beyond the southernmost tip of the Peloponnese—is hegemon of all peoples and cities up to the Straits of Gibraltar. Under her power she has placed the French (Γαλάτας), Spaniards (Ἴβηρας), and the northern Germans (Γερμανοὺς τοὺς ἀρκτίους)—whom they say exceed in number all the rest of the Christians combined—and, indeed, having crossed the Western Ocean, she has been established over the men living on the great islands [i.e., England, Scotland, Ireland], in but a part of which [islands], those who have recorded human dwellings there have revealed them as equal in number to our entire [empire], as much as extends to the Don River and the

[36] See Kydones, *Apologia*, 370–72: "....πάλιν δὲ καὶ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως [i.e., Jerusalem] καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πλακῶν καὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς σκηνῆς καὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης λατρείας τὰ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι προτιμήσομεν εἴδωλα καὶ τὰς αὐτόθι κιθάρας καὶ σύρριγας καὶ αὐλοὺς καταπλαγέντες τὸ χρυσοῦν προσκυνήσομεν βδέλυγμα· κἄν τις ἡμᾶς τὸ τῆς ἀσεβείας αἴτιον ἔρηται, τὸ μεγίστην πασῶν πόλεων εἶναι τὴν Βαβυλῶνα ἀρκεῖν ἡγησόμεθα πρὸς ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ οὕτω γελοίας ἀντὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀθροίσομεν δόξας, λίθοις καὶ πλίνθοις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀληθείας προσχρώμενοι. ὅμως εἰ σεμνὸν ὑμῖν ἡ τῶν τειχῶν εὐρυχωρία, καὶ δεῖ διὰ ταύτην ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀληθέστερα λέγειν, καὶ οὕτως τῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἡ νίκη μεγέθους γε ἕνεκα, ὡς ἂν φαῖεν οἱ καὶ ἄμφω τὼ πόλεε περιελθόντες καὶ ἐκμετρήσαντες, οἳ σαφῶς τῇ παλαιᾷ νέμουσι τὴν ὑπεροχήν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὕψος ἐκεῖθεν ἦκεν ἡμῖν· αὐτόθι γὰρ πρῶτον βασιλεύς τις ὠνομάσθη Ῥωμαίων, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον δὲ πάσης τοῦτον κρατῆσαι καὶ πᾶσιν ἔθνεσιν ἕνα ζυγὸν ἐπιθεῖναι τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης ἀξαίρετον, ἢ τοῖς παρ' ἑαυτῆς στρατηγοῖς ὥσπερ τινὰ παῖδα τὴν οἰκουμένην ἅπασαν στίξασα τήν τε μοναρχίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν αὐτῆς ἀντὶ στεφάνου τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ βασιλεύσασι δέδωκεν· ὥστ' εἴ τι καὶ ἡ νέα σεμνολογεῖται, ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐφ' αὑτῇ καὶ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι, παρ' ἧς καὶ βασιλείαν καὶ βουλὴν καὶ τὴν μεγάλην ἐπωνυμίαν ἐδέξατο, κἀκείνῃ δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι χρέος τὴν ὑπακοὴν ἀποτίνοι ὥσπερ αἱ ἀποικίαι ταῖς μητροπόλεσιν."

> Pillars [of Hercules]—so that if anyone wanted to judge the dignities of the Churches by the multitude of subjects, he would find that [Rome] much exceeds [Constantinople].[37]

And so here Demetrios Kydones is asserting the superiority of the Roman Church to the Constantinopolitan Church on the basis of the number, and ethnic diversity, of their respective adherents. By setting the Bosporus as the eastern boundary of Constantinople's jurisdiction (even if it also claims the allegiance of souls as far as the Sea of Azov to the northeast), Kydones sets the patriarchate within restricted boundaries—a modest jurisdiction reflecting contemporary geopolitical realities, when the Ottomans essentially controlled Asia Minor and had even established a foothold, by 1354, on the European-side of the Bosporus at Kallipolis.[38] Naturally, it will be pointed out that the patriarchate's jurisdiction was not coextensive with the emperor's effective realm.[39] Soon Kydones will address this discrepancy, although, as it will become apparent, he is not much impressed by a jurisdiction over Christians under Islamic rule that he understands as simply notional.

But something must be said as to the nature of this argument based upon the number and diversity of peoples held in obedience. Kydones was not the first proponent of the Roman Church to take this approach. In the eighth century, Pope Gregory II had sent a letter to the iconoclast Emperor Leo III in Constantinople wherein he bolstered his authority by alluding to the "kingdoms of the West" in his allegiance.[40] But Gregory had only vaguely

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[37] Kydones, *Apologia*, 372: "ταὐτὸ δ' ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἱερωσύνης· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη πολὺ μὲν τῆς Ἀσίας ὑπήκοον ἔχει, ἐκτείνεται δὲ μέχρι Μαιώτιδος καὶ Βοσπόρου, ἔχει δέ τι καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη εὐθὺς Μαλέα παραπλεύσαντι πάντων τῶν μέχρι Γαδείρων ἐθνῶν τε καὶ πόλεών ἐστιν ἡγεμών, εἴσω δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς Γαλάτας καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ Γερμανοὺς τοὺς ἀρκτίους ποιεῖται, οὓς φασι τῷ πλήθει πάντας τοὺς ὑπολοίπους συνελθόντας Χριστιανοὺς ὑπερβάλλειν, καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν ἑσπέριον Ὠκεανὸν διαβᾶσα τοῖς ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις νήσοις ἀνθρώποις νομοθετεῖ, ὧν τὴν ἑτέραν οἱ τὰς οἰκήσεις ἀναγράψαντες ἀντίρροπον ἀπέφηναν πάσῃ τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένῃ, ὅση Τανάιδι καὶ Στήλαις ὁρίζεται· ὥστ' εἴ τις τῷ τῶν ὑπηκόων πλήθει βούλοιτο κρίνειν τὰ τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν ἀξιώματα, πολλὴν ἂν παρ' ἐκείνῃ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαν εὕροι."

[38] See George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Hussey, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1968; reprinted 1989), 530, 466–551; Talbot, "Byzantium, History of,": "'Empire of the Straits' (1261–1453)," *ODB* 1.361; Donald M. Nicol, *Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453,* 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 253–91. Kallipolis was restored to the Empire in 1367, then lost finally to the Ottomans in 1376 (Alexander Kazhdan, "Kallipolis," *ODB* 2.1094–1095).

[39] Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State,* 535–36, 553–54 (the anecdote about the Muscovite Duke Basil and Patriarch Anthony IV; see also Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 299–300); Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 286–94, at 299: "Such fluctuations in territorial extent of the patriarch of Constantinople were in a sense peripheral to the life and development of the medieval Church within the Byzantine Empire and in no way lessened its claims to authority." See also Talbot, "Byzantium, History of": "'Empire of the Straits' (1261–1453)," *ODB* 1.361; Papadakis and Meyendorff, *Christian East*, 346–51 (on p. 346 is the anecdote about Patriarch Anthony IV), 392 (the expansiveness of the Greek Church), 412–14 (the endurance of the Church in the face of Byzantium's collapse).

[40] See J.D. Mansi, ed., *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* 12 (Florence, 1766), col. 968–974, esp. 971D.

gestured at the might of the Western nations in Roman obedience; Kydones is unprecedented in the detail of his catalogue of the numerosity and diversity of Rome's faithful. Nor was Kydones the last to have recourse to this "quantitative argument." Besides the subsequent unionist tradition in which, as we shall see, this approach will be maintained, Pope Nicholas V took up this same theme in his letter of 1451 admonishing the Emperor Constantine XI to enact the Florentine Union.[41]

What was the point of such descriptions of the number and diversity of adherents to Rome? Far from being a mere boast about the power wielded by a Church based on the number of its subjects—although it certainly is this too—we should consider how such claims brought ecclesiological credibility to the Roman Church. The Roman Church claimed to embody, in a singular and special way, the Church established by Christ and professed as "one, holy, catholic, and apostolic" in the Creed. By claiming that so many diverse peoples living throughout Latin Europe—the expanse and populousness of which would be even better appreciated by the Byzantines later thanks to Emperor Manuel II's extensive tour in the West in 1400–1402, including England[42]—Kydones was undergirding Rome's claim to "catholicity" or "universality"—it is not the Church of this or that ethnic group; it is the Church of the more numerous and noble part of the world.

Then Kydones shifts his focus from subjects to ruler:

> But I have heard a man—[who], as Demosthenes says, is not even capable of lying—that [Rome] has allotted overlordship, revenues, and dignities to the other churches, as is fitting for her who has obtained authority from Christ over all—for this has been found written in the archives of the *acta* in Rome (*τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πεπραγμένων*). And so whoever he may be—this man has said—be he ever so venerable and puffed up with an arrogant self-esteem, let him account his swelling pride to the Church of Rome, from whom he has received to have what he rules with his arrogant self-esteem. For just as kings unto their subjects, she has honored all [the churches] making them partakers of those things that are her own, so that she not only has more than those who are less than her, but she even enriches others by the things with which she is endowed, for what is already hers become the possessions of all. But she, thus providing for all (πάντων οὕτω προνοουμένη) has always appointed teachers—just as is

[41] Pope Nicholas V, *Ad Constantinum Romaeorum Imp. Epistola de unione ecclesiarum*, PG 161:1208 (in the Latin and the Greek translation of Theodore of Gaza). On this letter in general, see Nicol, *Last Centuries*, 372; Gill, *Council of Florence*, 377–78.

[42] Charlambos Dendrinos, "Manuel II Palaeologus in Paris (1400–1402): Theology, Diplomacy, and Politics," in *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History, 1204–1500*, 397–422; Jonathan Harris, "Manuel II Palaiologos (1391–1425) and the Lollards," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 57:1–4 (2012): 213–34.

> suitable for her who was endowed by Christ with care for everyone—of orthodoxy regarding God, and has sent them out to the boundaries of the world, even now deigning to imitate the Apostles, and putting down laws for all concerning things divine and human through letters, and receiving those who abide by the laws, while not hesitating, for the sake of the security of others, to punish those who are engaged in strife. And similarly [she has] become the promoter of peace and wisdom for all, and exhibits the disposition of a Mother and Mistress to all, because of which things anyone should understand those who are convinced that shamelessness toward her is plainly war against God, and on account of this no one would ever doubt her authority, just as neither would anyone doubt the hegemony of God over all.[43]

Clearly Kydones was impressed with the Roman Church. The qualities he picks out here are as follows. First, Rome's magnanimity or beneficence as ruler: Kydones maintains—based on what he has heard from his trustworthy informant (probably the Dominican Philip of Pera) and some sort of documentation "found in the Roman archives"[44]—that authority, jurisdiction, and privileges of the other churches are derived from the Roman Church. Hence the ecclesiastical analogue with his previous argument about the derivation of Constantinople's imperial government becomes clear. The theory that Rome, out of a sense of benevolence, conceived the other four patriarchates by parceling out to them her own overarching and universal *solicitudo* is attested in a number of ecclesiological statements made by the papacy *ad Graecos* from the thirteenth century forward—although this ecclesiological vision had already been formulated in an earlier era and different context (i.e.,

[43] Kydones, *Apologia*, 372–73: "ἤκουσα δὲ ἔγωγε ἀνδρός, ὅ φασι Δημοσθένης, οὐδαμῶς οἷου τε ψεύδεσθαι, ὡς αὕτη δή ἐστιν ἡ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις Ἐκκλησίαις τάς τε ἡγεμόνας καὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα νείμασα, ὡς προσῆκον τῇ παρὰ Χριστοῦ τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἐξουσίαν λαχούσῃ, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πεπραγμένων γεγραμμένον εὑρῆσθαι· ὥστε κἂν ὁπωσοῦν τις, ἔφασκεν ἐκεῖνος, ᾖ σεμνὸς καὶ φρονήματος πλήρης, τῇ τῆς Ῥώμης Ἐκκλησίᾳ λογιζέσθω τὸν ὄγκον, παρ' ἧς αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ φρονήματος καὶ τὸ ἔχειν ὧν ἄρξει· τῶν γὰρ ἑαυτῆς ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπάρχους οἱ βασιλεῖς μεταδοῦσα πάντας ἐτίμησεν, ὥστ' οὐ μόνον τοῖς μείνασι παρ' αὐτῇ πλέον ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἐχαρίσατο τὰς ἄλλας πλεονεκτεῖ, αὐτῆς γὰρ ἤδη τὰ πασῶν γίνεται. αὐτὴ δὲ ἕστηκε δι' αἰῶνος πάντων οὕτω προνοουμένη ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τὴν παρὰ Χριστοῦ τὰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀναδεδεγμένην φροντίδας, διδασκάλους μὲν τῆς ὀρθῆς περὶ Θεοῦ δόξης μέχρι τῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης ὅρων ἐκπέμπουσα καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀποστόλων καὶ νῦν ἀξιοῦσα μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ πᾶσι δὲ περί τε θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων διὰ γραμμάτων νομοθετοῦσα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένοντας ἀποδεχομένη, τοὺς δ' ἄγαν φιλονεικοῦντας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀσφαλείας οὐ παραιτουμένη καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅλως εἰρήνης καὶ σοφίας πᾶσι πρυτανὶς γινομένη καὶ τὰ μητρὸς καὶ δεσποίνης πρὸς πάντας ἐνδεικνυμένη· ὑφ' ὧν καὶ πάντας ἂν ἴδοι τις πεπεισμένους σαφῆ πρὸς Θεὸν εἶναι πόλεμον τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνην ἀναίδειαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέποτ' αὐτῇ τις τῆς ἀρχῆς ἠμφισβήτησεν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Θεῷ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τῶν ὅλων."

[44] See Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, "Les prêcheurs, du dialogue à la polémique (XIIIe–XIVe siècle)," in *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History*, 154–56, referring to archival research undertaken by Kydones on behalf of Philip of Pera *in Constantinople*; on the relationship between Philip and Kydones (and the "investigations carried out by" the former), Ryder, *Career and Writings,* 27, also 187–89, 210–13. Clearly, Friar Philip's views reflected a Latin ecclesiological tradition reaching back through Thomas Aquinas, Innocent III, and the materials contained in Gratian's *Decretum*.

not controversies with the East). Kydones here is endorsing this theory while relying on his trustworthy informant as a rhetorical device. The informant serves in this text not only as a credible authority, I argue, but as a means for Kydones to "buffer" or moderate his own support of Rome's claims without seeming too subversive. These are the claims of Romanist ecclesiology consisting in the view the Roman Church has the "fullness of solicitude"—full jurisdiction—while admitting other churches, as Rome wishes, to a portion (*pars solicitudinis*) of her pastoral oversight, or a partial jurisdiction.[45]

Kydones admires the evangelical energy of the Roman See as observed in its missionary activity. That this aspect was conspicuous to Kydones deserves reflection. It is true that Constantinople's enthusiasm for proselytizing beyond the boundaries of the empire was historically rather tepid. Even if scholars have demonstrated, in different contexts, that Latin religious abroad were concerned with ministering to expatriate Latins before proselytizing (insofar as they showed interest in this at all),[46] when compared to the lackluster showing of

[45] See *Acta Innocentii PP. III: 1198–1216,* ed. Theodosius P Haluščynskyj, Pontificia commissio ad redigendum codicem juris canonici orientalis, fontes, ser. 3.2 (Rome, 1944), 188: "Huius etiam primatum Veritas per se ipsam expressit, cum inquit ad eum: Tu vocaberis Cephas, quod etsi Petrus interpretetur, caput tamen exponitur; ut sicut caput inter cetera membra corporis, velut in quo viget plenitudo sensuum obtinet principatum, sic et Petrus inter Apostolos et succesores ipsius inter universos ecclesiarum praelatos, praerogativa praecellerent dignitatis; vocatis sic ceteris in partem sollicitudinis, ut nichil eis de potestatis plenitudine deperiret." And p. 192: "Dicitur enim universalis Ecclesia, quae de universis constat ecclesiis, quae graeco vocabulo "catholica" nominatur; et secundum hanc acceptionem vocabuli, Ecclesia Romana non est universalis Ecclesia, sed pars universalis Ecclesiae, prima videlicet et praecipua, velut caput in corpore; quoniam in ea penitudo potestatis existit, ad ceteras autem pars aliqua plenitudinis derivatur." (Both quotes from letter #9). *Acta Urbani IV et Clementis IV, Gregorii X: 1261–1276,* ed. Aloysius L. Tăutu, Pontificia commissio ad redigendum codicem iuris canonici orientalis, fontes, ser. 3.5 (Rome, 1953), 67: "Ipsa quoque sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia summum et plenum primatum et principatum super universam Catholicam Ecclesiam obtinens, quem se ab ipso Domino in beato Petro Apostolorum principe se vertice, cuius Romanus Pontifex est successor, cum potestatis plenitudine recipisse veraciter et humiliter recognoscit.... Sed et in omnibus causis ad examen ecclesiasticum spectantibus ad ipsius potest recurri iudicium et eidem omnes Ecclesiae sunt subiectae ipsarumque Prelati et oboedientiam et reverentiam sibi debent, apud quam sic potestatis plenitude consistit, quod Ecclesias ceteras ad sollicitudinis partem admittit...." (#23—"profession of catholic faith" composed for Emperor Michael VIII—see p. 61). These same clauses would be repeated in the oath sworn in 1369 by Emperor John V, as prepared by Pope Urban V in 1366 (see *Acta Urbani V,* ed. Aloysius L. Tautu, Pontificia commissio ad redigendum codicem iuris canonici orientalis, fontes, ser. 3.11 (Rome, 1964), 174, 170 (#107). On Demetrios Kydones's role in Emperor John V's personal submission to the Roman Church, see Ryder, *Career and Writings,* 202–203; *Acta Urbani V,* 283–86 (#167). As Papadakis and Meyendorff, *Christian East,* 51, 221ff., indicate, this particular ecclesiology was articulated already in the twelfth century by St. Bernard of Clairvaux: "The term *plenitudo potestatis* used to describe the papal fullness of power (the pope's supreme right to intervene in all parts of the Church, according to St. Bernard of Clairvaux) had already become commonplace among western canonists, including of course Gratian who was to publish his *Decretum* in about 1140" (158); see Klaus Schatz, *Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present,* trans. John A. Otto and Linda M. Mahoney (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 85–94.

[46] This view is shared by two scholars in their respective fields: see Robin Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims, and Jews in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), *passim*, e.g. 104–105 (against seeing Dominican *studia* for learning Arabic as functioning principally in support of proselytism), 133–64, 192–221, 222–49 (on Dominicans in medieval Spain and North Africa); Nickiphoros I. Tsougarakis, *The Latin Religious Orders in*

Constantinople in the later Middle Ages, Kydones must have been impressed by the organized presence and directed activity of Latin religious in the Islamic South and, above all, the Greek East.[47] Obviously Kydones was also channeling his (Dominican) informant's inflated esteem for his own order, but the mere fact of Kydones's association with this Dominican and others like him—after all, highly-placed intellectuals like Kydones were preferred targets in what Dominican proselytism *did* transpire in the East[48]—the existence of a multitude of Latin religious communities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, the service of mendicants as emissaries between the papacy and imperial government in union negotiations (of which Kydones was certainly aware) informed and validated Kydones's impressions.[49] Other developments, such as efforts to institute Latin studies throughout Armenia with the purpose of bringing about a greater cultural rapprochement during the papacy of Pope John XXII, further validated them.[50] Even if it is quite possible to exaggerate

Medieval Greece, 1204–1500 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2012). See my review of Tsougarakis's book in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 107.1 (2014): 284–89.

[47] See R.J. Loenertz, "Les établissements Dominicains de Pera-Constantinople," *Échos d'Orient* 34 (1935): 332–49; Delacroix-Besnier, "Les prêcheurs," *passim*; Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, *Les Dominicains et la Chretiente grecque aux XIVe et XVe siècles* (Rome, 1997); Tommaso Violante, *La provincia domenicana d Grecia* (Rome, 1999); Antoine Dondaine, "'*Contra Graecos*': Premiers écrits polémiques des Dominicains d'Orient," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 21 (1951): 320–446. On the comparatively weak concern of the Church of Constantinople (at least after the ninth-tenth centuries), see Timothy E. Gregory and Ihor Ševčenko, "Missions," *ODB* 2.1380ff.; Ihor Ševčenko, "Religious Missions Seen from Byzantium," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988/1989): 7–27; Sergey A. Ivanov, *"Pearls before Swine": Missionary Work in Byzantium*, trans. Deborah Hoffman (Paris, 2015), 107–56); Dmitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453* (New York, 1971), 83–97, though the poor and weak picture Demetrios Kydones paints of the patriarchate, as we shall see, ill fits with robust missionary activity.

[48] On this, see contributions cited in the previous note, but above all, Delacroix-Besnier, *Les dominicains*, *passim*, but esp. 185–200. See also Delacroix-Besnier, "Les prêcheurs," 154–56.

[49] The literature here is vast and many key studies have already been cited. I restrict myself to naming a few here: Delacroix-Besnier, *Les Dominicains*; Delacroix-Besnier, "Les prêcheurs"; Delacroix-Besnier, "Manuel Calécas et les freres Chrysoberges, grecs et precheurs," in *Actes de congress de la Societe des historiens medievistes de l'enseignement superieur public* (Dunkirk, 2001), esp. 153–57; Tsougarakis, *Latin Religious Orders*; Loenertz, "Les établissements dominicans"; Violante, *La provincia domenicana*; Papadakis, *Christian East*, 66; B. Altaner, "Die Kenntnis des Griechischen in den Missionsorden während des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Humanismus," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 53 (1934): 436–93; Dondaine, "'*Contra Graecos*'"; H. Golubovich, "Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum seu Relatio Apocrisariorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bythinia et Nymphaeae in Lydia 1234," *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 12 (1919): 418–70; Robert L. Wolff, "The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Franciscans," *Traditio* 2 (1944): 213–37 (reprinted in *Studies in the Latin empire of Constantinople* (London,1976) (same pagination); Joseph Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400* (New Brunswick, 1979), 78–243 and *passim*.

[50] For documents, see *Acta Ioannis XXII: 1317–1334*, ed. Aloysius L. Tăutu, Pontificia commission ad redigendum codicem iuris canonici orientalis, fontes, ser. 3.7 (Rome: 1952), 26–27 (#15); in general, see Irene Bueno, "Avignon and the World: Cross-cultural Interactions between the Apostolic See and Armenia," *Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History* 20 (2012), 344–46.

the consistency of Latin evangelical outreach, it was far in the advance of anything coming out of Byzantium.

Otherwise, the image of Elder Rome that Kydones gives in this passage is that of the "good hegemon": Rome sends missionaries, enlightenment, and education throughout the world; Rome establishes laws for the enlightened; Rome punishes the transgressors of that law while protecting her law-abiding children. And so it is, indeed, that she appears as a "Mother and Mistress" to her own. Rome is both empowered, even threatening, toward rebels and evil-doers, but maternally loving toward her own faithful adherents. This dual-image of the Roman Church as Mother-Vindicator will recur in subsequent unionist discourse and serve, as it does here, as the positive mirror-image to Constantinople as both weak and aloof—or even cruel—toward her own.

Kydones maintains this theme of Rome as "mother-mistress" and considers it from the vantage-point of Rome's children, whom he considers now not in their quantity, but according to their qualities. The statesman-intellectual was well aware of the conceit of his fellow Byzantines, who scorned the Latins as a barbaric race of mere merchants, and mercenaries, and sailors. Demetrios Kydones's own study of the writings of Thomas Aquinas had satisfied him that the Latins had much more to offer than their counterfeit wares, sword-arms, and fondness of drink.[51] But he must have had other sources besides the writings of Thomas informing him about the virtues of the Latins, which he enumerates as follows:

> And, indeed, if anyone should deign to look not only to these things, but even to the virtue and good fortune of those who obey [Rome], he will find this [Roman Church] rules exclusively over Christians [who are] entirely unmixed with the enemies of Christ, [who] follow the laws and what is just, who are frightening to their enemies, loyal to their friends, distinguished by wealth and what otherwise pertains to the preeminence of life; [the Roman Church] is even the treasury of all wisdom, surrounded by flocks of philosophers, encircled by crowds of theologians, adorned by ascetics of every sort of virtue, while all venerate her as mistress, all care for her as mother, all are eager to die for Christ's sake and hers and to wage war ceaselessly on all those who do not honor her.[52]

[51] Kydones, *Apologia*, 362–66 *passim*, esp. 364–65; see R. Bruce Hitchner and Kazhdan, "Rome": "The Idea of Rome," *ODB* 3.1809ff.

[52] Kydones, *Apologia*, 373: "Καὶ μὴν εἴ τις οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἀρετήν τε καὶ τύχην ἀξιώσειεν ἀποβλέπειν, ταύτην μὲν εὑρήσει Χριστιανῶν ἄρχουσαν καθαρῶς ἀμίκτων παντελῶς τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ πολεμίοις, νόμοις ἑπομένων καὶ δίκῃ, φοβερῶν μὲν πολεμίοις, φίλοις δὲ εὔνων, πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ τοῦ βίου περιφανείᾳ λαμπρῶν· ἔτι δὲ σοφίας πάσης ταμεῖον, φιλοσόφων ἀγέλας προβεβλημένην, θεολόγων ἀνδρῶν δήμοις κεκυλωμένην, ἀσκηταῖς παντοίας ἀρετῆς κοσμουμένην, πάντων ἐκείνην ὡς δέσποιναν

In his *Politics*, Aristotle maintained that the dignity of the ruling authority is determined by the dignity of the subjects ruled.[53] Kydones essentially had just this principle in mind. By waxing eloquent on the excellences of Rome's subjects—who, by the way, are true Christians living under Christian princes and not slaves of Islam whose Christian faith is questionable—Kydones demonstrated the superior dignity of the authority of the Roman Church. He described their cordiality toward friends and hostility toward enemies, their enjoyment of a dignified life owing to their possession of wealth and whatever else is needful, their distinction in the areas of philosophy, theology, and sanctity, and, finally, their deep acknowledgment of Rome's beneficient rule exhibited by their eagerness to fight for Roman supremacy.

Not so for the Church of Constantinople. Complete with his depiction of Elder Rome, Kydones proceeds to its negative mirror-image:

> On the other hand, [our] patriarch has little concern at all for his flock, but all [his] zeal seeks what thing he can do to gratify the emperor—for he knows that his leadership of the Church is the gift of the [emperor's] decision—even though he should fall straight away into a rage [if he heard me saying this]. As a result, he is compelled to act in a servile manner toward the emperor if he will enjoy [his] idol of rule—at least as much [as the emperor will allow him to enjoy it], at any rate. But if he should dare to murmur any little thing, or to rebuke any one of the clergy, or to punish any huckster, or to decree anything that does not please the emperor apart from the most insignificant things, immediately those who have been wronged [by the patriarch] rush to the imperial palace and in all things the patriarch is reduced to powerlessness—even if he should put forth in his defense the Gospels and the Apostles, all the canons and the laws. And except he should fall on his knees begging, not only is he deprived of his throne and his authority, but he is even subject to the laws against traitors or murderers, and in addition he will merit the penalty of impiousness. Anyone could see the bride of Christ, to whom belongs boldness of speech (*παῤῥησία*) and freedom in all things, just as a sort of distinguishing mark (*σύμβολον*), is exposed to so much slavery and shame by our people.[54]

προσυνούντων, πάντων ὡς μητρὸς κηδομένων, πάντων ἐκείνην ὡς δέσποιναν προσκυνούντων, πάντων προθύμων Χριστοῦ καὶ αὐτῆς ὑπεραποθνήσκειν καὶ τοῖς αὐτὴν οὐ τιμῶσιν ἀδιάλλακτα πολεμούντων."

[53] Aristotle, *Politics,* trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: 1932), 18–19 (1254a 25–30 is where this principle is stated most succinctly).

[54] Kydones, *Apologia*, 373–374: "ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῷ μὲν πατριάρχῃ ὀλίγη πάνυ τοῦ ποιμνίου φροντίς, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα σπουδὴ ζητεῖν τί πράξας χαριεῖται τῷ βασιλεῖ, οἶδε γὰρ ὡς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ ψήφων τὸ τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν ἄγειν δῶρον αὐτῷ, κἂν ἐκεῖνος χολωθῇ εὐθὺς αὐτὸς κρημνισθήσεται· ὥστ' ἀναγκάζεται τὰ τῶν δούλων εἰσφέρειν τῷ βασιλεῖ εἰ μέλλει τοῦ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδώλου μέχρι γοῦν τινος ἀπολαύσεσθαι. εἰ δέ τι καὶ γρύξαι τολμήσειεν ἤ τινι τῶν τοῦ κλήρου μεμψάμενος ἤ τισι τῶν καπήλων δικάσας ἤ τι ἄλλο καὶ τῶν ἄγαν εὐτελεστάτων ἀποφηνάμενος μὴ δοκοῦν βασιλεῖ, δρόμος εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰ βασίλεια τῶν ἁλόντων, καὶ δεῖ πάντων ἄκυρον εἶναι τὸν πατριάρχην, κἂν εὐγγέλια κἂν ἀποστόλους κἂν πάντας κανόνας καὶ νόμους προΐσχηται· καὶ εἰ μὴ εἰς γόνυ πεσὼν ἱκετεύσειεν, οὐ τοῦ θρόνου μόνον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκπεσεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τῶν προδοτῶν ἢ ἀνδροφόνων νόμοις ἐνέξεται καὶ προσέτ' ἀσεβείας δίκην ὀφελήσει· τοιαύτῃ δουλείᾳ τε καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ νύμφην ἴδοι τις ἂν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐκκειμένην, ἧς τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὴν διὰ πάντων ἐλευθερίαν ὥσπερ τι σύμβολον εἶναι προσῆκεν."

Here then is the negative mirror-image: the patriarch as cringing creature of the emperor; the patriarch as a power-hungry would-be tyrant serving "[his] idol of rule," but who cannot even rule over his own clergy properly, because his authority is compromised by the dependence of his status on the imperial mood. The relationship between emperor and patriarch in the Byzantine Empire, though of obvious and fundamental importance, is difficult to characterize. Kydones's characterization would seem to epitomize the (outmoded) scholarly assessment of the imperial-patriarchal relationship as that of "caesaro-papism"—in short, the subordination of the Church to the emperor—a label that has been rejected, or at least shied away from, by Byzantinists attempting to bring a more nuanced understanding to this relationship.[55]

And yet Kydones was no Westerner, although he was certainly influenced by Latins.[56] Moreover, though obviously exaggerated, and clearly envenomed against the patriarch by personal spite,[57] Kydones's image cannot be dismissed as pure malevolent fantasy. Kydones could not have gotten away with foisting a wholly false description of the imperial-patriarchal relationship upon his adversaries, and so he presumably would not have attempted to do so, especially if his aim was to persuade.[58] If his account can be called caricature, there is some truth at the bottom of all caricature. Indeed, the emperor exercised the right to choose the patriarch (usually, but not always, from the list of names forwarded to him by the Patriarchal Synod, and emperors sometimes deposed patriarchs who displeased them—though the Patriarchal Synod could theoretically veto such depositions).[59] In Kydones's immediate context, for instance, the patriarchate bounced back between Patriarchs Kallistos I and Philotheos Kokkinos at the whim of the Emperors John VI Kantakouzenos, John V Palaiologos, and Andronikos IV. For a time, after Kallistos's first deposition, a schism even

[55] Papadakis and Alexander Kazhdan, "Caesaropapism," *ODB* 1.364ff.; Gilbert Dagron, *Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium,* trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, UK: 2003), esp. 8–10, 282–312; Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 299–303. Anthony Kaldellis, *Byzantine Republic: People and Power in New Rome* (Cambridge, MA: 2015) decisively rejects Caesaropapism as accurately describing the *actual workings* of the Byzantine State. For the old view of Byzantium as a theocracy, Runciman, *The Byzantine Theocracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[56] See Ryder, *Career and Writings*, 29–54; Plested, *Orthodox Readings*, 63–72.

[57] On such envenomed polemic, and its motivation, see Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas*, 73, 75–76 (Kydones's attitude toward Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos) and Ryder, *Career and Writings*, 232–38.

[58] On the intended audiences and purpose for Kydones's *Apologia* here, see Ryder, "Divided Loyalties?" who reads the text as Kydones's declaration of the "freedom of conscience" and plea for the distinction between political loyalty and conventional, religiously-founded rejection of the Latins.

[59] Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 312–14; see 299–303 on relations between the emperor and the Church.

existed in the patriarchate when the latter refused to relinquish his claim to the see from which he had, in fact, been forced.[60] Claims aside, such depositions not only attest to the power of the emperor over the chief hierarch of the Greek Church[61] but, in Kydones's own day, they were bound to erode the dignity of patriarchate itself. Although (ironically for Kydones) the scandalous division of the Latin Christendom by rival popes during the Great Western Schism loomed just on the horizon,[62] for a Greek Christian amidst the evident subjection of the Greek Church to imperial majesty, the Roman See in its seeming stability and, above all, independence may have seemed very attractive. Moreover, Kydones's characterization of the patriarch places in relief the quality of the Roman Church he most prized: her liberty. "The bride of Christ"—that is, the Church—Kydones claims, ought to be free. Her "distinguishing mark" (σύμβολον) is her freedom of action and expression in fidelity to the Gospel and her spouse, Christ. Would anyone recognize Christ's Bride, Kydones asked, here "among us," where the Church is "covered with so much slavery and shame?"

This "slavery and shame" applies not only to her interior condition, Kydones states, but even her "outside affairs." This distinction between inside and outside arises from the linkage between the Great Church and the Byzantine Empire.[63] We have already encountered Kydones's rather dismissive review of the patriarchate's jurisdiction—extending as it does in the immediate east only to the Bosporus (though to the northeast as far as the Sea of Azov). This circumscribed jurisdiction reflects Kydones's sense about Constantinople's actual power, which (in his view) extended as far as the shrunken, and shrinking, boundaries of the Roman Empire, or at least stopped at the gates of the *Dar al-Islam.* Kydones recognized that Constantinople exercised a theoretical jurisdiction over Christians living under Turkish rule in the East (and elsewhere beyond the limits of the empire), but Kydones does not think

[60] Ryder, *Career and Writings,* 230–31 (Philotheos likewise refused to give up his claim to the patriarchate after he, in turn, was forced out); Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 289, 292.
[61] Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 299–303, offers a much more moderate view (see 312–14), whilst nonetheless maintaining that emperors picked patriarchs and could depose them.
[62] On the Western Schism, see Howard Kaminsky, "The Great Schism," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History,* vol. 6, *c. 1300–c. 1415,* ed. Michael Jones (Cambridge, UK: 2000), 674–96; Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378–1417* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2016); Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas M. Izbicki, eds, *A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417)* (Leiden, 2009). See also Antony Black, "Popes and Councils," in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7, *c. 1415–c. 1500*, ed. Christopher Allmand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 65–86.
[63] See Hussey, *Orthodox Church,* 299–303.

much of this jurisdiction insofar as the subjects over which it extends are unreliable, subversive of Byzantine rule, and at the very least embarrassing. Beyond the Roman *limina,* the bishops are beholden for their revenues and dignities to their Turkish overlords—not the patriarch or even the emperor. The diminishing state of Christianity on the whole is frightening. Conjuring the image of a constant trickle, Kydones observes that Greek Christians are apostatizing and embracing Islam "day by day." But even when the Greeks do not yield their souls to the Turk, they "draw [his] yoke with their bodies." "What then is the dignity of our authority," Kydones asks, "if those over whom we seem to rule serve others instead of us; for if there is anyone [in the Muslim East] perhaps that prefers to look to us, is he not poor and illiterate in addition to his servility and poverty and, as has been said, only suitable for tending goats?"[64] Entirely different from Rome's "exclusively Christian" subjects distinguished by material and spiritual blessings are these orphans of Byzantium.

And so the character of the subjects reflects back upon the dignity of their (would-be) rulers—in this case, the patriarchate of Constantinople. But Constantinople's shame is not only in the near East, or because of her inability to exert any maternal despotism over her supposed children there. Her shame is at her very heart, in the abject humiliation of the Queen of Cities:

> But these things [i.e., the poverty, ignorance, and subjugation of Christians under Islam] are worthy of beasts far off from the city; but are these things not the same for them who are nearby or inside of it? For, that I might pass over the slavery that is also here, and to what extent we serve the barbarians in as many things as they should order us—where is justice? Where is law? Where the judge? Where is concern for literature? Where is the care for divine things? Where, indeed, is the monastic habit of virtue? Is not our city, upon which we pride ourselves so much, no better than ruined cities, deprived of everything for the sake of which anyone would pray to live—but in lieu of the cities over which it formerly ruled, is it not [now] the metropolis of all misfortune and pain? Do not our emperors act in servile fashion toward the barbarians, and are they not compelled to live according to their whim? Do they not endure humiliation and service for a long time in armies beyond the boundaries of the empire in pursuit of [the Turks'] interests, and in addition to their perils, do they not give taxes, because of which the common treasury is emptied, while the private wealth of the citizens runs short, and the rich first become

[64] Kydones, *Apologia*, 374: "...καὶ ὃ μηδ' ἄν τις ἄνευ τοῦ φρίττειν ἀκούσειεν, ὅτι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν τὸ πλεῖστον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀσέβειαν ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἀποχετεύεται....εἰ δὲ τις ἴσως ἐστὶν καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς αἱρούμενος βλέπειν, πένης οὗτος εἴη, καὶ πρὸς τῇ δουλείᾳ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ἀμαθὴς καί, τὸ λεγόμεν μόνον εἰτήδειος αἰπολεῖν;"

> beggars, while others flee the city.... And what would anyone say regarding the poverty and humiliation of those who have been left behind?[65]

Thus the wretchedness of the Greeks in the eyes of Demetrios Kydones. From the meanest slave of the Turks in the East to the patriarch, they are repulsively obsequious to an emperor who is himself a slave, once again, to the Turks. Slavery is branded upon the prostrate Church, along with the empire, unworthy of the name of bride of Christ. Rulers are dignified by the status of their subjects.[66] So much superior, then, to the Church of Constantinople is the Church of Rome, whose subjects "are more able to adorn their rulers and to persuade others to obey [Rome] insofar as they would partake in like possessions, for [the subjects of the Roman Church] are free—they know no other master except for God and the Church and the laws." Nor, as Kydones goes on to say, has he even yet spoken of Christ's promises to St. Peter, and Rome's rights and privileges therefrom and attested to "by decrees of the synods and the edicts of the emperors" and sound reason—rights and privileges including primacy in the Church, the status of final tribunal for ecclesiastical business and doctrinal questions, and the obligation of all the faithful to obey her.[67]

The key element in Demetrios Kydones's comparison between the two Churches—and between the Christian cultures subject to these two sees—is liberty. This is the key criterion distinguishing them from each other. Confident in her supremacy—essential for her liberty, for she answers to no one—the Roman Church sends forth missionaries, gives laws, threatens

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[65] Kydones, *Apologia*, 374–75: "Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρω τῆς πόλεως ἄξια θρήνων· τὰ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ καὶ τὰ ἔνδοι ἐκείνοις οὐ παραπλήσια; ἵνα γὰρ παραλίπω καὶ τὴν ἐνταῦθα δουλείαν καὶ τὸ τοσοῦθ' ἡμᾶς τοῖς βαρβάροις ὑπηρετεῖν ὅσα ἂν ἐπιτάξωσιν, ποῦ δίκαιον; ποῦ νόμος; ποῦ δικαστής; ποῦ λόγων φροντίς; ποῦ τῶν θείων μελέτη; ποῦ σχῆμα γοῦν ἀρετῆς; οὐχ ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν, ἐφ' ᾗ μέγα φρονοῦμεν, τῶν ἀναστάτων οὐδὲν ἄμεινον πράττει, πάντων μὲν ὧν εἵνεκα ζῆν ἄν τις εὔξαιτο στερηθεῖσα, συμφορᾶς δὲ πάσης καὶ ἀηδείας ἀντὶ τῶν πόλεων ὧν πρότερον ἦρχεν μητρόπολις; οὐχ οἱ βασιλεῖς ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν δούλων τοῖς βαρβάροις εἰσφέρουσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ κείνων νεῦμα ζῆν ἀναγκάζονται; οὐ στρατείας ὑπεφορίους ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτοῖς δοκούντων πολὺν χρόνον ταλαιπωρούμενοι καὶ πονοῦντες ὑφίστανται, προστιθέασι δὲ τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φόρους, ὑφ' ὧν κεκένωται μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταμιεῖον, αἱ δὲ ἴδιαι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐσίαι ἐπέλιπον, καὶ προσαιτοῦσι μὲν οἱ πρότερον πλούσιοι, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι φεύγοντες τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ εἰρκτὴν ζητοῦσι παρ' οἷς οὐ δουλεύσουσιν; καὶ τί ἄν τις εἴποι τὴν ὀλιγότητα καὶ ταλαιπωρίαν τῶν περιλειπομένων;"

[66] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1254a25–30.

[67] Kydones, *Apologia*, 375: "Εἰ τοίνυν τὸ σεμνὸν παρὰ τῶν ὑπηκόων τῷ θρόνῳ, καὶ δεῖ τοῖς πλείοσι καὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς βελτίοσιν ἕπεσθαι, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πλείους ὅσον οὐδ' ἄν τις εἰκάσαι, βελτίους δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ πλείους, καὶ ταύτῃ δυνάμενοι πλέον τούς τε ἡγεμόνας κοσμεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῖς προστίθεσθαι πείθειν ὡς ἂν τοσούτων πλενεκτημάτων μέλλοντας κοινωνεῖν, ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ πάντες, πλὴν Θεοῦ καὶ Ἐκκλησίας καὶ νόμων μηδένα ἄλλον εἰδότες δεσπότην· ἡμεῖς δὲ (ἀλλ' εἴη γε οὕτω τοῖς ἔχθροῖς καὶ δι' ὧν εἰς τοῦτ' ἀφίγμεθα τύχης) καὶ τοιαῦτα μονῳδεῖν ἠναγκάσμεθα....etc."

the impious and cherishes the obedient. She is a "mistress" and a "mother" whose children reciprocate her attention—we are told—by their fierce filial devotion. And there are many children, for she is a "hegemon of nations." And the glory of her offspring—both material and spiritual—validates the supernal dignity of her rule, for Rome rules maternally over free men.

The opposite of liberty is slavery, and this is Constantinople's distinguishing mark in Kydones's imagination of her as the negative of Rome. The Church is beholden to the empire, which is, in turn, beholden to the godless Turks. Under these circumstances, Constantinople lacks the "boldness of speech" and the "freedom of action" that are the necessary adornments of the bride of Christ. Because of her slavery—the result of patriarchal dependence upon the emperor and the reality of Islamic overlordship—Constantinople cannot act as "mother" or "mistress" to her children who, whether inside or outside of the empire, are poor, ignorant, and servile. Furthermore, the conclusion to which these premises lead (under the influence of Aristotelian political philosophy, to which Kydones seems to gesture) is that the Church of Constantinople, as a Church of slaves, is a tyrant.

V. THE COMPARISON DEVELOPS: MANUEL KALEKAS (†1410) AND THE INDEFECTIBILITY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH

Many of the elements that appeared in Demetrios Kydones's comparison between Rome and Constantinople feature in the writings of his younger associate, Manuel Kalekas.[68] Indeed, in at least one instance there is reason to believe that Kalekas borrowed certain themes from Kydones directly—something unsurprising given Kalekas's obvious admiration for Kydones and familiarity with the latter's writings.[69] But Kalekas also contributed something unique to the unionist discourse of comparison between Rome and

[68] On Kalekas, see especially Raymond-Joseph Loenertz, "Manuel Calécas, sa vie et ses oeuvres d'apres ses lettres et ses Apologies inedites," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* (1947): 195–207; Manuel Kalekas, *Correspondance,* ed. Raymond-Joseph Loenertz (Vatican City, 1950), 16–45; Delacroix-Besnier, "Manuel Calécas et les freres," 151–64; Talbot, "Kalekas, Manuel," *ODB* 2.1092.

[69] On the relationship between the men, see Loenertz's commentary in Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 53; for letters in Kalekas's correspondence either addressed to, or mentioning, Kydones, nn. 4 (108, 172–73); 5 (108ff., 173ff.); 17 (114, entitled by Loenertz "A un Byzantin émigré (Démétrius Cydonès?")), 189ff.); 25 (118; 199ff.); see "Appendix" no. 7 (162ff., 333ff.) for a letter from Kydones to Kalekas. Also see Gennadios Scholarios's characterization of Kalekas as the "μαθητής" of Kydones, in George Gennadios Scholarios, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Martin Jugie, Louis Petit, and Xénophon A. Sidéridès, 8 vols. (Paris, 1928–1936), 3.94.

Constantinople, and this is his preoccupation with an indefectible magisterium as the single most important criterion distinguishing Elder from New Rome.

The trials endured by the circle of Byzantine intellectuals surrounding Kydones that resulted, principally, from their opposition to the doctrines of Gregory Palamas, and which (along with the straitened circumstances brought about by Ottoman siege) ultimately compelled them to flee Constantinople for exile abroad, negatively inflected Kalekas's views of his countrymen.[70] At the same time, Kalekas's association with "Latinophiles" such as Kydones himself as well as Latin Dominicans—with whom he had taken refuge following his flight from Constantinople in 1396—and his blossoming affinity for Latin theology and even potentially liturgy predisposed him to regard the Latins positively and as friends.[71] This dynamic is evident in the letter that Kalekas wrote from his exile among the Dominicans in Pera (a Genoese-administered suburb north of the Golden Horn) to Kydones, himself an exile in Italy, in the spring of 1397. The letter turns around the conceit of contrasting the happy fortune that Kydones has acquired in Italy—where Kalekas predicts he will be heaped

[70] On these trials endured by Kydones, Kalekas, and other anti-Palamite Greeks, see Yost, "Anti-Palamism, Unionism"; Loenertz's sketch in Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 21–46; Loenertz, "Manuel Calécas," *passim*; Tinnefeld, *Die Briefe des Demetrios,* 263, entry for "1369 Herbst." See also Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, 'Manuel Calécas et les frères," esp. 157–60; Thierry Ganchou, "Dèmètrius Kydônes, les frères Chrysobergès et la Crète (1397–1401): De nouveux documents," in *Bisanzio, Venezia e il mondo franco-greco (XIII–XV secolo),* ed. Chrysa A. Maltezou and Peter Schreiner (Venice, 2002), 435–93; Plested, *Orthodox Readings,* 58–60, 115, 118–20, 221–22; Dentakes, *Ιωάννες Κυπαρισσιώτης*, 11–34; Talbot, "Kyparissiotes, John," *ODB* 2.1162. For the more general historical context of the Palamite controversy, see Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris, 1959), 65–170; *Byzantine Theology*, 76–77; Gregory Palamas, *The Triads,* ed. Meyendorff, trans. by Nicholas Gendle (London, 1983), 5–8; Papadakis, *Christian East,* 287–93; Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, 5 vols. (Chicago: 1971–1989), 2.252–98; Hussey, *The Orthodox Church,* 257–60; Robert J. Sinkewicz, "Gregory Palamas" in *La Theologie byzantine et sa tradition*, II: *XIIIe–XIXe s.,* ed. Carmello Giuseppe Conticello and Vassa Contoumas-Conticello (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), 131–37.

[71] Regarding Kalekas and the Dominicans, see Loenertz's sketch in Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 20–31 (esp. 22 on the influence of Thomist thought, mediated through Kydones's translation, on Manuel's earliest theological work); for Manuel's relationship with the Dominican Fr. Elias Petit, see Manuel's Latin letter at App. 4 (159, 323ff.), and Loenertz's comments at 29ff., 91ff.; and see Tsougarakis, *The Latin Religious Orders*, pp. 169–173, 186–189, 198–200; Delacroix-Besnier, *Les dominicains,* passim; Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, "Les Prêcheurs, du dialogue à la polémique (XIIIe-XIVe siècle)" in *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History*, 151–67; Loenertz, "Manuel Calécas," 199–203. As a possible testimony to Manuel Kalekas's high esteem, at a relatively early date, for Latin liturgy and possibly even his communion therein, George Dennis draws attention to a letter by Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos that refers to a disgruntled Greek—unnamed—who has embraced Latin religious rites. Dennis suggests that this unnamed Greek is Manuel Kalekas—see *The Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus: Text, Translation, and Notes*, ed. and trans. by George T. Dennis, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 8 (Washington, D.C., 1977), no. 30, pp. 74–79, 78n1. This suggestion is convincing, because the date of Manuel II's letter fits with the chronology of Manuel Kalekas's life, while the man to whom the emperor addressed this letter, Constantine Asanes, was likewise a correspondent of Kalekas and would have known to whom the emperor was referring (on Constantine Asanes as correspondent of Kalekas, see Lonertz's comments at Kalekas, *Correspondance,* (n. 7), 73–76.

with honors—with the dreary fate he has escaped by leaving wretched Constantinople.[72] Kalekas's negative image of Constantinople consists not only in the horrors of war—in September 1396, western crusaders who had attempted to relieve Constantinople from the Ottoman siege that it had been enduring for some years were defeated by the Turks at the Battle of Nikopolis—but also in the savagery of the Constantinopolitans themselves.[73] How different it will be for Kydones now, writes Kalekas, in Italy where they will shower him with honors, "not like our people, who do as much evil as they can, praying for your death day by day," although Kalekas does express hope that the situation will improve in Constantinople.[74]

But Kydones may have also exerted a literary influence on Kalekas's characterization of Constantinople. In his own *apologia* to the Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, which Kalekas wrote in self-justification soon after his flight to the Dominicans at Pera, Kalekas penned a scathing critique of the leadership of the Constantinopolitan Church.[75] After describing the defects of the clergy, and alluding to the implications of these defects for the schism between the Churches, Kalekas writes: "And someone has said, that which is better left unsaid, that if anyone of ours subtracts the dignity of the city and the beauty of the churches, that nothing is left."[76] As Raymond-Joseph Loenertz himself noted, the "someone" (τις) whom Kalekas was thinking of here was Demetrios Kydones himself, who in his own *apologia* (as considered above) encountered and rejected the alleged appeals of his patriotic Greek confreres to the grandeur of Constantinople and, specifically, "the beauty of the churches" as proofs for the truth of the Greek position on the *Filioque*.[77]

But this is a rather minor point and does not convey the force of Kalekas's critique of Constantinople. As was said above, Kalekas's possible quotation of Kydones concludes with a critique of the hierarchs of the Constantinopolitan Church. In his *apologia* to the emperor, Manuel Kalekas is much concerned with the Church. He describes the officers of the

[72] For this letter, see Kalekas, *Correspondance*, (n. 17), 189ff.
[73] On the battle of Nikopolis in context, see Barbara Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1978), 567–94. In connection to Kalekas himself, see Loenertz's comments in Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 16–17, 23–26, 28, 49, 60–61 (in relation to Joseph Bryennios's letter to Maximos Chrysoberges; see 59 also).
[74] Kalekas, *Correspondance,* (n. 17), 190: "οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι κακοῦντες μὲν ὅση δύναμις, εὐχόμενοι δέ σοι τὸν θάνατον καθ' ἡμέραν."
[75] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 308–18 ("Appendix" #1). See also Loenertz's comments at 27–31.
[76] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 308–15 (App. #1): "Καὶ τις πρόεηκεν, ὅπερ ἄρρητον ἄμεινον, ὡς εἴ τις ἡμῶν τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα περιέλοι καὶ τὸ τῶν ναῶν κάλλος, μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ λειπόμενον" (315).
[77] See Loenertz's reference in Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 315n239. See above, sect. 2 and Kydones, *Apologia*, 370–74.

patriarchate—his inquisitors whose demand of a profession of faith impelled him to flee the city rather than yield in theological principle—as petty, self-absorbed, and ignorant. They "have strife among themselves and devour each other." They are so distracted by their own controversies—and the business of hunting dissenters from Palamite theology such as Kalekas himself—that they neglect to pray for the state of the empire and "what the circumstances demand." "They do not have the intelligence to be persuaded by those who are knowledgeable," he continues, "nor coming together do they want to find that which is needful according to reason, [but] by the depravity of their pride they think they exceed everyone—except for themselves, they think everything is nothing—neither man, nor people, nor polity, nor education, nor wisdom, nor art—[they think] nothing of anything, but themselves, [they consider] everything."[78] Kalekas refers to his antagonists in the Church as those who had "their office as their only proof."[79] Interestingly, Kalekas claims that it is this sort of hubris that "is the [true] cause of the dissension of the Churches." And it is clear that Kalekas is referring to the schism between the Greek and Latin Churches since he immediately adds, "For what they say otherwise about the addition is a pretext."[80] The specific

[78] Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 311–15 (App. #1. 4–9); see Loenertz's French summary at 156. On this moment in Manuel's life in general, see Loenertz's biographical essay, 23–26; On the "heresy-hunting activities" and enforcement of orthodoxy under the auspices of the Patriarchal Synod of this time and vis-à-vis the Palamite controversy, see Venance Grumel, *Les Regestes des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople,* 7 vols. (Paris, 1971–1989), 5.343 (n. 2414—cf. nn. 2470 and 2469 at 393ff.); 344–45 (n. 2415); 347 (n. 2419); 425ff. (n. 2509); 454–58 (n. 2541); 467 (n. 2555); 473 (n. 2562); 522 (n. 2619); 535 (n. 2633). For the entry in the register on Kalekas's own encounter with the Patriarchal Synod, see 6.285 (n. 3022), which the editor Jacques Darrouzès cobbles together on the basis of references found in the writings of Kalekas himself and Gennadios Scholarios (patriarch of Constantinople, 1454–1464). Although these sources are clearly problematic in terms of bias and (in Scholarios's case) distance, Darrouzès understands the force of particular words used in these mentions as implying a "[p]rocès synodal."

[79] See Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 311 (App. #1.4): "Τοῦτο δὴ βουληθεὶς καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἔχειν, καὶ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ καὶ πολλοὺς τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας εὕρισκον παλαιούς τε καὶ νέους, ἵνα κατὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἱστάμενος τῇ τε ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις χαρίζωμαι—τοὺς τοίνυν ἑκατέρωθεν λόγους ἀκριβῶς διελθὼν οὐκ ἄνευ πάντως τῆς τῶν εὐχῶν συμμαχίας, ἀνερευνῶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ζῶντας, εἴ τι καὶ λέγειν ἔχοιεν τῶν γεγραμμένων καινότερον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὁρῶν πρὸς ἔπος λέγοντας οὐδέν, ἀξιοῦντας δὲ τὰ παρ' ἑαυτῶν οὕτως ἔχειν οἷον ἄν τις ἐν Ἀθήναις ἠξίωσε τοὺς τοῦ Σόλωνος νόμους, καὶ τοὺς λόγον τινὰ περὶ τούτων προθυμουμένους ἀκούειν περιέργους εἶναι [ἡγουμένος] καὶ τῶν ἐπαράτων ἐγγύς, ἀπόδειξιν δὲ μόνην τὸ ἑαυτῶν προβαλλομένους ἀξίωμα, εἰ δὲ καί τι προΐσχοιντο...." The larger context of this passage has a distinctly Kydonian ring to it.

[80] Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 315 (App. #1. 9): "αἴτια ταῦτ' εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν διαστάσεως. τὸ γὰρ τῆς προσθήκης ἀφορμὴν ἄλλως φασὶ."

word Kalekas uses here, "addition" (*προσθήκη*), is the usual term for the *Filioque* clause in Byzantine theological discourse.[81]

But this hubris, ignorance, and quarrelsomeness are not the worst part for Kalekas. The problem is a defect that lies at the heart of the Church of Constantinople as a teaching institution, or magisterial authority.[82] According to Kalekas, "If [the Constantinopolitan Church], from the time she was established, never decreed falsehood, but always obtained the truth in all things, then it would hold true that no one would be in any doubt whatsoever concerning the things she speaks. But, if she has pronounced many things that are not true and has often been afflicted by heresies, with the result that, on the one hand, [today] she subjects those who were in agreement with her in the past to insoluble curses while, on the other hand, she now admires as saints those who opposed her [in the past]," how can any of Constantinople's adherents today be certain that what their Church professes and teaches is, in fact, orthodoxy rather than heresy? According to Kalekas, the faithful are necessarily in a state of doubt, "since there is no magisterium (*διδασκαλία*) [in the Constantinopolitan Church] leading the way and showing what is true and what is false." The feelings of anxiety resulting from this situation are aggravated by the fact that the inconstancy of Constantinople is not merely a matter of ancient history, but a recent phenomenon, for Constantinople "has decreed contrary things concerning the topic now proposed [i.e., the Palamite doctrine], with the result that it has been placed in doubt [regarding] which of the two [contrary] decrees [that she has made] it is necessary to profess. For it is absurd that she who otherwise proclaims herself to preside over the whole world (*οἰκουμένη*) as teacher (*διδάσκαλον*) does not want to apply her teaching within her own jurisdiction, as though begrudging her own [adherents]."[83] In this indictment specifically—of the Constantinopolitan Church as a

[81] This becomes clear from a Thesaurus Linguae Graecae "Proximity Search" including the terms "προσθήκη" and "σύμβολ-"; see Michael Psellos, *Poemata*, ed. Westerink, 76 (#4, lns. 97–98); Germanus II, *Ἐπιστολὴ Β΄*, 16 (doc. #3); Kamateros, *Sacred Arsenal*, App. III, sect. "Exhort," lns. 15–16 (via TLG).

[82] The following two paragraphs, including the last block paragraph, are reproduced—with some small modification—from Yost, "Anti-Palamism, Unionism," 534ff.

[83] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 313 (App. #1. 7): "Ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. εἰ μὲν ἐξ οὗπερ αὕτη συνέστη τὸ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἐψηφίσατο, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν πᾶσιν ἐτύγχανε, καλῶς ἄν ἔχοι περὶ ὧν λέγοι μηδένα μηδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἀμφιβάλλειν. εἰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἐξεῖπε καὶ ταῖς αἱρέσεσι συνεσχέθη πολλάκις, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς [μὲν] αὐτῇ τηνικαῦτα συμφωνήσαντας ἀραῖς ἀλύτοις ὑπάγειν, τοὺς δ' ἀντειπόντας νῦν ὡς μεγάλους θαυμάζειν, πῶς ἄν τις τὸ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ταύτῃ νεώτερόν τι δοκεῖν ὥς τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰς ἀπόδειξιν προβαλεῖται, μὴ προηγουμένης διδασκαλίας καὶ δεικνύσης τί μὲν ἀλήθεια τί δὲ ψεῦδος, καὶ τί μὲν ἀναιρεῖται τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦδέ τινος ὑποτεθειμένου, τί δὲ συμβαίνει; καὶ τοσούτῳ τοῦτο μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ τῆς

negligent or even spiteful mother unwilling to teach properly her own children even "within her own jurisdiction"—we are reminded of Demetrios Kydones's above characterizations of a weak and impotent patriarchate in contrast to Rome as *mater et magistra par excellence*. Constantinople's historical lapses, no less than her current maddening unclarity regarding the doctrinal controversy of the moment demonstrate the defect of her magisterium (insofar as she can be said to possess one at all): it is fallible. In our unionist's view, a disqualifying defect.

In no uncertain terms, Manuel Kalekas spells out from what it is that this defect disqualifies the Constantinopolitan Church in the prologue to a treatise on the Palamite controversy that he authored around this time, his *De essentia et operatione*.[84] In the passage in question, and with greater historical concreteness than in his letter to the emperor, Kalekas refers to Constantinople's alleged self-contradiction on the question of the Palamite Distinction, and from this 'flip-flopping' he derives an explicit ecclesial assessment of his Mother See:

> ....Since there was a time when the church herself, prior to this [later] decree [of 1351], published another contradictory [decree]; and those who still live and were present then in that synod under the Emperor Andronikos bear witness [to this], as do the foregoing synodical *acta* regarding these things, as well as that which has been recorded concerning them; so that there is doubt (ἀμφίβολον) about which of these decrees has truth on its side; for contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time, and because *it is impossible* that she who judges and maintains absolutely contradictory things about these important matters of faith—sometimes this way, sometimes the opposite—and issues forth [contradictory] declarations through letters and *acta* with boldness be called and believed to be the catholic Church. For the catholic Church must always speak the truth; since even the Lord decreed that the one disobeying her is a heathen and a publican.[85]

In particular, Kalekas indicts his ancestral church for its lack of magisterial indefectibility.

προκειμένης νῦν ὑποθέσεως ἐψηφίσατο τἀναντία, ὥστε νῦν ἐν ἀμφιβόλῳ κεῖσθαι ποτέρᾳ τῶν ἀποφάσεων τίθεσθαι δεῖ. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τῆς μὲν οἰκουμένης ἁπάσης διδάσκαλον ἑαυτὴν ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι προκαθῆσθαι, εἴσω δὲ ἑαυτῆς ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκείοις φθονοῦσαν μὴ βούλεσθαι τὴν διδασκαλίαν ἐκτείνειν....”

[84] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 27–30. For this text, see PG 152:283–428.

[85] Kalekas, *De essentia et operatione*, PG 152:285A: “....ὡς ἦν καιρὸς, ὅτε ἡ Ἐκκλησία αὕτη τῆς ἀποφάσεως ταύτης πρότερον ἑτέραν ἐναντίαν ἐξήνεγκε· καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ζῶντες τῇ συνόδῳ τότε παραγενόμενοι, καὶ αἱ προβᾶσαι συνοδικαὶ πράξεις ἐπὶ τούτοις, βασιλεύοντος Ἀνδρονίκου, καὶ τὰ ἱστορούμενα περὶ τούτων· ὥστ’ ἀμφίβολον εἶναι ποτέρα τῶν ἀποφάσεων τούτων τἀληθὲς μεθ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχει· τὴν γὰρ ἀντίφασιν μὴ δύνασθαι συναληθεύειν, καὶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὴν λεγομένην καὶ πιστευομένην καθολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι, τὴν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς πίστεως κεφαλαίων νῦν μὲν οὕτως, νῦν δ’ ἐκείνως τἀναντιώτατα κρίνουσαν καὶ κρατοῦσαν, καὶ παῤῥησίᾳ γράμμασι καὶ πράγμασιν ἀποφαινομένην. Δεῖ γὰρ τὴν καθολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν ἀληθεύειν ἀεί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν παρακούοντα ταύτης ἐθνικὸν καὶ τελώνην ὁ Κύριος εἶναι διωρίσατο.”

But the fact that the Church of Constantinople lacks this quality not only makes life anxious and unpleasant for her adherents—who are not sure what is orthodoxy—but it also means that Constantinople cannot be the "true Church," which Kalekas understands as necessarily infallible.[86] With all of this in mind, we are prepared to consider his characterizations of the Roman Church and Latin Christianity, and his direct comparisons between the latter and the Constantinopolitan See.

Kalekas left his refuge among the Dominicans at Pera, and after a brief stint on Crete he considered moving on to the Kingdom of Cyprus. He decided against this move because his contact on Cyprus, though highly placed in the Latin government, was unable to guarantee that Kalekas would enjoy the favors of the king.[87] But Manuel also cites the supposed hostility of the "barbarous" Cypriot Greeks toward men of his theological convictions as another reason dissuading him from this course. Instead, Kalekas followed the path of Kydones and other Greeks of his circle to Italy. There—in Pavia and Milan—Kalekas was deeply impressed by the shrines, monuments, the asceticism, and learnedness of the Latin monks. Now writing from northern Italy in the autumn of 1401, Kalekas confirmed to his friend in Cyprus that he had no regrets about his decision to journey to Italy:

> In addition to being among friends and many other worthy men, I saw the wonders and monuments of the cities, the multitudes of Christians untainted by any admixture of unbelievers, and, above all, I honored the graves of the common teachers Augustine and Ambrose, and I have hope of seeing great Rome in order to venerate Peter and Paul, the most divine leaders of the faith. What could anyone say of the choirs of monks, observing diligently the strictest silence, abstaining from food to the greatest extent, and living in all things for God alone, preaching wisdom to the masses and being teachers of these things, whether faith or morals, or [whether they are] teaching human wisdom, and providing altogether the entire form (*εἶδος*) of knowledge and virtue for those desiring it—encountering such folk, is it not possible to compare them to the monastics of ancient times? And I pass over things more unusual, such as are a cause of wonder to those who know them, although they are not easily believed.[88]

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[86] Besides Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 313 (App. #1. 7, already quoted above), see *De essentia et operatione*, PG 152:287–92 (#83); *Contra errores Graecorum*, PG 152:248D–249C.

[87] See Loenertz's comment at Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 39.

[88] Loenertz, *Correspondance*, 276 (#77): "πρὸς γὰρ αὖ τῷ [φίλοις] ἀνδράσι καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀξίοις συγγεγονέναι εἶδον κάλλη πόλεων καὶ μεγέθη, καὶ χριστιανῶν πλήθη τῆς τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἐπιμιξίας χωρίς, καὶ πρὸ πάντων ἐτίμησα μὲν Αὐγουστίνου καὶ Ἀμβροσίου τῶν κοινῶν διδασκάλων τοὺς τάφους, ἐλπὶς δὲ καὶ τὴν μεγάλην Ῥώμην ἰδόντα Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον τοὺς θειοτάτους προσκυνήσειν τῆς πίστεως ἡγεμόνας. τί δ'ἄν [τις] λέγοι χοροὺς μοναχῶν, τοὺς μὲν ἄκραν σιωπὴν κατορθοῦντας, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐς ἄκρον κεκολασμένους, καὶ διὰ πάντων θεῷ μόνῳ ζῶντας, τοὺς δὲ τὴν σοφίαν προβαλλομένους τοῖς [πλήθεσι] καὶ τούτων εἴτε τοὺς τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῶν ἠθῶν διδασκάλους, εἴτε τοὺς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν διδάσκοντας, καὶ ὅλως πᾶν ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἀρετῆς εἶδος

Kalekas was evidently impressed with the Italo-Latin culture as he encountered it in Milan (the resting place of St. Ambrose) and Pavia (the resting place of St. Augustine) in the first years of the fifteenth century.[89] Considered generically, many of the things that were salient to Kalekas have featured in Demetrios Kydones's characterization, for instance, the abundance of wisdom and the holiness of the religious. Also, in rhetorical parallel to the "wonders and monuments of the city" (among which, presumably, were the magnificent cathedrals) are "the multitudes of Christians"—again, similar to Kydones, the theme of quantity emerges, and more similar yet is his characterization of these multitudes as "untainted by any admixture of unbelievers." We may remember that Demetrios Kydones had referred to Latin Christians in just this same way, in direct counterpose to the Constantinopolitan patriarchate's subjects in the Islamic East whom Kydones portrayed disparagingly as dangerously mixed up among the Muslims to whom they are corporeally, if not spiritually, subjected. (Although it may also be possible that by "*ἀσεβῶν*" Kalekas meant the Palamites, of whom the Westerners were likewise free).[90]

In passing, we may note the epithets that Kalekas has given to the saints he has encountered. Ambrose and Augustine are called "common teachers"—that is, their universality as authoritative exponents of the faith is emphasized; they are not portrayed as merely "teachers of the Latins." This is in keeping with the concept of *consensus patrum*, the necessary agreement of the saints, East and West. Previously articulated by Demetrios Kydones, we see here, as elsewhere, that this concept was explicitly maintained by his younger associate.[91] Meanwhile Saints Peter and Paul are hailed as "the most divine leaders of the faith." Although somewhat similar to conventional Byzantine epithets for these apostles as "pillars and chiefs and light-bearers of the ecumene and preeminent heralds of the faith" or "chief teachers of the world,"[92] it is easy to see in Kalekas's use of the specific

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[συνειλοχότας καὶ] τοῖς βουλομένοις παρέχοντας, οἷς ἐντυγχάνοντι μόνα τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ἔξεστι παραβάλλειν; καὶ παρίημι τὰ πορρώτερα, τοῖς εἰδόσιν οὕτω θαῦμα παρέχοντα ὡς μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως [πιστεύεσθαι]."

[89] See Loenertz's comments, Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 39–40.

[90] In this same letter, a little later on, Kalekas uses this same word to designate the Palamites: *Correspondance,* 276–77.

[91] On the concept of *consensus patrum*, see John Monfasani, "Pro-Latin Apologetics," *passim,* esp. 181; Gill, *Council of Florence,* 255–56, 261; for critical perspectives, Papadakis, *Christian East*, 402, 407; Nicolas Constas, "Tongues of Fire Confounded," in *Conciliation and Confession: The Struggle for Unity in the Age of Reform, 1415–1648*, ed. Howard P. Louthan and Randall C. Zachman (Notre Dame, 2004), 42–43. For this concept in Kydones, see *Apologia*, 367–68.

[92] The first phrase comes from Anastasius of Sinai, *Viae dux*, ed. Karl-Heinz Uthemann, Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca 8 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1981), ch. 12.3; the second from John Chrysostom, *In epistulam ii ad*

term "leaders" or "hegemons of the faith" (*τῆς πίστεως ἡγεμόνας*) ecclesiological connotations of Roman supremacy[93]—just as Demetrios Kydones had called the Roman Church the "hegemon of nations."

Then Kalekas had written of the Latin religious orders—"the choirs of monks"—whom he describes as paragons of asceticism (both temperate in speech and in eating) and wisdom. The monks are characterized as possessing knowledge of subjects both sacred ("faith and morals") and profane, the fruits of which they share freely—by preaching to the people and, it seems, by teaching ("providing altogether the entire form (*εἶδος*) of knowledge and virtue for those desiring it"). It is hard not to think that Kalekas is here offering an implicit contrast between the educational levels attained by Latin and Byzantine monastics respectively.[94]

Then there is that last rather cryptic sentence, about "unusual things causing wonder to those who know them" but that "are not easily believed." Might Kalekas have been gesturing at the miraculous, for instance, the presence of thaumaturgic relics?

And Kalekas is bitterly aware of a set of persons who would not believe in these sort of "unusual things," nor that any shred of virtue resides among the detested Latins. These are the Byzantines, of course, who, as Kalekas writes to his friend, even if they should "change city for city, and linger in the *piazze* [of these Italian cities], they would be deaf and blind to the things I've told you about, nor capable of acknowledging them, but only mingle with the urban filth—[they] whom the ancient hatred for [the Latins] compels to blaspheme mindlessly."[95] Kalekas is indicting his countrymen for something more grievous than mere Byzantine snobbery—although he is certainly doing that too—rather, he is characterizing their mentality as spiritually blinded by the force of "ancient hatred," or prejudice—much in the same way that John Plousiadenos, at the end of the medieval unionist tradition, will

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Corinthios, PG 61:464—there are many other instances in Greek theological discourse, as can be seen through a Thesaurus Linguae Graecae search, of Peter and Paul being referred to as "κορυφαῖοι."

[93] See Yost, "Anti-Palamism, Unionism," *passim.*

[94] See Kazhdan, "University of Constantinople," *ODB* 3.2143, who implies a degeneration of the infrastructure of higher education in Constantinople in the fourteenth century. There is no parallel in the Byzantine East to the academicization of Latin religious during the High Middle Ages.

[95] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 276: "μὴ γάρ μοι λεγέτω τις τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν δὴ τούτων καὶ ἡμετέρων, ἐκ πόλεως πόλιν ἀμείβοντας, κἀν ταῖς πλατείαις περιόντες, τῶν μὲν εἰρημένων μηδὲν μήτ' ἀκούοντας μήθ' ὁρῶντες, μηδὲ δυναμένους ἐπιγινώσκειν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν πόλεων ἀρρωστήμασιν ἀναμειγνυμένους, οὓς καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν μῖσος πρὸς τούτους βλασφημεῖν ἀλόγως προσαναγκάζει."

characterize the attitude of his anti-union countrymen.[96] This spiritual blindness works in two ways: it both renders the Greeks blind to any virtue among the Latins, while it likewise renders them blind to any faults of their own: "if not scorning the world, they consider themselves alone to be men; while having fallen from the precept of *Know Thyself*, they have declared their blind judgment concerning everything."[97] Kalekas would return to this theme of prejudice in the lengthy treatise conventionally known as *Contra errores Graecorum libri quatuor*, which he wrote sometime during the last decade of his life. In this work Manuel writes that, from the perspective of his fellow Greeks,

> everyone who is annoying is heterodox. And [when the Greeks see] some Christians transgressing the laws, not them only, but even their Church they judge to be heretical and faithless. For having encountered some cheap sailors and rustic fools [among the Latins], they declare that every Latin is similar to them. And since hatred from prejudice (*προλήψεως*) has disposed them [to the Latins] as to enemies, that which they wish [to believe] is the same as what they deem to be the case. But on the whole, that which they do not see, or seeing do not understand on account of the difference of language, they assume not to be the case at all.[98]

Even when they can see with their eyes—Kalekas claims that his countrymen often sit in judgment on Western Europe all the way from distant "Thrace"—they cannot see in truth, blinded as their hearts are by prejudice, or at least impeded as their understanding is by the

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[96] See John Plousiadenos, *Disceptatio inter Pium quemdam, Rhacendytam, et unum ex duodecim sacerdotibus unionem amplexi fuerant, praesentibus et aliis tribus, Audictore videlicet, Teste et Dicaeocrita de differentiis inter Graecos et Latinos, et de sacrosancta synodo Florentina,* PG 159:965D–968A.

[97] See Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 276: "ὑπὲρ ὧν (καὶ πάντων λέγω τῶν ἡμετέρων) ἐν τοσαύτῃ τῶν καλῶν εὐπορίᾳ λυπεῖσθαι μόνον ἔστι, προσλογιζομένους τίνες πότ' ἂν ἦσαν [καὶ] αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς πάντα, εἰ μὴ τῆς οἰκουμένης καταφρονοῦντες μόνους ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγοῦντο, καὶ τοῦ *γνῶθι σαυτὸν* παραγγέλματος ἐκπεσόντες τυφλὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπεφαίνοντο ψῆφον." On this theme of the Greeks' spiritual blindness, see 288 (n. 83.4)

[98] Manuel Kalekas, *Contra errores Graecorum libri quatuor,* PG 152:214B–C: "...ab aliquot illorum injurias accepit, eum qui se laesit, circa fidem ultus est. Et hic enim omnis, qui constristat, malae protinus opinionis efficitur. Si qui vero Christianorum praevaricantur leges: non eos solum, verum illorum quoque Ecclesiam haereticam et infidelem putant. Nautis enim et vilibus quibusdam, ac vulgaribus hominibus congredientes, de omnibus, ut sibi similibus, sententiam ferunt. Cumque eos praesumptum odium inimicis animis esse fecereit, quod volunt, id putant esse. Prorsus vero quod non vident, vel videntes propter linguae varietatem non intelligunt, neque esse omnino arbitrantur." See the Greek text in the manuscript contained in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek MS B.VI. 20, f. 120r: "...γὰρ πᾶς ὁ λυπῶν· κακόδοξος· καὶ τοὺς τῶν χριστιανῶν παραβαίνοντας νόμους, οὐκ αὐτοὺς μόνους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐκκλησίαν, αἱρετικὴν καὶ ἄπιστον [Γραικοὶ] ἡγεονται. ναύταις γὰρ καὶ φαύλοις τισὶ καὶ ἀγοραίοις ἐντυγχάνοντες ἀνοῖς, καὶ περὶ παντῶν ὡς ὁμοίων αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνονται· **καὶ τοῦ παρὰ τῆς προλήψεως μίσους διατιθέντος ὡς πρὸς ἐχθροὺς διακεῖσθαι,** ὅ βούλονται, τοῦτο καὶ νομίζουσιν εἶναι. καθόλου δὲ**, ὅπερ οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, ἢ καὶ ὁρῶντες διὰ τὸ τῆς γλώττης οὖχι οἴδασι διάφορον, οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν**." (Emphasis mine).

cleavage caused by a difference of culture and tongue.[99] His comment about how the Greeks assume all Latins to be like the few idiots they have encountered at their taverns or the sailors who have cheated them at the marketplaces also recalls Kydones's deconstruction of anti-Latin biases.[100]

But it would be wrong to characterize Kalekas's attitude toward his fellow Greeks as unalloyed critique. His attitude was complex, as can be seen from the letter he wrote to a friend in Constantinople around 1403 excusing himself for the brevity of his homecoming there.[101] From Latin-ruled Mitylene, Kalekas wrote to his friend expressing his ambiguous and somewhat tortured feelings for his home: nostalgia and longing mingled with smug contempt and even fear. Though he opens his letter by thanking God for granting to him the power to leave his "fatherland" once again after he had visited it, he assured his friend that he said this not out of hatred or insensitivity to the charms of his home and friends. "For I know that nothing is sweeter than one's fatherland, and those things our [fatherland] offers everywhere as so many spells, by its natural graces, unto desire, and as an inexorable love-charm to its own people: conversation with friends, grace, and the affinity of those of the same race." In addition, Kalekas mentioned some honors that he expected to receive among his own—a peculiar expectation, considering his circumstances. "How could anyone not be overcome by all of these things," Kalekas asks, "unless he were sprung from tree or rock?"[102]

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[99] Kalekas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, PG 152:212A–B: "Addunt praeterea, qui ita sentient, *Nullum apud Latinos, post schisma signum fuisse*; quod enim non videtur, neque esse putant. Volunt enim ex Thracia, quae in Italia, et Germania, Hispania, et in Galiis, ac Britannicis insulis inspicere, ubi post schisma plurimi virtutibus, atque prodigiis insignes Occidentem illustrarunt totum, non ambiguis quibusdam, et obscuris, sed qualia ab apostolis, eorumque succesoribus facta legimus...."—cf. MS B. VI. 20, f. 118v–119r: "Οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀξιοῦντες καὶ προστιθέασι, μηδένα παρὰ τοῖς δυσκοῖς **ἅγιον** γεγονέναι μετὰ τὸ σχίσμα· ὃ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, οὐδὲν νομίζουσιν εἶναι· ἀξιοῦσι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Θράκης, τὰ ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, καὶ Γερμανίᾳ, καὶ Ἱσπανίᾳ, καὶ Γαλλίαις, καὶ τᾶις Βρετανικαῖς νήσοις ὁρᾶν· ὅπου πολλοὶ μετὰ τὸ σχίσμα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ τοῖς θαύμασι, τὴν δύσιν πᾶσαν περιειλήφασιν· οὐκ ἀμφιβόλοις καὶ ἀμυδροῖς || τισιν, ἀλλ' οἵα τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν διαδόχων τούτων ἀκούομεν" (Emphasis mine). Note the corruption in the Latin text of the PG that has interpreted *ἅγιον* as *signum*—Kalekas here was evidently referring to a claim among his countrymen that there had been no saints in the West since the beginning of the schism.

[100] See above in the previous section, and Kydones, *Apologia*, 364–65.

[101] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 287–92 (#83); and see Loenertz at 43ff. on this letter in the context of Kalekas's life.

[102] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 287 (#83. 1): "Καὶ τοῦτο τῆς περὶ ἐμὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίας ἔργον, τὸ διὰ χρόνου πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπανελθόντα πάλιν ἐξελθεῖν αὐτῆς δυνηθῆναι. Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μισοῦντος, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναισθήτως ἔχοντος ὧν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἡττωμένη ἀπόντων μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖ, τέρπεται δὲ παροῦσιν. Οἶδα γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἐῆς πατρίδος, καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἡμετέρας πολλὰς εἰς ἔρωτα ταῖς φυσικαῖς χάρισιν ἴυγγας πολλαχόθεν προβαλλομένης, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἀπαραίτητον φίλτρον τήν τε τῶν φίλων ὁμιλίαν καὶ χάριν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁμογενῶν οἰκειότητα· προσθείην δ' ἂν καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν σὺν θεῷ φάναι μετρίαν περὶ ἐμὲ δόξαν καὶ τὰς εἰκότως ἂν παρ' αὐτῶν ἐλπιθείσας τιμάς, οἷς τό γε νῦν ἔχον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τῶν

It was God alone who steeled his will thus enabling him to forsake his country once more. It was in accordance with divine mercy, lest Kalekas, overcome by the siren-song of nostalgia, yield to the persuasions and assaults of his fellow Greeks and give up his allegiance to the true faith and Church. Kalekas presents his mere presence in Constantinople among his countrymen as facing the alternative between apostasy and scorn: "For either, remaining in [the city], it would be necessary to withhold myself often from speech regarding the truth of the faith, when contradictory things are being said, and, joining together with those who are most hostile to [the truth] in common discussions and prayers, to act against conscience, and, as is the case with many who think that they have become a scandal, to return to my previous, first beliefs (*τὰ πρῶτα*), or, if I speak the truth with boldness, to be placed in a corner, hated by all, deaf to everything that is said and blind to everything that happens...."[103]

Orthodoxy, as Kalekas understood it, is what marks him out from his fellow Greeks to whom he is united by kindred and race, by common speech and even friendship. But, for Kalekas, the truth of the faith must prevail over all other considerations—even flesh and blood.[104] As for those Greeks, who have rejected the basic monotheistic foundation of Christianity by maintaining Gregory Palamas's distinction between the divine energies and essence, Kalekas wonders: "who is so stupid to call [them] ... the apostolic and catholic Church?"[105] After all, he continues, the Church must be indefectible, lest her adherents be troubled by anxious "doubts" (*ἀμφιβόλοις*) as to whether the faith she professes and the sacraments she offers truly save. For this reason, Christ himself, "who founded her on the rock, prophesied that the gates of hell (the contradictions of the heretics) would not prevail, and he allotted the one not heeding her to be ranked among the pagans and the publicans"—utterances only meaningful if they represented perpetual guarantees about the Church.

καλῶν ἀπορίᾳ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μέγα ἂν δόξαι. ὧν ἁπάντων εἰ μή τις ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἢ πέτρης πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἠττηθείη; ἀλλ' ἦν δήπου τὸ κινοῦν ἑτέρωθεν μεῖζον, καὶ οἷον ἔμοιγε μὴ δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν εἰρημένων συμβαίνειν."

[103] See Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 287–88 (#83. esp. 2): "ἢ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν αὐτῇ μένοντα τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας περὶ τῆς πίστεως λόγους πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων λεγομένων σιγᾶν, καὶ τοῖς αὐτῇ πολεμιωτάτοις ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ προσευχαῖς συμφερόμενον κατὰ τοῦ συνειδότος ποιεῖν, καὶ ἅμα πολλοῖς εἰς σκάνδαλον κεῖσθαι οἰομένοις ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἐπανελθεῖν, ἢ παρρησιαζόμενον τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν γωνίᾳ καθῆσθαι παρὰ πάντων μισούμενον, πάντων μὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀνήκοον πάντων δὲ τῶν γινομένων ἀθέατον...."

[104] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 287–89, see esp. sect. 4 (288ff.).

[105] The rest of this paragraph is found in Yost, "Anti-Palamism, Unionism,'" 539ff.

Indeed, Kalekas understood that guarantee to be Christ Himself, who gave his assurance that "I am with you all days, unto the consummation of the age."[106]

Constantinople cannot be the Church of Christ's promise. But this Church must exist somewhere on earth lest Christ's promise be empty and Christ Himself a liar. Since this is unthinkable, the true Church, the indefectible Church over which heresy has not prevailed and cannot prevail and whose magisterium can thus be trusted by the faithful, is worth being sought out on earth—wherever she is—and being embraced wholeheartedly as the only unfailing beacon of orthodoxy and sure harbor for the faithful struggling amidst the raging storms of heresy and doubt. Thus, although Kalekas was reluctant to say that his identification of this true Church with Rome was merely an *argumentum ex negativo* (i.e., because Constantinople is not the true Church), he did see the integrity of Christ's promise as dependent upon that very identification.[107]

And yet Manuel Kalekas had positive reasons for championing Rome. Besides her alleged doctrinal inerrancy—something that he believed was rooted in Christ's unique bequests to the Apostle Peter and validated in Peter's successors to the Roman see by the witness of history—Kalekas had other reasons to be impressed by the Roman Church. And so, in this same letter to his friend, Kalekas describes himself, orphan of the Church of Constantinople, as happy in his adoption as a son of Elder Rome. In fact, Kalekas sees himself as one of the latest members of a noble company of Greek sages who, down through the ages, were ostracized by their own people for the sake of orthodoxy. And, indeed, has he not gained "so many races of the West as hierarchs and brothers in the faith, [races

[106] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 289–90 (#83. 7, 149 for Loenertz' summary): Τίς δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀλόγιστος τοὺς ἀνέδην οὕτω τὰς ἀξιολόγους ἀναιροῦντας καὶ κοινοτάτους περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις καὶ οἷς φασι τοῖς τῆς κοινῆς πίστεως διδασκάλοις φανερῶς μαχομένους, ἀποστολικὴν καὶ καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναγορεύειν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ μίαν ἁγίαν καὶ ὅσα περὶ ταύτης ἐξῆς ὁμολογεῖν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ συμβόλῳ τῆς πίστεως περιέχεται (ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ μόνῃ τὴν πίστιν ἐνεργεῖσθαι δι' ἀγάπης ἔστιν) εἰ μέλλοιμεν τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν μυστηρίων τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν, τὴν δ' ἀνάγκη διὰ παντὸς ἐν ταῖς τῆς πίστεως ἀποφάσεων ἀληθεύειν (ἄλλως γὰρ ἐν ἀμφιβόλοις ἂν ἦμεν ὁπότε τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ λόγοις τυγχάνοι καὶ μή), ἧς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πύλας Ἅιδου (τὰς τῶν αἱρετικῶν ἀντιλογίας) οὐ κατισχύσειν ὁ ταύτην οἰκοδομήσας ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ προέφη, καὶ τὸν αὐτῆς παρακούσαντα τοῖς ἐθνικοῖς καὶ τελώναις συντάττειν προσέταξεν, (ἃ δὴ φανερῶς ἀεὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀληθεύειν προὐποτίθησι) καὶ ἅμα «μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμὶ πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος» προσέθηκε. Cf. Kalekas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, cols 245C–D, 248A–C.

[107] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 290 (#83. 7): "καὶ ταῦτά φημι οὐχ ὅτι διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην καινοτομίαν ἀποροῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Δύσεως ἐκκλησίαν καταφευκτέον, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο τὴν περὶ πάντα τῶν δογμάτων ἀλήθειαν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ταύτης συναποδείκνυσιν. ἄλλως γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ τῆς γῆς ἂν ἦν πρὸ τῆς συντελείας ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησία, ὅπερ ὡς ἄτοπον καὶ τὴν πίστιν παντελῶς ἀνειροῦν ἀπερρίφθω."

adorned] with every form of education and wisdom, and representing a Church that has always presided from the beginning and never yielded to falsehood, and thus [they] regard those who contradict them as weaklings, their assaults as 'the arrows of infants?' Thence there is much comfort for me," he concludes, "I lack neither fatherland nor home." And yet, all of these newfound brethren and patrons did not quite blot out that lingering ache caused by his own, for "though I have many at hand as familiars and friends, one thing alone grieves [me]," Kalekas conceded, "the insensibility of our own people, and the fact that they, having declared war upon truth, have fallen into alien doctrines. I am able to help them in no other way [than] to pray that they come to their senses and knowledge of [the truth], without which they would not be benefited even if they should acquire the empire of the Persians."[108] Clearly his election of the West had not effaced his concern for his own people—whether we take him at his word as anxious for their salvation, or suspect that these words resulted, at least in part, from hurt feelings because of his own failure to find acceptance among his countrymen—in any case, Kalekas cared for his countrymen, even if he regarded them with a gaze jaundiced by rejection.

In his treatise *Contra errores Graecorum,* Kalekas adds historical depth and detail to his characterizations of the Greek and Latin Churches. While the Greek Church was repeatedly compromised by heresy reaching up to its highest levels, the Roman Church remained unswerving in her commitment to orthodoxy. There may have been individual orthodox Greek saints in the East, but because of their convictions they were persecuted by their ancestral Church and forced to have recourse to the Western Church under Rome. Thus, not only in his own day, but time and again throughout history, it has been shown that Constantinople cannot be that Church appointed by Christ as reliable teacher of the faithful—reliable because of Christ's guarantee of doctrinal inerrancy. This guarantee, on the other

[108] Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 291–92 (#83. 9): "καίτοι τίνι πρὸς εὐδοξίαν οὐκ ἱκανὸν μετὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστάμενον κοινωνεῖν μὲν τῶν μέμψεων τοῖς ἱεροῖς διδασκάλοις, ὑβριζόμενον διὰ ταύτην καὶ συνδιωκόμενον διωθεῖσιν, ἐλπίζειν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα φέρουσι τοὺς ἐν οὐρανοῖς μισθοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένου, καὶ προστάτας μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς τῆς πίστεως ἔχειν τὰ τοσαῦτα τῆς Δύσεως γένη, μετὰ παντὸς εἴδους παιδεύσεως καὶ σοφίας, καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀεὶ πρωτεύουσαν μηδεπώποθ' ὑποπεσοῦσαν τῷ ψεύδει παρέχοντα, οὕτω δὲ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἀσθενεῖς ἔχειν ὡς νηπίων τοξεύματα τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι βολάς; ἐντεῦθεν ἔμοιγε πολλαχόθεν παραμυθία, μήτε πατρίδος μήτε οἰκίας ἀποροῦντι· καὶ πολλῶν ὡς οἰκείων καὶ φίλων προσφερομένων ἓν λυπεῖ μόνον, ἡ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀναισθησία καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐκπολεμωθέντας εἰς ἀλλοκότους ἐμπεσεῖν δόξας. Οἷς οὐδὲν ἕτερον δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν, ἑαυτῶν αἰσθέσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐκείνης ἐπίγνωσιν εὔχομαι, ἧς χωρὶς οὐδ' ἂν ὠφέλησεν οὐδ' ἡ τῶν Περσῶν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ προστεθεῖσα."

hand, has ever been validated in the Roman Church alone. Otherwise, Christ's promise would have been in vain, and the true Church would exist nowhere on earth, since there is no other church besides the Roman/Western Church and the Constantinopolitan/Eastern Church capable of manifesting that promise.[109]

Although, like Kydones, Kalekas highlighted the numerosity, holiness, and intellectual superiority of the Roman Church and her adherents, magisterial indefectibility—the unfailing orthodoxy of the Church as teaching institution—occupied a central position in his comparison in a way unobserved in that of Kydones. Indefectibility is Kalekas's central criterion according to which he rendered an evaluation about Rome and Constantinople: the latter could not be the one true Church of Christ's promise; the former must be—otherwise the true Church of Jesus Christ cannot be found anywhere on earth. Manuel Kalekas's preoccupation with doctrinal indefectibility as his central criterion in comparing Elder and New Rome was born of his own experiences as a dissenter from Constantinople on the issue of the theology of Gregory Palamas, as well as, without doubt, his own exposure to Latin ecclesiology and perspectives of ecclesiastical history. According to this criterion, Constantinople is characterized as weak—though she postures menacingly at her children, she is incapable of teaching them the true faith clearly, for she has vacillated and still vacillates in her teaching and is thus ecclesiologically impaired. Moreover, the officers of the Church of Constantinople are characterized as squabbling, petty, and imperious; her more humble adherents as almost perversely benighted. Conversely, the Roman/Western Church is presented—historically and in his own time—as the strong and unfailing witness to orthodoxy, as the faithful "ally" for what orthodox Greek Christians remained in their struggle against their wayward ancestral see, as distinguished by holy and wise monastics and theologians, and served by peoples numerous and self-assured[110]—sure of themselves, in a way that the

[109] See Kalekas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, PG 152:240D–241B, 244C–245A, 245C–246A, 246C–248–C, 250C (certain passages cited here, MS B. VI. 20, f. 133v, 137v–138r, are worth comparing to the Greek of the Basel manuscript). On Kalekas positioning himself as among the latest in a line of orthodox Greeks who looked to the Western Church as a refuge of orthodoxy in the face of Greek heresy: see Kalekas, *Correspondance*, 289–91 (#83. 5–8, esp. 8) and 325 (App. #5 (a Greek excerpt from Kalekas's *Contra errores Graecorum,* edited by Loenertz from the MS "Vat. gr. 1112"—see Loenertz's note at Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 325n5). On this same note of his self-perception vis-à-vis the tradition of Greek saints who looked westward, see Kalekas*, On the Errors of the Greeks*, PG 152:244C–245A, 245B–C, 250D, and the Basel manuscript B. VI. 20, f. 139v.

[110] See the previous note, but esp. Kalekas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, PG 152:250D and compare with the Basel manuscript B. VI. 20, f. 139v—there remains some question regarding the proper interpretation of these passages. As can be seen from the Latin translation in the Patrologia Graeca, the translator Ambrogio Traversari himself may have

benighted children of Constantinople cannot be, because unlike the latter the Westerners know that their Mother always speaks the truth.

VI. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT: JOHN PLOUSIADENOS, THE GREEK CHURCH, AND THE GATES OF HELL

This foregoing survey puts us in a good position to conclude by way of briefly considering the view on the patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek Church articulated by John Plousiadenos—whose perspectives represent the final word of the medieval unionist discourse. Here we can observe how the various contributions articulated by past unionists are assimilated and filtered through the ecclesiological vision afforded by Plousiadenos's historical vantage-point as a Greek unionist living after the Council of Florence (1439), but in spite of which—as he himself knew well—many Greek Christians remained outside of the union. This created a tension in the thought of John Plousiadenos.

For instance, the fact of the formal union allowed Plousiadenos to present the "official" Eastern Church of his own time as not only united to Rome, but as, together with Rome, constituting one and the same "catholic" Church. This represents a borrowing of the thought of the thirteenth-century unionist John Bekkos—who in the aftermath of the union of Lyons (1274) could represent his own Church as united to the Western Church by a sort of "bilateral" treaty. In the introduction of his *Expositio pro sancta et oecumenica synodo Florentina* (c. 1464), Plousiadenos asserts—within the context of a passage largely borrowed from Bekkos's *On the Union of the Churches*—that "both [Churches] exist as one Church, and [both Churches] proclaim one faith and piety."[111] Plousiadenos goes on to maintain that

been somewhat unclear about Kalekas's intended meaning. On Traversari as translator, see the beginning of this work in the PG as presented by the editor and Traversari's preface (PG 152:11–14) and Loenertz's introduction in Kalekas, *Correspondance,* 46n1.

[111] Although the words quoted above are not drawn from Bekkos, they occur within a passage heavily drawn from Bekkos, which has already been quoted above. In the following quotation, words drawn from Bekkos are put in bold type: John Plousiadenos, *Expositio pro sancta et oecumenica synodo Florentina,* PG 159:1112C: "ὅμως **οὐ διὰ τοῦτο** πείσουσιν **ἡμᾶς σιωπῆσαι**, **πρὸς** ἐκεῖνον **ὁρῶντας**, **τὸν παντεπίσκοπον ὀφθαλμὸν**, **καὶ πρὸς τὸ** ἀδέκαστον **ἐνατενίζοντας ἐκεῖνο δικαιωτήριον**, ἐν ᾧ **οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς** βλάψει **ἡ ἀλόγως** ἐνταῦθα χεομένη **κατηγορία**. **Οὐ χρεία γὰρ κατηγόρων ἐκεῖ**, **ὡς** οὐδὲ **ἡ τῶν παραλόγως χαριζομένων** βοηθήσειε **σύστασις**· **οὐ χρεία γὰρ συνηγόρων ἐκεῖ**. **Πρὸς γοῦν τὸ** ἀλάθητον **ἐκεῖνο δικαιωτήριον** ἀποβλέποντες, ἥκιστα τῶν λοιδοριῶν φροντίζομεν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν ἡμῶν γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ παῤῥησίᾳ κηρύξομεν. **Τοῦτο** δὲ **μόνον** πάντας **εἰδέναι θέλω περὶ ἡμῶν**, **ὡς πᾶν εἴ τι παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπράχθη** ἢ ἐῤῥέθη, καὶ τὰ παρόντα, **ἐπὶ συστάσει τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς εἰρήνης** πέπρακται· Κύριος οἶδε· καὶ **οὐκ ἐπ' ἀθετήσει οὐδενὸς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ δογμάτων.** Ἀλλ' ὅστις **ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν ταύτην ἦλθεν εἰρήνην**, καὶ τὸν τῆς ἐν Φλωρεντίᾳ συνόδου

the historic and official Eastern Church never anathematized any of the doctrines of the Roman Church now rejected by certain Greeks[112]—an honor-saving statement which, along with his attempt to exculpate most of the Byzantines' ancestors from responsibility for the schism[113]—appears to be in tension with his awareness of the reality of schism, past and present, and the damning implications in consequence for any ecclesial "limbs" severed from Rome (including, presumably, the Greeks).[114]

But predominant in his thought are the "Kydonian" and especially "Kalekan" negative assessments of the Greek Church—at least as she exists currently in Constantinople and her dependencies--as wretched, fallible, and disqualified from being considered the "true" Church. Like Kalekas, Plousiadenos maintains that the Greek Church fell into error numerous times in the past.[115] Whereas Kalekas used this observation as his basis for disqualifying Constantinople from being the "true" Church, Plousiadenos does this on a basis nearer akin to the assessment offered by Kydones: this is the assessment of liberty, dignity, and holiness. Kydones had reflected on the miserable state of his contemporary ancestral Church, whose chief officer was portrayed as essentially the slave of the emperor, whose bishops are seen as hirelings, whose faithful are presented as largely languishing under Islamic rule. It is precisely by virtue of the fact that 1453 and its aftermath had swept much of the Greek East, including the revived Greek patriarchate, under Muslim authority that Plousiadenos denied that it could be the "true" Church. In his pathos-dripping lamentation for the lost empire of Constantine, Plousiadenos showed himself directly inspired by another unionist not considered above but no less important for himself: the Cardinal Bessarion.[116] Rather, the true Church can only be identified with Rome, the beauty of whose churches,

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ὅρον ἐδέξατο, **ὡς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ δογμάτων κατεγνωκὼς, καὶ ὡς τὴν Ῥωμαικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν πρεσβεύειν διεγνωκὼς εὐσεβέστερόν τι τῆς** ἀνατολικῆς τε καὶ **ἡμετέρας**, καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐγνωκὼς τὸ αὐτὸ σέβας ἀπονέμειν ἀμφοτέραις ὡς μιᾷ οὔσαις Ἐκκλησίᾳ, καὶ μίαν κηρυττούσαις πίστιν τε καὶ εὐσέβειαν, **ἔκπτωτος εἴη τῆς Χριστοῦ βασιλείας, καὶ τῷ προδότῃ Ἰούδᾳ καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ σταυρωταῖς τοῦ Σωτῆρος συντεταγμένος."** See Bekkos, *On the Union of the Churches*, PG 141:20C–21A.

[112] Plousiadenos, *Expositio,* PG 159:1112D.

[113] See John Plousiadenos, *Disceptatio*, PG 159:1017A–1020B.

[114] For John Plousiadenos's awareness of the reality of schism beyond Florence see, e.g., *Disceptatio,* PG 159:1225B–D; 1225D–1228A; 1021C. See also John Plousiadenos, *Refutatio Marci Ephesini*, PG 159:1092A. and for his ecclesiological view of "severed limbs" see *Disceptatio,* PG 159:1337C–D, 1340A.

[115] Plousiadenos, *Disceptatio*, PG 159:1337C–D; 1341D–1344A; 1345D–1348B. See 1340A (quoting St. Anastasios).

[116] Plousiadenos, *Disceptatio,* PG 159:1353D–1356A, 1368B–C. See Cardinal Bessarion's *Encyclica ad Graecos,* PG 161:452B–453B. Although Bessarion's writings represent another promising avenue for further comparisons between Elder and New Rome in unionist thought, space constraints prevent me from including substantive treatment. I hope to treat Bessarion's views elsewhere.

the dignity of whose priests, and the reverence of whose faithful bespeak the liberty and decorum that are the trustworthy signs of the Church guaranteed by Christ's unshakeable promise that the "gates of Hell" would "not prevail against her." The fact that Hell has finally prevailed over Constantinople as a result, it is claimed, of her people's persistence in schism, reveals not only the dire negativity of Plousiadenos's final assessment of the patriarchate, but his interpretation of Pope Nicholas V's letter of warning to Emperor Constantine XI in 1451. This letter threatened calamity against the Greek Empire in the event that its subjects should continue to reject Florence.[117] In the aftermath of 1453, Plousiadenos understood this warning as a prophecy and a revelation of the papacy's prophetic connection with divine providence: the pope's anathema is Peter's curse and, if gone unheeded, the harbinger of divine retribution—thus John Plousiadenos's mystical assessment of the power of the papacy revealed throughout history, and with frightening reality in his own day.[118]

Past scholarship has tended to assess Byzantine arguments for union with Rome in theological terms. Often, though not always, these assessments have determined that pro-union arguments are essentially derivative of Latin theology—hence giving apparent justification to the charge that the unionists were *Latinophrones*—"Latin-Minded"—rather than true representatives of an "authentic" Byzantine tradition. Moreover, past treatments have tended to treat the unionists on a case-by-case basis. Without denying the substantial contributions of Latin theology and law to henotic thought, I argue that this isolated, and de-historicized, treatment has obscured from our sight a major theme of unionist discourse, particularly as this discourse developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This major theme involved politics and culture, power and dignity, and enshrined at its heart an extended comparison between the Churches of Elder Rome and New Rome and the civilizations they represented respectively. And in that comparison, New Rome consistently fell short of the power, splendor, and magisterial integrity of Elder Rome as cherished in the unionist imagination. Even if issues of ecclesiastical autonomy or cultural strength do not interest today's theologians or enter into contemporary ecumenical discussions, they nonetheless mattered intensely to the major exponents of Byzantine henotic thought in the fourteenth

[117] This letter is found PG 160:1201–1212.

[118] See Plousiadenos, *Disceptatio*, PG 159:1365C–1368C. This is truly a remarkable passage. In an article forthcoming in *Speculum*, I shall examine the argument of John Plousiadenos in detail.

and fifteenth centuries. Not only does this help us to understand that tradition of thought on its own terms, but it helps us to see, perhaps ironically, how this tradition is authentically "Byzantine": for it was only within the context of an Empire crumbling before the Islamic advance and a Church convulsed by internal doctrinal controversy that these men could look westward, admittedly with their own jaundiced gaze, and see in the West a Christian society offering them a sense of power, freedom, the psychological security of inerrancy, and dignity—everything for which they looked in vain on their native soil.

Trewest Tricherie and the Corsedest Kyrk:
Dichotomy in the Fallen World of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight

Aaron Thurow

The poet of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight uses a series of dichotomies—treachery and truth, victory and defeat, peace and war, spiritual and material, nature and artifice—to both understand and analyze the chivalric code as a guide to virtue in a fallen world. He uses Sir Gawain, a seeming paragon of virtue devoted to perfect obedience, to show the limits of this code, in both its moral perfectionism and enforcement by honor, when facing certain death. He concludes with the possibility of a more perfect but also more difficult code informed by a conscientious awareness of one's own past failures; past defeat becomes a new strength. Ultimately, he leads the reader to examine the moral life considering a distinctly Christian view of a cosmos not divided between material good and evil, but providentially united by the Augustinian mystery of the incarnation in which what is unlike God's perfection becomes like it: a certain kind of lowness, failure, suffering, and even death. Through the rejection of fundamentally Manichaean false dichotomies, the poet argues for a faith that finds nothing that is true to be anathema.

Through a series of apparent dichotomies, the anonymous poet of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight examines the chivalric code as a guide to virtuous action within a fallen world. He reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of this code in the success and failure of its highest follower, who is devoted to perfect obedience to its law and admiration of its highest possible object. At the end, the poet proposes a means by which the faults that he finds might, in part, be rectified, while acknowledging the difficulty of such an attempt. We are left uncertain as to whether the false dichotomies portrayed as leading the knight into danger might, in fact, be inextricable from a life dedicated to such a human-defined code of conduct. The poet sees this entire examination as existing in the light of Christmas and the blend of seemingly dichotomous aspects it represents. I have appended Tolkien's modernization of the original middle English in this essay for the convenience of anyone unfamiliar with the Gawain poet's dialect but also to occasion a few comments where it is interesting to note Tolkien's potential biases in his modernization.

The tale's use of dichotomy begins in the very first line, subtly setting out some of the issues to be addressed:

Siþen þe sege and assaut watz sesed at Troye,
Þe borȝ brittened and brent to brondez and askez
Þe tulk þat þe trammes of tresous þer wroȝt
Watz tried for his tricherie, þe trewest on erthe. (lines 1–4)

[When the siege and the assault had ceased at Troy
and the fortress fell in flame to firebrands and ashes,
the traitor who the contrivance of treason there fashioned
was tried for his treachery, the most true upon earth.]

Obviously, treachery and truth are at odds and yet joined in some way, whether we take "trewest" as referring to the "tricherie" or the "tulk." We are also beginning with an ending, as it were, in the fiery end of Troy being seen here as the beginning of the history of Britain and of the action of this poem. Foreshadowing what I will argue is a felix culpa at the end of the story, even victory and defeat are here simultaneously contrasted and confused: we go straight from a first sentence about the fall of Aeneas's city to a second describing how in consequence he and his kin "patrounes bicome / Welneȝe of al þe wele in þe west iles" ["lords became / of well-nigh all the wealth in the Western Isles"] (6–7). Finally, we may note briefly, in the ambiguity of the first four lines, that the "tulk" might be a number of different people. Is it Antenor or Aeneas, as critics have most often suggested, or might it be someone else? That is, in the context of the story to come, might the author not be referring to Paris, whose utter failure in a test externally very similar to Gawain's (as guest to a noble host and his beautiful but willing wife) causes the fall of Troy here described and the birth of the world in which the poem's action is set? Certainly, if we are to ascribe to this "tulk" a treason worthy of being called "þe trewest on erthe" (in competition, of course, with such figures as Judas) the betrayal must be heinous indeed. Paris may also be said to have been both true and false: being true to his lady while being false to his host, both at great cost. Perhaps erotic love, by its nature, always inclines one to a certain betrayal of other obligations, a problem with the human condition. Whatever the intended implication, however, it suffices to note the dichotomous nature of this ending-beginning of the poem with the destruction-creation of a nation from the truest falsehood on earth.

The break from the savage history of Britain to the courtly festivities of Camelot (stanza 2 to stanza 3) represents another set of important dichotomies. In the wheel of the first stanza and the body of the second, Britain is presented as a place where "were and wrake and

wonder / Bi syþez hatz wont þerinne" ["where strange things, strife and sadness / at whiles in the land did fare"] (16–17), inhabited by "Bolde bredden þerinne, baret þat lofden, / In mony turned tyme tene þat wroȝten" ["bold men ... who in battle rejoiced, / and many a time that betid troubles aroused"] (21–22). By the time we have reached the end of the first sentence of the third stanza, however, we are amidst "rych reuel oruȝt and rechles merþes" ["merriment unmatched and mirth without care"] (40). War has given way to game, and it is hard to take the poet's assertion at the end of the stanza describing the festivities as being intended without a hint of irony: "Hit were now grete mye to neuen / So hardy a here on hille" ["it would now be hard to name / a troop in war so tried"] (58–59). The greatest struggle one may engage in at this court is to try to find a braver warrior-band of dancers at affray with such fearsome ladies? Manly martial warfare becomes "joust" ["just"] (42) and then degrades further to even less martial games of mixed men and women without concern for victory: "Ladies laȝed ful loude þoȝ þay lost haden / And he þat wan watz not wrothe" ["ladies laughed loudly, though they lost the game, / and he that won was not woeful, as may well be believed"], wink wink nudge nudge! (69–70). But what is a warrior at peace or a romance without marvel?

Arthur, be it foolishly or wisely, is not content with this state of affairs in his court, set seemingly in opposition to the outside world as established by the first two stanzas of the poem. He demands a marvel, and into the court rides what seems to be the ultimate symbol of dichotomy: the Green Knight. It should not surprise us that even the literal description of the knight has evoked such varying interpretations. Morgan is quite right to point out the wealth of descriptive language that ties the Green Knight to proper knightly appearance and demeanor: "the dominant idea here is not the churlish but the noble," "the elegance of the Green Knight's dress is such that it can only be the product of a courtly environment," and "the conduct of the Green Knight, indeed, answers the decorum of the hostile challenger. He offers no greeting (line 223) and addresses Arthur in the familiar singular form (lines 258–74)." Morgan goes too far, however, in asserting that "what distinguishes the Green Knight from Gareth is not monstrosity, but simply greenness." The Knight enters on a horse, he is larger than life, he carries strange "unmete" objects (208), he proposes an incredible game, he survives decapitation, and no one knows who he is or from whence he comes! Setting aside the oddities and extremities in his appearance, however, it is from the reaction

of the observers that we most clearly see the overwhelming otherness of this figure. They know him at once for a marvel of some significance, like readers looking upon what they recognize to be a sign, but without understanding its signification:

> "Ther watz lokyng on lenþe þe lude to beholde, /
> For uch mon had meruayle quat hit mene myȝt /
> Þat a haþel and a horse myȝt such a hwe lach"
>
> ["Then they looked for a long while, on that lord gazing; /
> for every man marvelled what it could mean indeed /
> that horseman and horse such a hue should come by"] (232–34).

He is not, to the courtiers, merely a knight who is marvelously green, but they take him at once for something other than human: "Forþi for fantoum and fairyȝe þe folk þere hit demed" ["wherefore a phantom and fay-magic folk there thought it"] (240). Even if Lewis and Tolkien are right that such inquiry distracts from, rather than adding to, the value of the piece, we cannot disregard those who seek the roots of the Green Knight in pagan superstition because the poet, himself, presents Arthur's court as doing exactly this. What is significant here, I take it, is that the court sees this intruder as something so wholly foreign: "al stouned at his steuen and ston-sil seten" ["astounded at his stern voice stone-still they sat there"] (242). But the poet provides details that do, indeed, make us wonder if his opinion matches that of the court.

Interestingly, in addition to providing the familiar, even courtly description of some aspects of the Green Knight, the poet himself observes precisely this dichotomous nature in the Knight: "Half-etayn in erde I hope þat he were / Bot mon most I algate mynn hym to bene, / And þat þe myriest in his muckel þat myȝt ride" ["half a troll upon earth I trow that he was / but the largest man alive at least I declare him / and yet the seemliest for his size that could sit upon a horse"] (140–42). He is either the ultimate man writ large, "mon most," or not a man at all. The Green Knight is man and not-man, he is wild and courtly, and he carries symbols of still further dichotomies:

> Bot in his on hande he hade a holyn bobbe
> (Þat is grattest in grene when greuez ar bare)
> And an ax in his oþer, a hoge and unmete
> A spetos sparþe to expound in spelle quoso myȝt. (lines 206–209)

[But in his one hand he held a holly-bundle,
that is greatest in greenery when groves are leafless,
and an axe in the other, ugly and monstrous,
a ruthless weapon aright for one in rhyme to describe.]

In the holly and axe may be seen life and death, an implement of peace and of war, beauty and cruelty, and the green spring glimpsed amidst the barren winter like the strange feasting of Christmastide amidst winter's deprivation (or perhaps the cross, itself). There is also a tradition of linking holly with the immortal soul for precisely the reason given here by the poet (who reminds us that this is poetry, "spelle," along the way), for the holly is invisible amidst the greenery of summer, but enduring and even seeming to grow greener amidst the death of the world's glory in winter, enduring the axe, as it were. Indeed, the poet's repeated emphasis upon this being "ȝol and new ȝer" ["yule and new year"] (284) (linked by more meaning than mere chronology) and the root of this tale being specifically a "Crystemas gomen" ["Christmas game"] (283) may point us, through the dichotomies of the Green Knight, to the dichotomy of the season. The secular aspect of seasonal dichotomy is reasonably clearly demonstrable in the beginning of the second fitt:

For þaȝ men ben mery in mynde quen þay han mayn drink,
A ȝere ȝernes ful ȝerne and ȝeldez neuer lyke;
Þe forme to þe fynisment foldez ful selden ... (497–99)
After Crystenmasse com þe crabbed Lentoun,
Þat fraystez flesch with þe fysche and fode more simple. (502–503)

[For though men be merry of mood when they have mightily drunk,
a year slips by swiftly, never the same returning;
the outset to the ending is equal but seldom ...
after Christmas there came the crabbed Lenten
that with fish tries the flesh and with food more meagre.]

We move from Arthur's call to return to feasting in stanza 21 to a brief reminder of the feasting in lines 497–99 and then into the ensuing dearth of Lent (note that there is no mention of Easter feasting, as with Christmas, thus heightening the contrast between Christmas and Lent).

It is possible that this is as far as the seasonal dichotomy is intended to go, but it may not be too much of a stretch to suggest that the dichotomous nature of the liturgical occasion is

also meant to be evoked. God become man, spirit in flesh, defeated to triumph, born blameless to die for sin: "Þat Dryȝtyn for oure destine to deȝe watz borne / Wele waxez in uche a won in worlde for His sake" ["that our dear Lord for our doom to die was born / in every home wakes happiness on earth for his sake"] (996–97). It should be noted, however, that there is a sort of explicitly Pagan resurrection in the purely secular description of Spring (504–15). This beautifully descriptive rebirth is brought about not by God's grace, but by "Þe weder of þe worlde with winter hit þrepez" ["the weather of the world mak[ing] war on winter"] (504). This is neither the first nor the last time a scheme of pagan immortality will be hinted at (the Green Knight surviving the axe earlier and the promise of the girdle later), but this will be discussed further below. Here it suffices to note that the poet has created the image, like the court's perhaps false impression of the Green Knight, of a world of radical dichotomy both within itself and between its physical and spiritual truth. In the thriving seasons we are given "Quen Zeferus" ["Zephyr"] (517) and "Heruest" ["Harvest"] (521) both anthropomorphized and active. There is no mention of Christian forces or the liturgical calendar, however, until linked closely with the returning winter: "Meȝelmas mone / Watz cumen with winter wage" ["Michaelmass moon / has winter's boding brought"] (532–33). Secular and holy seem to dwell in opposite worlds, one thriving only when the other fades, and it is nature's power that can be seen overcoming death, not Christ's (remember, no Easter is mentioned). The pagan world seems to be filled with over-abundant life while the Christian promises only a difficult journey ending in inevitable death: "Þen þenkkez Gawan ful sone / Of his anious uyage" ["Gawain then full soon / of his grievous journey thought"] (534–35). Unlike the Green Knight or the season, we know that Gawain cannot survive his own death ... or do we?

Between the court and the wilderness we are given the much-examined description of Gawain's panoply and, especially, his shield. Shoaf argues that the pentangle on the shield is a "natural sign." He means it in a slightly different sense, but I would disagree strongly with the impression such an appellation might give. That is, a truly "natural" sign would be, for instance, a lion (not an uncommon heraldic symbol). If it symbolizes bravery and strength, it also represents a creature that, possessing an independent existence in the real world, exemplifies both these virtues. The pentangle, by contrast, is the ultimate artificial symbol. Neither does it occur in the natural observable world, nor does a mathematical geometric

shape have anything inherently to do with the concept of "trawþe" ["honor"], much less the five-by-five virtues. It is only through human artifice—human intellect and interpretation—that the symbol becomes, as it is, a perfect symbol for truth and chivalric virtue. This artificiality may be intentionally highlighted by the poet in the framing of his interpretation of the pentangle: "I am in tent yow to telle, þof tary hyt me schulde" ["I intend now to tell you, though it may tarry my story"] (624).

The poet intentionally breaks the flow of the action and addresses his audience as a teacher or divine who will interpret this "syngne" ["sign"] used originally by Solomon (625). In such close proximity to the description of the endlessly cycling seasons, it is also interesting to note that the pentangle is similarly endless, in the poet's opinion: "Withouten ende at any noke I oquere fynde, / Whereeuer þe gomen bygan or glod to an ende" ["not ending in any angle anywhere, as I discover, / wherever the process was put in play or passed to an end"] (660–61, emphasis added). Is this yet another stab at immortality? If so, it is closer to being Christian, but falls short because the true symbol of Christian immortality would surely be the cross, which, hinging upon Christ's mortality, is defined by the two things the pentangle does not possess: an ending and a beginning (Alpha and Omega).

With regard to the pentangle there are three points that are, perhaps, most important to note. The first point is that the pentangle contains the quintessence of the chivalric code Gawain claims and is claimed to represent and follow:

> ForÞy hit acordez to þis knyȝt and to his cler armes,
> For ay faithful in fyue and sere fyue syþez,
> Gawan watz for gode knawen and, as golde pured,
> Voyded of uche vylany, with vertuez ennoured
> In mote.
> Forþy þe pentangle new
> He ber in schelde and cote,
> As tulk of tale most trwe
> And gentylest knyȝt of lote. (631–39, emphasis added)

> [So it suits well this knight and his unsullied arms;
> for ever faithful in five points, and five times under each,
> Gawain as good was acknowledged and as gold refined,
> devoid of every vice with virtues adorned.

So there
the pentangle painted new
he on shield and coat did wear,
as one of word most true
and knight of bearing fair.]

The second point is that, if one notes the particular language of this passage, some of which is lost in Tolkien's modernization, there is a real emphasis on honor. That is, this is the right symbol for Gawain because everyone knows it is, and his truth is that of speech, which is inherently social (perhaps even of tales told about him). Just as the pentangle is what the world sees of him, since it is upon the outside of his shield, these virtues are defined and tested by external social measures. This leads to the third point: the pentangle is not, in fact, perfect and all-containing. The "fyue joyez" ["five joys"] of "Heuen Quene" ["heaven's courteous Queen"] (646–47) may be contained, intellectually, within the pentangle, but the image of the queen itself must be appended to the inside of Gawain's shield: "In þe inore half of his schelde hir ymage depaynted, / Þat quen he blusched þerto his belde neuer payred" ["on the inner side of his shield her image depainted, / that when he cast his eye thither his courage never failed"] (649–50). The poet highlights the fact that the pentangle faces away from Gawain and outward to the world, while behind the symbol of the pentangle, what is most present to Gawain and most inspires his knightly courage is the image of the "Heuen Quene." This image, nested in his interpretation of the pentangle, is a symbol of a very different kind, one that the poet would not have to interpret for his reader. The "Heuen Quene," like the example of the lion above, is a symbol that functions much more directly and naturally. More than that, however, it engages the observer not intellectually, as the geometric form of the pentangle, but emotionally and intuitively. We will later learn that Gawain is her knight.

In Gawain's shield taken in its entirety, therefore, we are perhaps given a beautifully rendered image of the chivalric code at its best. That is, in the outward-facing pentangle we see the ordered perfection of a life lived by the exacting and interconnecting standards of a code of conduct enforced by a society which, aware of those standards, constantly judges the knight and, by its reactions, allows him to judge himself. In the inward-facing image of the "Heuen Quene" we are given the highest possible object of the undeniable chivalric emphasis upon the female as the means to the perfection and virtue of the male. As with the

pentangle, however, this focus upon the female also emphasizes the judgment of others (though striving to earn the approval of the Blessed Virgin could hardly be considered a shallow enterprise). The pentangle is endless, overcoming the mortal world, perhaps, in the same way as wisdom and honor: perfectly formed ideas outlast their creators and followers, and the honor of a man lives after him according to how close he has come to that theoretical perfection of virtue.

Thus armed, Gawain sets out from the civilized court into the wild wastes where he is beset by war and winter, fights bulls and bears, and amidst a land where "Wonde þer bot lyte / Þat auþer God oþer gome with goud hert louied" ["there wandered but few / who with good will regarded either God or mortal"] (701–702), he prays for the seemingly impossible, and, at the opposite end of the world, he discovers nothing less than a second court. This is the beginning of the demolishment of the false dichotomies: the flip side of the coin is also a coin. Indeed, Hautdesert is not only not a wild overgrown place, but it is the court in the superlative (writ large, if you will): "Þe comlikest þat ever knyȝt aȝte" ["the most comely that ever a king possessed"] (767), "in Þe best lawe" ["in the best fashion"] (790), indeed--complement of all complements: "A better barbican þat burne blusched vpon neuer" ["the knight a better barbican had never seen built"] (793). Indeed, after all the descriptive and superlative detail, the castle is described as a thing of such artifice that it is almost a toy or decoration: "Þat pared out of papure purely hit semed" ["all pared out of paper it appeared to have been"] (801–802). We are supposed to be, I think, astonished to find not merely some shelter for our hero to hear Mass in, but such perfection of artifice so far from Arthur's court amidst the wild wood. And the castle is far from deserted. In contrast to the striking "Alone" (735) of the 31st stanza (lost by Tolkien's typical alteration of the bob), Gawain is nearly swamped with crowds of attendants (815–25) who observe proper etiquette (826–51) and guide him inside to sumptuous quarters (852–70). And the court is equally impressed with him, so that in the wheel of stanza 36 the poet can assert that the courtiers thought:

> Wheþen in worlde he were,
> Hit semed as he moȝt
> Be prynce withouten pere
> In felde þer felle men foȝt. (871–74)

[He came none knew from where,
but it seemed to them he ought
to be a prince beyond compare
in the field where fell men fought.]

Gawain has become the Green Knight, in a sense and to an extent. The court of Bercilak sees Gawain as a marvel, intruding from the inhospitable wilds into their court, in something like the chivalric but superlative light in which Arthur's court saw the Green Knight. The analogy only goes so far, but it is interesting to note that not only does Gawain not find some wild anti-court at the other end of the world, but he finds a place every bit as civilized as Arthur's court to which he, coming in from the wilds, seems a most impressive figure (though without quite the otherness with which Arthur's court saw Bercilak when he made the reverse journey a year previously). The apparent dichotomy of Gawain versus the Green Knight is, perhaps, also here questioned. The suggestion may also be present, however, that the honor with which Gawain is greeted runs the risk of blasphemy, since he is seen as a "prynce withouten pere"—slightly softened by Tolkien's "prince beyond compare"—but, nonetheless, language that could easily be used of Christ in either case, but which could also have easily been made safe by substituting "knyȝt" ["knight"] for "prynce." Regardless of whether this moral danger is hinted at here, however, the sheer sumptuous detail and the length of the poet's description of Bercilak's court cannot help but be intended to contrast with the preceding description of the wilds and highlight the incongruity of finding such a perfectly civilized place so far from Arthur's court and amidst such apparently godless savagery (Gawain cannot even find a chapel at which to hear mass, after all). Even this will be challenged, however, when we discover that this savage wild from which Gawain escapes is actually Bercilak's hunting preserve! The irony is that, though Gawain's body was at jeopardy in the wilds, his chivalric honor and Christian soul were both far safer amongst the beasts than in the court.

As Savage was, perhaps, one of the first to argue, it seems clear that the hunting and bedroom scenes are thematically linked, and subsequent scholarship has almost unanimously accepted this assertion. I would argue that these scenes, in part, examine and explode the primary false dichotomies set up by the Green Knight's appearance at the beginning of the poem. That is, their enterprises are clearly linked, but seem to stand in

perfect dichotomy: Gawain spends his days so wholly immersed in the courtly world of artificial peace and tranquility that he hardly leaves his bed for half the day while Bercilak rides from dawn to dusk in the wilds, doing violent deeds of martial skill (even if directed towards animals). The game helps highlight this comparison, especially since Bercilak seems to consider it a competition, and compares their performance each day, each time with more advantage going to Gawain in the exchange: "Hit is god" ["That is a good one] (1392), "Bi Saynt Gile, / ȝe ar þe best þat I knowe!" ["By Saint Gile, / your match I never knew!"] (1644–45), and "'Mary,' quoþ þat oþer mon, 'myn is bihynde'" ["'Marry!' said the other man, 'mine is not up to't'"] (1942). The exchanges are rather orange-and-apple affairs and bring to the fore the difficulty of comparing the fruit of these two apparently dichotomous worlds. In the wild, noise is repeatedly emphasized: how the dogs "bayed þayr rachchez" ["amid the barking of dogs"] (1362), and the hunters "Strakande ful stoutly mony stif motez" ["Striking up stongly many a stout horn call"] (1364). By contrast the court is implied to be quiet, as in the lady's stealthy entrance (1182–90), and it is private, shown in how the lady carefully closes the door (1188, 1742). One of the most striking contrasts, however, is the overwhelming energy of Bercilak, rising at or before dawn, and the increasing sloth of Gawain lingering in bed and ever less watchful. Bercilak and his hunters "lepen vp lyȝtly" [leap up lightly] on the first day, "lopen of his bedde" ["leap from his bed"] (1413) on the second (interestingly breaking a stanza prematurely just as he breaks his rest), and they are most directly compared in the broken wheel of the third awakening in stanza 67:

> Sir Gawayn lis and slepes Ful stille and softe al niȝt;
> Þe lorde, þat his craftez kepes, Ful erly he watz diȝt. (1686–89)
>
> [Sir Gawain lies and sleeps soft and sound all night;
> his host to his hunting keeps, and is early arrayed aright.]

Even the preceding bob, "With liȝt" ["With light"] (1685), emphasizes this comparison. Gawain, for his part, goes from lying tensely in bed, debating what to do, but aware of the lady from her first touching the latch of the door (1182–83), to seeming not to be aware of her until she peeps through the bed curtains (1476), until, on the third morning, when surely we have wised up to the certainty that the lady will come again, he is so soundly asleep that the lady "Wayuez vp a window and on þe wyȝe callez ... /... / 'A! mon, how may þou slepe?

/ Þis morning is so clere'" ["wide set a window, and to wake him she called ... 'Ah! man how can't thou sleep, / the morning is so clear!'"] (1743, 1746–47). Interestingly, at the beginning of the next stanza, we are told he has been dreaming of "dreȝ droupyng of dreme draueled Þat noble /... / How þat Destine schuld þat day dele hym his wyrde" ["in heavy darkness drowsing he dream-words muttered ... how destiny should his doom on that day bring him"] (1750–52). This is the reason that he is caught unawares on the third morning, foreshadowing the reason he will take the girdle: fear of his own death. If this is, indeed, a foreshadowing, then the fact that this dream causes his moment of greatest sloth (while he is also caught in bed the other days, he is at least watchful) then it is not unreasonable to see a potential link between the requirement that he stay in bed until Mass and an increased danger that he will fail in the test, just as his very presence at court, rather than hunting with Bercilak, increases his peril. It is not in war and suffering that we most fear death, but in peace and pleasure.

But the apparent dichotomy of the two knights' adventures is gradually revealed to be false. Bercilak, in the wilds, appears to be in danger, but Gawain is in more danger. The hunt appears at first glance to be chaotic and savage, but it has been amply demonstrated by critics that the language of the hunt is that of a complex art done with perfect form: this is the best season for hunting due to the lack of foliage, it is proper to hunt only the females in winter (1156–57), and even the bloody slaughter is done according to precise and proper form. I would add, however, that the first, and most extended, scene of slaughter is intentionally graphic and carnal (it couldn't help but be carnal, but it doesn't have to be included). Before the first bedroom scene, the hunt lacks any significant bloody details; afterwards it is nothing but bloody sensual details. Perhaps what we have here is Hollywood: titillation and dismemberment. The danger we are meant to see in the bedroom is that it will end like the hunt, a danger that would not exist if the dichotomy of court and wild was true. Critics have noted that one may compare Gawain's performance day-by-day to that of the prey in the hunt, but if such an analogy is to be made, it cannot merely be brushed aside that the quarry is not caught only on the third day. The long slaughter description of the first day can leave us no doubt concerning this fact. Just as the exhilarating chase becomes an image for the couple's verbal sparring, its carnal conclusion becomes an image for where that sparring, if the prey is caught, might end. Indeed, the lady's increasingly immodest offers make Gawain squirm (and us moderns laugh) because they hint at a world of sexuality and carnality that

both parties know to exist under the thin but precious veneer of courtesy. It is not that the hunt is seeping into the court, but that it has always been there, and the dichotomy that places the court in opposition to the wilds is illusory. Man's actions in nature are guided by the court, and in the court they are guided by his nature.

But what of the analogy of the two hunts: in the forest and in the bedroom? Can it be carried through further? For instance, might there be some way in which Gawain, like the prey, is indeed caught every day? Perhaps it is not so much a matter of being caught, but in what nature he is caught. As Savage points out, the prey of the first two days is noble and proper prey, while that of the third, the fox, is vermin. Indeed, we see that Bercilak is proud of his catch on the first two days, but on the third he is not: "I haf hunted al þis day and noȝt haf I geten / Bot þis foule fox felle—þe Fende haf þe godez!" ["I have hunted all this day, and naught else have I got / but this foul fox-fell—the Fiend have the goods!"] (1943–44). Perhaps in accepting the kisses each day, but passing them on to his host, Gawain is caught, but proves himself worthy prey. On the third day he does, indeed, give the best chase, almost escaping, but when he is caught, he proves an unworthy catch. Does this suggest that the kisses are in some way not entirely blameless? Morgan, for his part, reverses his own sharply-observed analogy concerning who is the hunter, arguing instead: "To win kisses so entirely pure and passionate from a lady so beautiful, determined, and clever in the circumstances that Gawain finds himself involves moral action of quite exceptional courtesy and chastity ... in no respect worthy of laughter but only of the highest admiration." It is interesting how wholly supporters of Gawain's virtue accept the Green Knight's judgment when Gawain himself does not. Not only do we have the testament of the poem's end, but even while at Hautdesert, Gawain's demeanor is not that of a triumphant man aloof from sin. On the second night we are told:

> Such semblaunt to þat segge semly ho made,
> Wyth stille stolen countenaunce, þat stalworth to plese,
> Þat al forwondered watz þe wyȝt and wroth with hymseluen,
> Bot he nold not for his nurture nurne hir aȝaynez. (1658–61, emphasis added)

> [Such glances she gave him of her gracious favour,
> secretly stealing sweet looks that strong man to charm,
> that he was passing perplexed, and ill-pleased at heart.
> Yet he would fain not of his courtesy coldly refuse her.]

Tolkien reveals his own interpretation here, a bit, with the modesty of his language by comparison to the original text. Gawain, for his part, tries his best in the next stanza to escape what he is now recognizing as a dangerous trap before the third day: "Þe knyȝt craued leue to kayre on Þe morn" ["But said Gawain: 'Grant me leave to go on the morrow!'"] (1670). These are not the actions of a man who has won himself nothing but renown so far, and it is precisely his chivalry that constrains him from flight or reproach. When we are told that their play is blameless, the poet is very careful in how he phrases it: "Bot he defended hym so fayr that no faut semed, / No non euel on nawþer halue, nawþer þay wysten / Bot blysse" ["his defense was so fair that no fault could be seen, / nor any evil upon either side, nor aught but joy / they wist"] (1552–53 emphasis added). Tolkien mistranslates seemed ("semed") to make the lovers' judgment seem to be that of the poet. However, what the poet actually asserts is that their actions seemed not to be evil, and they did not know them to be, but they only knew bliss.

What, then, are we to make of this possibly willful ignorance in light of Gawain's chivalric code? The pentangle both succeeds and fails for deeply examined reasons. That is, the reason Gawain is caught on the first two days, to the extent that he is, is because of the very code that saves him from falling further into sin on those days. The Lady wins the first kiss by questioning Gawain's identity:

> So god as Gawayn gaynly is halden,
> And cortaysye is closed so clene in hymseluen,
> Couth not lyȝtly haf lenged so long wyth a lady
> Bot he had craued a cosse bi his courtaysye
> Bi sum towch of summe tryfle at sum talez ende. (1297–1301, emphasis added)
>
> [One so good as Gawain the gracious is held,
> who all the compass of courtesy includes in his person,
> so long with a lady could hardly have lingered
> without craving a kiss, as a courteous knight
> By some tactful turn that their talk led to.]

That is, the chivalric ideal, upheld by honor—the opinions of others and especially that of the female—is open to a sort of literary assault. Who writes the fiction defines the righteous knight. At the end of a proper knightly tale there is always that little trifle ... a kiss. She tells Gawain what his own identity demands of him, and he complies. Thereafter, she may kiss

him when she likes: "I am at you comaundement, to kysse quen yow lykkez" ["I am at your call and command to kiss when you please"] (1501). But we cannot ignore the fact that she does not simply kiss him that first time but wins him over to accept her kiss; he is not a purely passive victim. On the second day, however, despite her continued efforts to define him by her own texts, Gawain's chivalry serves him well enough to prevent the greater crime of kissing her himself, which he equates with an act of force. It is his dependence upon the social judgment or "favor" or "folk where I dwell" ("Þede þer I lende," line 1499) that protects him this day, just as his dependence upon the individual judgment of the lady and the books of chivalry she interprets weakened him on the first. The weakness revealed by the first day, it seems, had something to do with the apparent passivity of the crime. That is, unable to judge the individual woman, he must allow her to do what she pleases, but in defining himself according to the judgment of a broader community, he is able to avoid doing evil in the overt actions of his own will. The second day is his most triumphant, though she still leaves with a kiss, and his conscience moves him to shame at dinner and the attempt to leave in the morning. Bercilak, however, quite correctly and ominously assesses the trends of the last two encounters after the exchange in the wheel of stanza 65: "Þe ben ryche in a whyle / Such chaffer and ȝe drowe" ["You'll be wealthy in a while, / such trade if you pursue"] (1646–47). This is not a richness Gawain should desire to be moving towards.

But whence comes the critical fall on the third day? Even if we mistrust the Green Knight's assessment, it is the third day that garners Gawain the mark he will carry with him and thus, seems to represent the greatest sin. It seems reasonably clear that Gawain's fear of his own death motivates the taking of the girdle. The lady catches him strikingly unaware on the third morning because he is dreaming of the axe's "buffet" (1754). His chivalry turns aside all her tactics, even refusing the ring (1822) and, at first, the girdle (1836–38), but when he learns that the girdle will save his life he sees it immediately as a "juel for þe joparde" (1856) and accepts it (Tolkien translates this as "prize for the peril", but this is based on the same Biblical imagery he misses in his translation of Pearl). This description of the girdle is especially interesting in light of where jewels are properly supposed to go in Pearl, where all "juels" that are lost in the "joparde" proceed to the celestial city. This is both an old Christian dilemma and an interesting comment on the chivalric code we have seen, for the most part, defending Gawain so well. That is, what fear need a Christian have of death if Christ is alive?

And yet the fear remains. But what can an idealized system of virtue so mathematically precise that it forms an endless knot, enforced by the judgment of all civilized humanity, do to help a man with that moment when he must, being mortal (unlike the knot), leave the world and its honors entirely behind? Gawain thinks, "Myȝt he haf slypped to be unslayn þe sleȝt were noble" ["if by some slight he were not slain, 'twould be a sovereign device"] (1858, emphasis added). "Noble" is perhaps skillfully and carefully used here, implying both that Gawain thinks such an escape would be good in itself and that it would be in some way proper for a knight (perhaps this notion disturbed Tolkien, resulting in his modification). As can be seen in all three of the other texts of the Pearl Manuscript, the poet seems to see one of the central aspects of Christian living as being the task of making one's soul worthy for what will come after the time of death (clean and like a perfect pearl, not a complexly interwoven pentangle). The chivalric code, as endless knot, is focused upon this world and the judgment one receives within it, not upon the world to come. This is why Gawain, for courtesy, cannot chastise the lady and remove himself from temptation to sin. The pentangle (with the perfection of womanhood on the reverse) is his shield, his defender, but simultaneously his Achilles' heel.

We should note, in passing, an interesting juxtaposition that might bear upon this encounter and the chivalric code being tested here. During the third encounter the poet comments: "Gret perile bitwene hem stod, / Nif Mare of hir knyȝt mynne" ["great peril between them stood, / unless Mary for her knight should pray"] (1768–69). As suggested by her image on his shield, Gawain is Mary's knight. She stands in the place usually occupied in romance by the beloved and, as such, may be seen as the highest possible object of the chivalric focus upon the female. Interestingly, after this assertion by the poet—that his lady, Mary, is his only hope—the very next thing the lady does is ask if Gawain already has a "lemmen" [beloved lady] and Gawain answers: "In faith I welde riȝt non, / Ne non wil welde þe quile" ["Nay! lover have I none, / and none will have meanwhile]" (1790–91). This is sufficient to defeat the lady's assault (or so it seems), but it is passive chastity not active devotion that he exhibits. If Mary is Gawain's lady, upon whom his defense depends, why can he not say so? Because it would be an absurd answer and out of context? The discovery of the Green Chapel is, in part, that such an answer would have been neither absurd nor out

of place in a contest where not only Gawain's chivalric virtue but his Christian virtue was being tested.

Before we move on to that final encounter, it occurs to me that the evolving description of the slaughter of Bercilak's prey may lend still-further insight into Gawain's greatest failure. That is, the slaughter scenes are each noticeably different and occur only after we know the outcome of the bedroom encounter, but the last, occupying only two lines after we have seen Gawain's slip, stands in striking contrast to the extended sensual gore of the first: "and syþen þay tan Reynarde / And tyuen of his cote" ["and Reynard then they sieze, / and off with his cloak"] (1920–21). Just as the court is not as far from the carnal world as we might initially assume, so the most dangerous carnality, to one of Gawain's code, is the least overt. It is not coveting lady's flesh that will cause his fall, but coveting his own flesh. As Reynard's coat is removed, so Gawain is metaphorically stripped of the raiment of the pentangle, in accepting the girdle to wear in clear contravention of his code. That is, in choosing the "noble" sin, Gawain proves himself not a noble beast but a wily vermin.

In Gawain's assessment of the Green Chapel we see that he is still working under at least some of the false dichotomies examined throughout the text. Indeed, the Green Chapel seems, at first, to be much more what we might have expected to find at the other end of the world from Arthur's court:

> "Now iwysse," quoþ Wowayn, "wysty is here;
> Þis oritore is ugly, with erbez ouergrowen.
> Wel bisemez þe wyȝe wruxled in grene
> Dele here his deuocioun on Þe Deuelez wyse;
> Now I fele hit is þe Fende, in my fyue wyttez,
> Þat hatz stoken me þis steuen to strye me here." (2189–93)

> ["On my word," quoth Wawain, "'tis a wilderness here!
> This oratory looks evil. With herbs overgrown
> it fits well that fellow transformed into green
> to follow here his devotions in the Devil's fashion.
> Now I feel in my five wits the Fiend 'tis himself
> that has trapped me with the tryst to destroy me here."]

But why is this the "corsedest kyrk" ["church most accursed"] (2196), as he puts it? There are no satanic symbols, no bloody sacrifices, not even a Celtic knot or image of the Green

Man carved on the wall. That the answer has something to do with Gawain's chivalric code is implied in the reference to his five wits (the first and lowest of the five-fives of the pentangle). It belongs to the devil, Gawain seems to suggest, because it is "with erbez ouergrowen" (it is of the wilds and of the physical world, not the court, the spirit, or of proper social order) and because he will be "stryed" ["destroyed"] here. That is, death, like nature and flesh, is seen as a thing of inherent evil because the lens of his code requires this appearance of dichotomy between life and death in order to facilitate the clear judgment of the observer necessary to enforce the code's virtues by honor. Gawain is, of course, forgetting "Þat Dryȝtyn for oure destine to deȝe watz borne" ["that our dear Lord for our doom to die was born"] (996): the Christmas mystery of God becoming flesh and entering nature in order to triumphantly die and make of death a blessing of eternal life. As it turns out, the Green Chapel will be the place of his spiritual rebirth and awakening, not a place of devilry at all. One may even ask whether, had Gawain not seen nature as antithetical to divinity rather than Its creation, on Christmas Eve of all days, he might have found the Green Chapel and celebrated Mass there safe from the temptations that led to his sin?

Indeed, more explicit biblical allusions may be intended in the imagery of the chapel. The opening in the mound from which the spring flows, for instance, may allude to the open tomb of Christ from which the spring of life flows eternally (John 4:13–16). Ezekiel 47 places the stream of life in a wilderness not unlike that surrounding the Green Chapel. John 4:13–16 is particularly apt because it links the image of the stream of life with Christ's encounter with the woman at the well who is, apparently, guilty of adultery. Gawain's contemplation of what might happen at the Green Chapel around midnight further emphasizes this possible allusion to Christ's tomb, especially given the theme of dichotomy throughout the text, in that he assumes that the darkness of "mydnyȝt" belongs only to the devil even while acknowledging it is the proper time for even the devil to be saying "matynnes" (2188–89). The reader may be meant to recall that it was in the darkest night that Christ left the tomb and precisely at matins that Easter is celebrated in the monastic tradition, contrasting the darkness with the coming of the Light.

In his judgment of Gawain, then, the Green Knight merely reiterates Gawain's implicit judgment of his own actions when he accepted the girdle. The Green Knight suggests that it is but little shame to love one's own life more than virtue: "But for ȝe lufed your lyf—þe lasse

I yow blame" ["because you loved your own life; the less do I blame you"] (2368). At the chapel, however, the remaining false dichotomies are dissolved. When Gawain understandably flinches at the gigantic axe about to hit his neck, the Green Knight says "Þou art not Gawayn" ["Thou'rt not Gawain"] (2270), mirroring the language and tactics of the lady, but also causing us to realize that her manipulation of identity in turn mirrored that of the Green Knight when he first persuaded Arthur to enter into his shameful game: "What, is þis Arþures hous?" ["What! Is this Arthur's house?"] (309). The weakness of an identity defined by external human judgment is revealed, as is Arthur's own analogous failure at the beginning of the poem. Indeed, the implicit failure in accepting the game in the first place is highlighted by the brief explanation that so many critics have brushed past as irrelevant or a "degraded myth." Morgan le Fay (who turns out to be as closely related to Gawain as the court is to the wilds) intended "for to haf greued Gaynour and gart hir to dyȝe / With glopnyng of þat ilke gome þat gostlych speked / With his hede in his honed" ["Guinevere to hurt, that she in horror might die / aghast at that glamoury that gruesomely spake / with its head in its hand before the high table"] (2460–62). That is, once the head was cut, half Morgan's intention (the other half being to test the court's chivalry) was already achieved. Indeed, we may now remember that Arthur noticed Guenevere's distress at the sight of the marvel, saying, "Dere Dame, today demay yow neuer. / Wel bycommes such craft vpon Cristmasse" ["Dear lady, today be not downcast at all! / Such cunning play well becomes the Christmas tide"] (470–71). Just as the outcome of the Green Chapel is already decided by the time Gawain gets there, so the game was one that could only truly be won before it ever began. In another sense, Gawain thinks he is playing the beheading game, which was actually over when Guenevere had to be exposed to the speaking head, when he is, in fact, still playing the game begun in Hautdesert and awaiting the even exchange. Death, the end, does not stand in dichotomy to life, the author suggests, but the nature of one is defined by the nature of the other. The chapel is no more evil than Hautdesert, since their masters are the same. Just as in the Christian cosmos, life and death have but one Lord and Master, from Whose cave-like tomb flows life eternal.

Gawain, in refusing the Green Knight's judgment and retaining the girdle, gains a tool by which his chivalry might be brought to an even greater perfection as a guide to a Christian life. Like the fall of Troy with which the poem begins, his defeat makes possible even greater

perfection. The girdle, as he retains it after the test, is no longer emblematic of a false form of pagan immortality by which to escape death. Instead, it promises to become a tool by which, through knowledge of, rather than imagined escape from, the fleshly, Gawain may perfect his spirit:

> When I ride in renoun remorde to myselven
> Þe faut and þe fayntyse of þe flesche crabbed,
> How tender hit is to entyse teches of fylþe.
> And þus, quen pryde schal me pryk for prowes of armes,
> Þe loke to þis luf-lace schal leþe my hert. (2434–38)

> [When I ride in renown, ruefully recalling
> the failure and the frailty of the flesh so perverse,
> so tender, so ready to take the taints of defilement.
> And thus, when pride my heart pricks for prowess in arms,
> one look at this love-lace shall lowlier make it.]

The girdle will guard him internally against the pride that sought an immortality without the death which even Christ endured. He will no longer overvalue his own flesh, however noble.

The irony of the end is that, while Gawain may have found what is, in effect, a deeply Christian means to further perfect his chivalric code through the honest recollection of his own imperfection actions, Arthur's court takes the same external sign—the girdle—for a badge of honor: "For þat watz accorded þe renoun of þe Rounde Table / And he honoured þat hit hade" ["For that was reckoned the distinction of the Round Table, / and honour was his that had it evermore after"] (2519–20). If it is possible to introduce self-assessment (conscience) into a chivalric code based upon external judgment (honor), it will not be an easy task and will always be in peril of falling from humility into pride, since the girdle, like humility, is a sign the honesty of which cannot be judged by anyone but the bearer.

In conclusion we may say that the poet's assessment of chivalry as a guide to the Christian life is cautious, but far from entirely pessimistic. Indeed, it is a far-cry from the grim conclusions intimated in Chaucer's assessments of chivalry in the "Knight's Tale" and elsewhere. Gawain's perfect chivalry defends him from the worst sins of the world, and provides for his cleansing confessions, but the poet reveals not only that there are limitations to any such worldly law, but that such a law actually creates new weaknesses. Through the testing of false dichotomies and true ones, the poet examines the perfection of an earthly

code as a guide to the Christian life and presents the complexity of a world created, in a sense, by the joining of dichotomies that was the incarnation of Christ.

The Counterrevolutionary Thought of C. S. Lewis

Joshua Paladino

C. S. Lewis is not usually thought of as a political theorist. Yet Lewis's literary works, rather than divorced from politics, connect moral decline and political disorder, especially what he saw as the danger of technocratic rule in the postwar era. This article, looking both to Lewis's own writings and current scholarship, seeks to revise our views of Lewis as a political thinker. It argues that his writings demonstrate a persistent theme of counterrevolutionary opposition to the growing bureaucratic elite and scientific education of the postwar era. He provided critiques of technocracy, the state of exception, the authoritative teaching of humanitarian justice, and modern gender roles in marriage and society. Moreover, he called for spirited resistance to the modern state. A new ruling class, he hoped, could overturn the pieties of humanitarian justice and scientific democracy and replace them with retributive justice and traditional morality.

In his 1957 essay "Delinquents in the Snow," C. S. Lewis warned that Britain was descending into anarcho-tyranny—a state where the government failed to protect citizens from crime while aggressively regulating ordinary freedoms.[1] Drawing on classical political theory, Lewis argued that such conditions could drive individuals to reclaim their natural right to self-defense, potentially spawning vigilante groups. While he advocated the formation of associations to resist a bureaucratic, anarcho-tyrannical regime, he rejected violent rebellion as a viable option in the modern context, arguing that the same criminals and technocrats who benefited from the old regime would end up co-opting the revolution for their own ends. He advocated, instead, for a counterrevolutionary strategy that aimed to cultivate opposition to the modern state and create a new ruling class to overturn the pieties of humanitarian justice and scientific democracy and replace them with retributive justice and traditional morality.

Lewis is rarely considered a political theorist, yet his writings reveal a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between moral decline and political disorder. His analysis

[1] C. S. Lewis never used the phrase anarcho-tyranny, but it accurately and efficiently summarizes his opinion about the British state after the world wars. The term comes from a 1994 article by Samuel T. Francis, "Anarcho-Tyranny, U.S.A.," *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture* (July 1994), who defines it as "a kind of Hegelian synthesis of what appear to be dialectical opposites: the combination of oppressive government power against the innocent and the law-abiding and, simultaneously, a grotesque paralysis of the ability or the will to use that power to carry out basic public duties such as protection or public safety. And, it is characteristic of anarcho-tyranny that it not only fails to punish criminals and enforce legitimate order but also criminalizes the innocent."

of mid-twentieth-century Britain anticipated many contemporary concerns about the administrative state, criminal justice reform, and cultural transformation. This paper argues that Lewis developed a coherent counterrevolutionary strategy—not a program for immediate violent overthrow, but a framework for principled resistance to technocratic governance rooted in natural law and spirited opposition to injustice.

This paper examines Lewis's critique of technocracy and the state of exception, his opposition to humanitarian justice, his controversial stance on gender roles in marriage and society, and his call for spirited resistance to the political and social crises of his era. Lewis foresaw the dangers of a technocratic elite replacing traditional justice with rehabilitative measures, thereby fostering a regime that alternates between an anarchic state of nature, in which the state refuses to protect innocent citizens, and a tyrannical state of exception, in which the state punishes the innocent and promotes the rule of criminals.

The paper also discusses Lewis's reflections on arbitrary restrictions of property rights, such as in the Crichel Down and Pilgrim affairs, and the lingering state of exception following World War II, which he believed signaled a drift toward totalitarianism. Lewis's advocacy for retributive justice, his disdain for bureaucratic property regulations, and his call for spiritedness are analyzed as counterrevolutionary strategies to combat modern governance.

The resistance to anarcho-tyranny requires, at least in part, a revival of traditional roles in the family so that children's education in justice, which begins in the family, can be properly ordered. While Lewis never explicitly addressed women's political participation, his writings on complementary gender roles in domestic life suggest he may have envisioned similar distinctions in public life. However, this interpretation must remain tentative given the limited textual evidence and Lewis's explicit statement that he opposed removing women's legal equality. Given the difficulty surrounding Lewis's views on gender roles, a brief explanation here will clarify the direction of the argument concerning the fulfillment of male and female nature. Vera Gebbert, who corresponded with Lewis for over a decade, sent him a letter humorously stating that she had confused pregnancy for seasickness. In response, Lewis likened a woman's experience during pregnancy to a man's experience in war, connecting each gender's purpose and fulfillment to distinct spheres: "I am sure you felt as I did when I heard my first bullet, 'This is War: this is what Homer wrote about.' For, all said and done, a woman who has never had a baby and a man who has never been either in

a battle or a storm at sea are, in a sense, rather outside—haven't really 'seen life'—haven't served."[2] However, Lewis clearly indicated that these roles can converge and blend for the well-being of both sexes if males and females fulfill their respective domestic and political responsibilities. In a letter to Sister Penelope, Lewis stated that "there ought spiritually to be a man in every woman and a woman in every man. And how horrid the ones who haven't got it are: I can't bear a 'man's man' or a 'woman's woman.'"[3] These statements, along with others described below, support the argument that Lewis believed men should lead in the outer world while women should cultivate the home, though their duties can often be flexible, as illustrated in *That Hideous Strength* at St. Anne's, where men and women share domestic obligations and both engage in political operations.

Finally, the paper considers Lewis's Christian perspective on the limits of political action, his emphasis on both moderation and manly vigilance, and his suggestion that friendship serves as a bulwark against state power.

ANARCHO-TYRANNY, THE STATE OF NATURE, AND VIGILANTISM

Lewis wrote that Britain's political conditions had become "like that of the South after the American Civil War."[4] Law and order had deteriorated to such an extent by 1957 that Lewis feared "that some sort of Ku Klux Klan may appear and that this might eventually develop into something like a Right or Central revolution."[5] Vigilante societies, he predicted, might spring up to fill the vacuum created by the state's negligence of its primary duty of protecting citizens. These organizations might provide temporary relief as they justly reassert their right to punish violations of the natural law, but they would likely fail in one of two ways, according to Lewis. First, the state might rediscover its love of violence and summon all its forces against those who punish wrongdoing. The state, in other words, might find the strength to destroy the very citizens who want to prevent anarchy, suppressing the remaining citizens with the clarity, vigilance, and courage necessary to identify and punish infringements of the civil and

[2] Lewis to Vera Gebbert, March 23, 1953, in *Collected Letters*, ed. Walter Hooper, 3 vols. (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 2009), 3:310–11.
[3] Lewis to Sister Penelope, October 1, 1952, in *Collected Letters*, 3:158.
[4] Lewis, "Delinquents in the Snow," in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics*, ed. Hooper, in *The Timeless Writings of C. S. Lewis: The Pilgrim's Regress, Christian Reflections, God in the Dock* (New York: Inspirational Press, 1970), 510.
[5] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510–11.

moral law. In this crusade against citizen-based law enforcement, the state would probably partner with criminals against the law-abiding. Lewis came to this conclusion based on his observation of law enforcement and adjudication in Britain. "Criminal law increasingly protects the criminal and ceases to protect his victim," he wrote.[6] Second, the vigilante societies might find that the government poses a fundamental threat to their safety, and, instead of satisfying themselves with enforcing the law in place of the government, they would resort to overthrowing and replacing it. But Lewis suggested that the second option, the right to revolution, would likely result in a similar government under a new guise because the criminals and technocrats who rule the current regime would embed themselves into the revolution. Lewis witnessed the early manifestations of anarcho-tyranny, a condition in which a totalitarian state's unprecedented police and military power serves to prevent the enforcement of law and to protect criminals from punishment. He predicted that anarcho-tyrannical governance would strengthen and spread.[7]

Based on "classical political theory," Lewis argued that the state's refusal or failure to protect citizens means that "'nature' is come again and the right of self-protection reverts to the individual."[8] Unlike a traditional state of nature, however, the English government had not lost its power or will to punish; it had lost its will to punish criminals. Lewis warned that the state *would* punish a man with the audacity to enforce the traditional moral law with his own hand. In this modern state of nature, a totalitarian government with a full monopoly on force selectively allows or actively creates areas in which the law shall not be enforced, even if it requires violence to prevent citizens from enforcing the law. Under these twentieth-century conditions, a man cannot safely resume his right to self-defense in the same way that an eighteenth-century man could simply shoot a criminal who had invaded his property. Lewis wrote that if he had taken up his natural right to self-defense when "hooligans" stole "curious weapons and an optical instrument from his shed," he would have been "prosecuted" more harshly than the boys who robbed him.[9] Rather than acting alone, then, citizens must organize societies for collective protection, but these societies are likely to be infiltrated by the state or by criminals and then turned toward ideological purposes or incited

[6] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.
[7] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.
[8] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.
[9] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.

to full revolution. Under classical political theory, according to Lewis, a man regains his right to protect himself, his family, and his fellow humans whenever the government fails to do so. Lewis argued that a government, like that in Britain, purposefully nurtures lawlessness as a trap for citizens; it wants citizens as individuals or within vigilante societies to reclaim the right to self-defense so that it can justify the steps necessary to bring about a police state that disregards the rule of law, protects criminals, and prevents citizens from enforcing the moral law.

Across his writings, Lewis identified four potential revolutions that Britain could suffer: a "Dictatorship of the Criminals," which would devolve into "mere anarchy" because criminals cannot govern effectively; a "Right or Central revolution" that would arise to quell anarcho-tyranny but would likely exacerbate lawlessness;[10] an oligarchic tyranny that would present itself as a "'scientific planned democracy;'"[11] and a "Left revolution" that would attempt to correct economic injustices.[12] Lewis understood these potential revolutions as interconnected manifestations of the same underlying intellectual, social, moral, and political crisis. These four types of revolutions all stem from the rise of technocracy. Technocrats—what Lewis called the Conditioners in the *Abolition of Man*—came to power after World War II, and they brought scientific planned democracy, or technocracy, to Britain and the West. Lewis wrote:

> Again, the new oligarchy must more and more base its claim to plan us on its claim to knowledge. If we are to be mothered, mother must know best. This means they must increasingly rely on the advice of scientists, till in the end the politicians proper become merely the scientists' puppets. Technocracy is the form to which a planned society must tend.[13]

Lewis defended politics against technocratic planning. He wanted politicians to retain their proper position in which they deliberate and decide about matters of justice and the common good. Today, politics proper has ended, and politicians merely implement the advice they receive from scientists.

[10] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.
[11] Lewis, "A Reply to Professor Haldane," in *On Stories: and Other Essays on Literature*, ed. Hooper (San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2017), 115.
[12] Lewis, "Meditation on the Third Commandment," *God in the Dock*, in *Timeless Writings*, 431.
[13] Lewis, "Is Progress Possible? Willing Slaves of the Welfare State," *God in the Dock*, in *Timeless Writings*, 514.

Then, from the scientifically planned democracy, anarcho-tyranny emerged. The technocrats viewed criminals as pathological, seeing them as victims of their environment, biology, or upbringing—patients to be cured rather than citizens to be punished. This lenient attitude toward crime, rooted in behavioralist theories about human nature, led to anarchy. Simultaneously, the technocratic desire to plan and organize society limited citizens' economic rights. Despite these increasingly despotic conditions, Lewis believed that political action under anarchic or tyrannical situations should focus on reversing the trends that contributed to the government's failure, rather than accelerating them or attempting to overthrow the state. He advocated for a moderate approach, suggesting that the government's opponents should neither spark a revolution nor passively observe as the state's failure causes a regression to the state of nature.

Lewis affirmed that the right to protection reverts to the people in a state of nature, but he avoided using the language of the right to revolution. In *C. S. Lewis on Politics and the Natural Law*, Justin Buckley Dyer and Micah Watson wrote that Lewis, following Locke, "agreed that when a government ceases to live up to [the law of nature], the people reclaim rights once given up, and they have moral justification for revolution."[14] Lewis would have accepted Dyer and Watson's formulation, but he stressed that citizens reclaim the right to self-protection, not revolution, in a passage about the possible rise of a vigilante organization. The advice against forming an organization to overthrow the existing government comes from a practical consideration about the nature of regime change, not a principled opposition to violence against state actors:

> Revolutions seldom cure the evil against which they are directed; they always beget a hundred others. Often they perpetuate the old evil under a new name. We may be sure that, if a Ku Klux Klan arose, its ranks would soon be chiefly filled by the same sort of hooligans who provoked it. A Right or Central revolution would be as hypocritical, filthy and ferocious as any other. My fear is lest we should be making it more probable.[15]

The right of self-protection in the state of nature implies a right to revolution—a right to oust the current government by force and replace it with one that will punish criminals, defend

[14] Justin Buckley Dyer and Micah J. Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics and the Natural Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 103.
[15] Lewis, "Delinquents," 511.

the innocent, and protect the nation from external enemies without entering into unjust wars. Lewis could have expounded on the right to revolution, but he chose to focus on the individual's right to protect himself against crime, not the people's collective right to depose their rulers. While the prediction of vigilante violence in England may appear like a "*threat*," Lewis clarified that he does not "wish for such a result" nor would he "willingly contribute to it."[16]

Instead, Lewis hinted at several counterrevolutionary tactics to prevent upheavals, including public-spirited resistance to crime and tyranny, the recovery of distinct roles for the sexes to reinvigorate politics while protecting the home, and the cultivation of manly friendships.[17] Christians must participate in politics to oust the new oligarchy, which rules based on technical skill, and inaugurate a ruling class that will govern according to moral law by protecting property rights, avoiding unjust wars, and punishing crime.

THE CRICHEL DOWN AFFAIR, THE PILGRIM AFFAIR, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Lewis's analysis of property rights violations reveals how technocratic governance systematically undermines traditional sources of independence that citizens needed to resist state power. He wrote about the British government's increasing disregard for property rights, its refusal to punish crime, and its prolonged use of wartime powers without regard for the common good. In a letter to I. O. Evans, a British civil servant, Lewis mentioned two instances of economic tyranny: the Crichel Down affair and the Pilgrim affair.[18] In 1938, the British government compulsorily purchased more than 300 acres of the Crichel estate for military purposes. The government promised to sell the land back to the owners after World War II. Instead, the military transferred the land to the Ministry of Agriculture, which refused to sell it and then rented it for a profit. The ministry eventually returned the land to its owners, but the event demonstrated the government's dishonesty and hostility to property rights. The Pilgrim affair followed a similar pattern, but it ended tragically. In 1952, the Romford Council compulsorily purchased Edward Pilgrim's land without his knowledge or consent. Five years earlier, Parliament had passed a law that authorized local governments

[16] Lewis, "Delinquents," 511.
[17] Lewis, "Is Progress Possible?," 514.
[18] Lewis to I. O. Evans, December 22, 1954, in *The Collected Letters*, 3:547–48; Lewis to Jocelyn Gibb, February 1, 1958, in *The Collected Letters*, 3:911–12.

to purchase land without the owners' consent for economic development. In this instance, the Romford Council bought Pilgrim's land to start a housing development. When Pilgrim learned that the council had taken his land, he contested the compulsory purchase, but the council denied his appeal. Pilgrim reported that the council built a high-rise apartment complex in the lot next to his home; the high-rise blocked the sun, forcing him to use electric lights during the day. He fell into depression and committed suicide in a tool shed on the property that the council had seized for the housing development.

Lewis wrote a short poem about the two events: "The weight of Crichel Down upon your backs / The blood of Mr. Pilgrim on your heads."[19] This poetic response reveals the moral weight Lewis attributed to these seemingly administrative matters, recognizing them as symptoms of a broader assault on the foundations of free society. The persistence of wartime emergency powers provided the legal framework for this expansion of state control. These measures represented more than temporary expedients; they constituted a fundamental transformation of the British constitutional order that Lewis believed would prove difficult if not impossible to reverse through normal political processes.

Lewis saw these prominent cases as part of a British political trend where the government trampled on property rights and prioritized economic development over the rights of citizens. In a letter to an American discussing the economic policies of the Labour government after World War II, Lewis wrote: "Under the last government, things were much the same here—acute shortage of building materials, but plenty available for children's swimming pools, community centres etc. It is I think part of the modern totalitarian pattern of life—neglect the home, but let the community be luxurious."[20] As the government gets involved in economic development, it restricts citizens' right to develop their private property. Screwtape favorably compared the restriction of property rights in England to the totalitarian victories in "the Nazi and the Communist state."[21] In England, Screwtape boasted, "a man could not, without a permit, cut down his own tree with his own axe, make it into planks with his own saw, and use the planks to build a tool-shed in his own garden."[22] Lewis

[19] Lewis to I. O. Evans, December 22, 1954, in *The Collected Letters*, 3:547.
[20] Lewis to Vera Gebbert, December 9, 1952, in *Collected Letters*, 3:259.
[21] Lewis, "Screwtape Proposes a Toast," in *The World's Last Night and Other Essays* (San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2017), 62.
[22] Lewis, "Screwtape Proposes a Toast," 62.

also complained that the government had "chosen this period of rearmament of all possible periods to nationalize the steel industry."[23] The war effort was over, yet the government had seized property against the wishes of the owners and the laborers, according to Lewis.[24] These restrictions appear minor, especially in contemporary Western nations, where citizens accept that the government exists to issue permits, build housing developments, and control major industries; however, Lewis warned his civil servant friend, Evans, about these early signs of tyranny. He wrote that a totalitarian impulse had crept into the British government, which might demand that civil servants enforce tyrannical edicts:

> I don't think you have worse taste or worse hearts than other men. But I do think that the State is increasingly tyrannical and you, inevitably, are among the instruments of that tyranny.... This doesn't matter for you who did most of your service when the subject was still a freeman. For the rising generation it will become a real problem, at what point the policies you are ordered to carry out have become so iniquitous that a decent man must seek some other profession.[25]

The violations of property rights during the Crichel Down and Pilgrim affairs—as well as the growing interventionism of the modern state—served as a warning to Lewis that tyranny would settle over Britain if its citizens could not smother it.

THE BRITISH STATE OF EXCEPTION

Lewis wrote repeatedly that the government had abused its wartime powers and refused to fully relinquish them after the war. He described the ongoing military state of exception in a 1958 article: "Two wars necessitated vast curtailments of liberty, and we have grown, though grumblingly, accustomed to our chains. The increasing complexity and precariousness of our economic life have forced Government to take over many spheres of activity once left to choice or chance."[26] A brief comment from Mrs. Dimble in *That Hideous Strength* sums up Lewis's view of post-war Britain. The Dimbles had watched the N.I.C.E. confiscate property, send its henchmen to arrest and abuse citizens, and turn the quiet, safe town of Edgestow into a police state. Mrs. Dimble said she and her husband both thought that "it's almost as if

[23] Lewis to Vera Matthews, September 20, 1950, in *Collected Letters*, 3:54.
[24] Lewis to Vera Matthews, September 20, 1950, in *Collected Letters*, 3:53–54.
[25] Lewis to I. O. Evans, December 22, 1954, in The Collected Letters, 3:547.
[26] Lewis, "Is Progress Possible?," 513–14.

we'd lost the war."[27] Britain had supposedly won the war, but the government had not lifted its wartime measures. To make matters worse, Britain began to act as if its enemies from World War II had invaded and conquered the nation and then implemented their totalitarian system. The government, according to Lewis, justified the emergency measures—like compulsory property purchases and mandatory Home Guard drills—to deter the threat of Russian aggression after World War II.

Lewis expressed "a hope we shall get away without World War III this time,"[28] but in 1950 he worried that the Labour government would deceive the British people and push them into war: "The thought of such a war as that [would] be bad enough in itself: but the thought of entering it with such a government as England now has, is sheer nightmare. Have you any parallel to their imbecility? All rulers lie: but did you ever meet such bad liars?"[29] The government also refused to keep the public informed and instead allowed speculations about war to circulate without correction. "Does your government give you any information about the world situation?," Lewis asked Edward A. Allen, an American, in a letter. "Ours steadily refuses to part with any, and consequently we live in a world of rumours and astonishing stories from the man who has a friend in the Navy or the Foreign Office or what have you."[30] Unfortunately, Lewis did not have faith that the British soldiers would resist the government's push toward war. They lacked both the information necessary to judge foreign affairs on their own and, as I will discuss below, the spirit necessary to resist the government's calls for war. In a letter, Lewis wrote:

> The other day I was listening to some working men talking in a pub. They were all of such ages as to have seen two wars and fought in one. One would have expected (and indeed excused) the attitude 'Oh, not a third time! Three times in my life is too much.' But there was not a trace of it. Merely a unanimous, and quite unemotional, view that 'I reckon these Russians are going the same way as 'Itler did' and 'We don't want no bloody Appeasement this time' and 'The sooner they're taught a lesson the better.' Of course it is partly ignorance: they don't know anything about the resources of the Russians. But then it was equally ignorance last time; they had no conception of Germany's strength. But anyway, they're obviously perfectly game.[31]

[27] Lewis, *That Hideous Strength* (New York: Scribner Classics, 1996), 74.
[28] Lewis to Mary Van Deusen, November 18, 1956, in *Collected Letters*, 3:809.
[29] Lewis to Warfield M. Firor, December 6, 1950, in *Collected Letters*, 3:67.
[30] Lewis to Edward A. Allen, July 21, 1950, in *Collected Letters*, 3:43.
[31] Lewis to Warfield M. Firor, July 26, 1950, in *Collected Letters*, 3:44.

The government would let the public speculate wildly about foreign affairs as it kept the nation under wartime regulations. Despite these tyrannical actions, the British people would willingly fight. They possessed the courage to fight but not to demand frankness and honesty from a propagandistic government.

The fear that the British government would never lift its emergency measures made Lewis's subconscious mind consider a violent overthrow of the state. In an article titled, "A Dream," Lewis wrote that he thought he heard an "influential person" claim that conscription would continue after the war, though not for military purposes.[32] He later dreamed that he was sailing on a ship—the ship of state. He and his fellow owners—Britain's citizens and soldiers—willingly manned the ship to protect the nation against foreign enemies. They obeyed the orders of the "emergency petty officers."[33] Then they learned that the emergency petty officers planned to keep them as conscripts to transform the ship, not to fight a war. The officers would use the emergency military powers, which the people granted the state to effectively fight the world wars, to instead carry out a technocratic revolution. The officers said, "Now's our chance to make this the sort of ship we want."[34] Lewis and the other sailors said they would fight for security but not allow the state to diminish their liberties, so they grabbed "every one of the emergency petty officers by the scruff of his neck and the seat of his trousers and heaved the lot of them over the side" of the ship.[35] Lewis dreamed about the possibility of removing corrupt rulers from their military and political positions. He half-heartedly condemned his dreaming mind, calling it "regrettably immoral," yet he "could do nothing but laugh" at the "meddling busybodies going *plop-plop* into the deep blue sea."[36] The reluctant condemnation demonstrates the tension in Lewis's thoughts between the justice of removing tyrants and the injustice that typically accompanies violent revolution.

This dream sequence reveals the depth of Lewis's frustration with the perpetual emergency that characterized post-war British governance. The image of throwing the emergency officers overboard suggests that even Lewis's disciplined Christian conscience occasionally entertained fantasies of direct action against tyrannical authority. More

[32] Lewis, "A Dream," in *Present Concerns: Journalistic Essays* (New York: HarperCollins, 2017), 41.
[33] Lewis, "A Dream," 43.
[34] Lewis, "A Dream," 43.
[35] Lewis, "A Dream," 43–44.
[36] Lewis, "A Dream," 44.

significantly, the dream illustrates his understanding that the wartime emergency had provided cover for a fundamental transformation of British government that extended far beyond legitimate security concerns.

ANARCHO-TYRANNY AND HUMANE PUNISHMENT

Lewis's concept of anarcho-tyranny describes a specific form of governmental failure that emerged in post-war Britain. Unlike traditional tyranny, which imposes order through oppressive means, or genuine anarchy, which represents the complete absence of government, anarcho-tyranny combines the worst elements of both conditions. While the technocracy controls citizens by taking their property for official reasons and keeping them under wartime restrictions, it also refuses to prevent crime and punish criminals who harm law-abiding citizens. Technocracy in practice is anarcho-tyranny because it exercises unprecedented control over the population while explicitly rejecting natural law conceptions of justice as the basis of its authority. Lewis expanded on this idea in "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment." The state either refuses to punish crime or prescribes inadequate punishments while aggressively prosecuting citizens who engage in self-defense or vigilantism. Lewis wrote that in England's "present position ... the State protects us less because it is *unwilling* to protect us against criminals at home and manifestly grows less and less *able* to protect us against foreign enemies [emphasis added]."[37] The English government had lost the will to punish.

The state had not lost the strength to rule through an external cause: a foreign invasion, a domestic insurrection, a collapse in funds or personnel needed to govern, a natural disaster, etc. Its rulers became averse to punishment because they stopped believing in sin and wickedness, and so they began to treat crime as a social ailment. They thought pathological illness to be the sole or primary cause of crime.[38] A judge, whom Lewis called "The Elderly Lady," presided over the trial of the boys who robbed him. Lewis accused her of sharing the view of "Thrasymachus," who asserted "'the interest of the stronger.'"[39] The Elderly Lady on the bench "enforced her own will and that of the criminals and they together are

[37] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.
[38] Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," *God in the Dock*, in *Timeless Writings*, 496.
[39] Lewis, "Delinquents," 509.

incomparably stronger than I," Lewis wrote.[40] Anarcho-tyranny emerged from a spiritual crisis, a crisis of the will. It was made possible by the prevailing opinion, held by the judge, that criminals should be treated compassionately because conditions outside their control led them to commit crimes or because the crime was basically harmless childishness—an unfortunate prank, not a deviation from the moral law. The judge shifted compassion from its proper object—Lewis, the victim—to the proper object of retribution—the criminals. Lewis suggested that the judge's misplaced feeling of compassion not only turned the criminals into the innocent but also transformed Lewis's righteous anger into a dangerous, sadistic feeling that might require the state's benevolent treatment. Lewis's desire for punishment even made the criminals into the victims because they became the object of his anger. Without traditional morality and retributive justice to guide the courts, Lewis foresaw the complete reversal of justice: the angered victim would become the patient, who needs to be cured of his spirited desire for justice, and the misunderstood criminal would fall under the state's protection.

Few scholars have written extensively about Lewis's views on criminal justice. Dyer and Watson stated that Lewis thought "government can and must punish wrongdoers" because it "has a duty to the protection of 'property,' broadly understood to include fundamental liberties and social relationships."[41] In *C. S. Lewis on the Final Frontier*, Sanford Schwartz mentioned in a footnote that Lewis had "proto-Foucauldian views" on punishment.[42] There is a connection between their critiques of rehabilitation, but Lewis and Michel Foucault reached opposite conclusions.[43] Peter Karl Koritansky provided an accurate account of "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," but he focused on the argument's theoretical strength rather than its application to politics. He argued that "retributive justice is intelligible and

[40] Lewis, "Delinquents," 509.
[41] Dyer and Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics*, 122.
[42] Sanford Schwartz, *C. S. Lewis on the Final Frontier: Science and the Supernatural in the Space Trilogy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 193n30.
[43] Lewis and Foucault both considered rehabilitative justice a more totalitarian form of discipline and social control than retributive justice. Under the older view of justice, criminals would often receive brutal yet swift physical punishments. Under the new view, the state subjects criminals—as well as political and religious dissenters, including Christians—to surveillance and psychological manipulation. They both opposed rehabilitative justice because it implies totalitarian social control, but Lewis wanted to return to the idea that crime violates natural law and deserves punishment. Foucault asserted that societies punish criminals because they threaten the systems of social and political domination, not because they violate an objective standard of right and wrong.

defensible, but only when viewed through the lens of Thomistic natural law."[44] In *Branches to Heaven*, James Como listed "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment" as an example of Lewis's "unlikely opinions," but Como did not say much else about it.[45] Instead, he used the opportunity to outline Lewis's alleged liberalism: his opinion "that abortion laws may be very ill-advised; that obscenity laws are useless at best, as are anti-sodomy laws; that a truly Christian economic order would have more than a small bit of socialism in it..."[46] Como's interpretation reflects a broader scholarly tendency to emphasize Lewis's allegedly liberal positions on social issues, but this reading does not fully capture the complexity of Lewis's political thought.[47] Kath Filmer critiqued Lewis's social and political opinions, especially his ideas about women and punishment.[48] Commenting on the violent endings of *Perelandra* and *That Hideous Strength*, Filmer wrote:

> Such scenes raise questions about Lewis's own attitudes to violence; the theories contained in his essay denouncing 'the humanitarian theory of punishment' are applied to Fairy Hardcastle, who delights in nasty methods of brainwashing and reprogramming. But Lewis's own theory of punishment, that is, according to desert, if not as articulated academically in a paper, is, at least as suggested in his fiction, equally nasty and inhumane.[49]

The problem with this approach is that Hardcastle and the rest of the N.I.C.E. deserve their swift and violent ends; no criminal, even if death is due him, deserves the long, strange tortures of Hardcastle. Filmer's hostile analysis hits the essential point that scholars of Lewis tend to downplay or ignore. She recognized that punishment according to the standard of moral law or just desert *is* nasty and violent, but often quick and exact. Lewis believed that only the old view of justice could prevent a return to the state of nature. Lewis's support for retributive justice will be bloody, but it will avoid the humanitarian tools of reprogramming,

[44] Peter Karl Koritansky, "Retributive Justice and Natural Law," *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 83, no. 3 (July 2019): 410.
[45] James Como, *Branches to Heaven: The Geniuses of C. S. Lewis* (Dallas, TX: Spence Publishing Company, 1998), 115.
[46] Como, *Branches to Heaven*, 115.
[47] Chad Walsh, *The Literary Legacy of C. S. Lewis* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 14. According to Walsh, Lewis's stepson, David Gresham, stated that his stepfather had "an ultra-conservative political philosophy."
[48] Kath Filmer, *The Fiction of C. S. Lewis: Mask and Mirror* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 100.
[49] Filmer, *Mask and Mirror*, 35.

correction, or reeducation as well as the sadistic love of torturing and experimenting on criminals.

Lewis explained that the English ruling class's lost willpower to punish criminals has created the possibility of either anarchy or the rule of criminals, but true anarchy—the absence of rule—is unlikely because the modern state still has the power to rule, even if it uses that power against the innocent. True anarchy requires the breakdown of the state, but the state, in many ways, has more power than at any other time in history due to the new tools of technological and psychological control. The theory of humanitarian justice weakens the will to punish. It creates a poorly trained sense of just desert or a distaste for punishment framed as punishment. The theory of humanitarian justice replaces "traditional" or "retributive" justice with rehabilitative justice.[50] Grounded in the "Law of Nature" and the "Scriptures," the retributive theory of justice states that crimes intrinsically deserve punishment, regardless of the criminal's psychological health or sickness.[51] Lewis acknowledged that "the actual penal code of most countries at most times" fell far short of the Law of Nature and the Scriptures, but the "conscience of society" always dictated just punishments under the retributive theory.[52] When punishment aims to give criminals what they deserve, "every man has the right to an opinion, not because he follows this or that profession, but because he is simply a man, a rational animal enjoying the Natural Light."[53] The humanitarian theory, on the other hand, states that psychological illness causes crime, implying that treatment can cure criminals or deter them from committing future crimes. Criminals require treatment; they do not deserve punishment.

Under this theory, only psychological experts can prescribe methods to deter and cure criminals. Since proper treatment depends on technical knowledge, not on moral law, only professionals can express an opinion: "The Humanitarian theory, then, removes sentences from the hands of jurists whom the public conscience is entitled to criticize and places them in the hands of technical experts whose special sciences do not even employ such categories as rights or justice."[54] Lewis argued that men as rational beings cannot comment on a

[50] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 496.
[51] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497.
[52] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497.
[53] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497.
[54] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497–98.

treatment's justice or injustice. Treatments aim at efficacy, not justice. Treatments depend on facts that ordinary men do not possess rather than on moral judgments that all rational men make. Lewis cynically asserted these arguments, concluding with the technocracy's sacred phrase, "*cuiquam in sua arte credendum*," meaning, "We must believe the expert in his own field."[55] In England, the "expert 'penologist' (let barbarous things have barbarous names)" and the "psychotherapist" have the sole authority to declare what deters and what cures.

The expert technocrats usurped a field that does not belong to them by right. They changed the political art of jurisprudence into a professional practice of psychological adjustment and criminal deterrence. The psychotherapists and penologists reject just deserts and thus the very idea of justice, so they can never judge; they can only measure and adjust:

> It will be in vain for the rest of us, speaking simply as men, to say, 'but this punishment is hideously unjust, hideously disproportionate to the criminal's deserts'. The experts with perfect logic will reply, 'but nobody was talking about deserts. No one was talking about *punishment* in your archaic vindictive sense of the word. Here are the statistics proving that this treatment deters. Here are the statistics proving that this other treatment cures. What is your trouble?[56]

Lewis realized that restoring the government's willpower to punish would require the removal of psychological experts from the courts or at least restrictions on their authority. The "conscience of society," he thought, would punish criminals according to the sense of justice that all men possess, but the ruling class determines punishments without public input. The reversal of anarcho-tyranny requires a resurgence of willpower to punish, and this renewal depends on replacing professional expertise about curing and deterring with the people's judgment of right and wrong.

The humanitarian theory of justice arose in the "era of secure and liberal civilization," which has made men "offended by suffering."[57] The liberal society's hatred of suffering, which cannot truly be called mercy or humanity, eventually infects its sense of justice. The humanitarian theory's proponents believe it to be "mild and merciful," but Lewis saw it as

[55] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497.
[56] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 497.
[57] Lewis, "The Pains of Animals," *God in the Dock*, in *Timeless Writings*, 415.

cruel to victims, society, and criminals themselves.[58] The rehabilitation of felons means that they become patients of the state, subjected to treatment without their consent but purportedly for their own good. They become objects of social and psychological experimentation. They first lose the right to a "definite sentence" that resembles to "some extent the community's moral judgment on the degree of ill-desert involved" and receive instead an "indefinite sentence terminable only by the word of those experts."[59] And then, despite being spared archaic punishment and a definite sentence for their crimes, they face a fate worse than death-row criminals:

> To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of 'normality' hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent success—who cares whether this is called Punishment or not? That it includes most of the elements for which any punishment is feared—shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the locust—is obvious. Only enormous ill-desert could justify it; but ill-desert is the very conception which the Humanitarian theory has thrown overboard.[60]

A man sentenced to hang can go to the gallows in a struggle with his own conscience or with a prayer of repentance, while the patients of humanitarian punishment will face a psycho-spiritual struggle in a white room with a master in a white coat.

As psychotherapists torturously adjust mentally disturbed criminals for their own good, the courts give lenient sentences to lesser criminals, like the boys who robbed Lewis. The leniency toward low-level criminals teaches them to continue and perhaps escalate their crimes, leading to social disintegration. By treating robbery as a mere "prank," as The Elderly Lady called it, Lewis thought that the judge had encouraged the boys to proceed "without any sense of frontiers crossed, from mere inconsiderate romping and plundering orchards to burglary, arson, rape and murder."[61] Anyone who attempts to stop these criminals in self-defense, however, will face a punishment more severe than the criminals themselves. The humanitarian theory of justice encourages leniency toward criminals while prohibiting self-

[58] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 496.
[59] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 498.
[60] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 498.
[61] Lewis, "Delinquents," 510.

defense, but then this initial leniency eventually results in subjecting convicted criminals to experimental treatment as patients. The citizen becomes a subject or a foreign alien, which the government has no duty to protect, and the criminal becomes a patient with a pathological case, without rights, who will experience the cures that experts prescribe for him.[62]

MARRIAGE, FEMINISM, AND SOCIAL ORDER

The transformation of family structures represented another front in the broader assault on natural authority that enabled technocratic control. Lewis understood that the technocratic assault on traditional institutions extended to the fundamental structures of family life, which provided the most important alternative source of authority to state power. His analysis of changing gender roles must be understood within this broader critique of modern society's rejection of natural law and traditional moral order. Lewis would admit that reversing the liberation of women alone would not restore political life to its former bearings in the natural law and retributive justice. The modern assaults on justice come from many angles; the insistence that the sexes are interchangeable is only one element in the modern state's ideological arsenal. As stated above, Lewis advanced the opinion that men become men through war and women become women through childrearing, but he also suggested that a proper balance of masculine and feminine traits makes a person whole. While he observed certain detrimental effects of women's emancipation on social and intellectual life, he did not advocate for reversing women's political rights. Instead, his concerns focused on preserving the complementary roles and separate spheres that he believed essential to social stability and human happiness.

Lewis's concerns about women's emancipation stem from the "effect" that it stifles conversations about truth, which must include conversations about justice, punishment, the common good, etc. There is no evidence in his writing that he strayed from that opinion, despite the hope among scholars that he would have repudiated it. While he did not suggest restrictions on women's political rights, he observed that rapid changes in gender roles contributed to the broader dissolution of natural authority that made technocratic governance possible. In his essay "Equality," Lewis called the idea of removing women's legal

[62] Lewis, "Humanitarian Theory," 496.

equality with men "wicked folly,"[63] and in "Modern Man and His Categories of Thought," he stated that he does not believe women's emancipation to be "a bad thing *in itself*."[64] Instead, he merely argued that women's emancipation has an "effect," but this effect is more than an easily manageable social irritation; it "cuts us off from the eternal."[65]

Many writers and scholars have struggled to reconcile Lewis's observations about gender roles with contemporary sensibilities. In *The American Conservative*, Grayson Quay wrote that Lewis's epithet, "The Elderly Lady," that he used to describe the judge in his robbery case reveals "subtle sexism" and "a lack of respect for women in positions of authority."[66] Similarly, Como saw Lewis's unpopular perspectives on crime, the role of government, and women in politics as out of character and thus something that Lewis would have presumably rejected once his emotions cooled. He described "Delinquents in the Snow" as one of Lewis's "misfires":

> If there is anything I wish he had not written it is 'Delinquents in the Snow,' a fairly late essay, splenetic nearly to the point of tantrum; pardonable, I think, as it was provoked by the disturbance of the pain-ridden Joy, who was finally getting some sleep until the disturbance. This is a tonal impropriety.[67]

Como interprets "Delinquents in the Snow" as atypical of Lewis's usual temperament. This reading emphasizes Lewis's ordinarily measured tone over his capacity for righteous indignation. However, this interpretation may not fully account for Lewis's consistent concern with justice throughout his corpus. Lewis wrote extensively about the need for men to openly show their hatred of evil and hope for justice. Dyer and Watson wrote that Lewis thought "the presiding judge was far too lenient on the young criminals," but they did not comment on the judge's sex.[68] Scholars tend to consider Lewis's attitudes toward women as unfortunate and uncharacteristic of his normal disposition. Lewis's criticism of the presiding judge focused on her judicial philosophy rather than her sex, so drawing broader conclusions

[63] Lewis, "Equality," in *Present Concerns*, 9.
[64] Lewis, "Modern Man and His Categories of Thought," in *Present Concerns*, 75.
[65] Lewis, "Modern Man," 76.
[66] Grayson Quay, "The Time C. S. Lewis Went Full 'Get Off My Lawn,'" *The American Conservative*, February 10, 2020.
[67] Como, *Branches to Heaven*, 172.
[68] Dyer and Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics*, 98.

about Lewis's views on women in authority from this single case would exceed the textual evidence.

Dyer and Watson likewise moderated Lewis's views about women's effect on men's conversations. In a section about an essay by Lewis entitled "Modern Man and His Categories of Thought," they softened Lewis's indictment of "the emancipation of women."[69] They argued that the essay gives "a good synopsis of Lewis' views on modernity," possibly excluding his "thoughts on the emancipation of women."[70] In a footnote, Dyer and Watson asserted that Lewis "probably ... would have repudiated" his opposition to women's emancipation "later in his life" because of his relationship with Joy Davidman Gresham and his philosophical dispute with Elizabeth Anscombe. While this speculation is unprovable, it reflects the tension between Lewis's theoretical positions and his practical relationships with women who actively engaged in the academic and literary world. They note only the reflection that "the presence of women among men would impair the masculine mind's 'disinterested concern with truth for the truth's sake,'" but this description misses the vigor of Lewis's original presentation.[71] Lewis did not argue, however, for a reversal of women's emancipation; he likely wanted to find a solution to women's emancipation through groups like the Inklings, which were exclusively male.

Lewis wrote "Modern Man and his Categories of Thought" for Bishop Stephen Neill, who wanted to understand the current obstacles to evangelism, but the discussion also gave practical considerations for reforming modern life, especially regarding feminism. The essay expresses the danger of women occupying male spaces. As women become freer, men become less free to be *by themselves*. Since "men like men better than women like women," unrestrained women will choose to spend more time with men, resulting in "fewer exclusively male assemblies."[72] As more places include men and women, sexual instincts replace philosophical wonder, and thus young men engage in less "serious argument about ideas."[73] In mixed-sex spaces, the enjoyment of "wit, banter, persiflage, and anecdote" replaces "prolonged and rigorous discussion on ultimate issues," causing a "lowering of metaphysical

[69] Dyer and Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics*, 106.
[70] Dyer and Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics*, 106.
[71] Dyer and Watson, *C. S. Lewis on Politics*, 106.
[72] Lewis, "Modern Man," 75.
[73] Lewis, "Modern Man," 75.

energy" and a declining concern "with truth for truth's own sake."[74] Not only do conversations become less serious, but Lewis noted that women's concerns prevail in conversations:

> The only serious questions now discussed are those which seem to have a 'practical' importance (i.e., the psychological and sociological problems), for these satisfy the intense practicality and concreteness of the female. That is, no doubt, her glory and her proper contribution to the common wisdom of the race. But the proper glory of the masculine mind, its disinterested concern with truth for truth's own sake, with the cosmic and the metaphysical, is being impaired.[75]

Women's emancipation means men's mental restraint—their separation "from the eternal" and enslavement to the "immediate and quotidian."[76] The increased mixing of the sexes also causes problems for both men and women because it focuses too much energy on sexuality. In a letter to Mary Willis Shelburne, Lewis commented on how modern attitudes toward sexuality have worsened relations between the sexes. In earlier times, men and women could associate with each other without worrying about courting, but in the modern world the proper ages for courtship have gotten both too young and too old:

> Yes, I too think there is lots to be said for being no longer young: and I do most heartily agree that it is just as well to be past the age when one expects or desires to attract the other sex. It's natural enough in our species, as in others, that the young birds [should] show off their plumage—in the mating season. But the trouble in the modern world is that there's a tendency to rush all the birds on to that age as soon as possible and then keep them there as late as possible, thus losing all the real value of the other parts of life in a senseless, pitiful attempt to prolong what, after all, is neither its wisest, its happiest, or most innocent period. I suspect merely commercial motives are behind it all: for it is at the showing-off age that birds of both sexes have least sales-resistance![77]

When men and women cannot have time alone, their intellectual strength wanes, their instincts reign, and they are prone to advertising; all these changes make them less concerned with "the other parts of life," including art, literature, politics, and other liberal inquiries that release humans from the narrow ideological lens of the modern state.

[74] Lewis, "Modern Man," 76.
[75] Lewis, "Modern Man," 76.
[76] Lewis, "Modern Man," 76.
[77] Lewis to Mary Willis Shelburne, August 1, 1953, in *Collected Letters*, 3:352.

While Lewis defended male headship in marriage as necessary for family unity and external relations, he did not explicitly extend this argument to politics. Any connection between his domestic and political theory remains speculative. One of his lengthiest and clearest discussions of marriage came in a letter to Mary Neylan. In a point titled, "The *Headship* of the Man," Lewis argued that the man and woman's union implies a headship, that both Scripture and nature point to the husband as the natural and divinely ordained head, that wives do not truly desire authority over their husbands, that wives' authority over their husbands would not produce good results, and that the headship of husbands does not imply tyrannical rule. Lewis began the section with an apology for having to speak plainly on a sensitive topic during a time of increasing women's liberation: "I'm sorry about this—and I feel that my defence of it [would] be more convincing if I were a woman."[78] Then, he rejected the egalitarian view of marriage as a partnership of equals:

> You see, of course, that if marriage is a permanent relation, intended to produce a kind of new organism ('the one flesh') there must be a Head. It's only so long as you make it a temporary arrangement dependent on 'being in love' and changeable by frequent divorce, that it can be strictly democratic—for, on that view, when they really differ, they part. But if they are not to part, if the thing is like a nation not a club, like an organism not a heap of stones, then, in the long run, one party or other must have the casting vote.[79]

Lewis relied on several beliefs about marriage that "the majority of the British people" did not accept because they are not Christians.[80] Beyond Britain, "most contemporary States" rejected Christianity and particularly Christian sexual ethics.[81] Instead, they believed in a "right to happiness," a right to remain faithful to marriage vows only as long as both parties remain "in love," defined narrowly as a continued feeling of intense erotic attraction.[82] Against the opinion that marriage lasts only as long as the parties continue "being in love," Lewis argued that the sacrament of marriage creates a new creature.[83] A marriage must have a method to resolve disputes. A dual headship would destroy the marriage's unity.

[78] Lewis to Mary Neylan, April 18, 1940, in *Collected Letters*, 2:394.
[79] Lewis to Neylan, April 18, 1940, in *Collected Letters*, 2:394.
[80] Lewis, *Mere Christianity* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 112.
[81] Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory," 499.
[82] Lewis, "We Have No 'Right to Happiness,'" *God in the Dock*, in *Timeless Writings*, 516.
[83] Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 110.

Furthermore, a marriage with the wife as the head, Lewis suggested, would not accord with nature, or even with women's natural inclinations:

> That [the need for unity] being so, do you really want the Head to be the woman? In a particular instance, no doubt you may. But do you really want a matriarchal world? Do you really like women in authority? When you seek authority yourself, do you naturally seek it in a woman?[84]

Lewis argued that male headship is logically necessary for a two-person association to function, that Scripture, reason, and nature point to the male as the head of the relationship, and that women's own feelings do not truly incline them to rule over their husbands.

In *The Taste for the Other*, Gilbert Meilaender summarized the first part of Lewis's argument against female headship in marriage by stating that Lewis thought "women themselves do not wish to be head."[85] Whether wives desire to be the heads of their households is "a purely empirical question," and "the opinion of women" might "have changed since Lewis wrote those lines."[86] In the letter to Mary Neylan, Lewis questioned whether she *naturally* sought female authority, and thus he based his claim on nature, not merely on wives' opinions. In *Mere Christianity*, where Lewis made the same argument, he wrote: "There must be something *unnatural* about the rule of wives over husbands, because the wives themselves are half ashamed of it and despise the husbands whom they rule."[87] The question of women's desire to rule over their husbands does not depend on "social conditions, which are certainly subject to change," as Meilaender suggested.[88] Even if women increasingly want to rule in marriage, the household, or politics, the growth of the desire does not make it right to exercise, good for the marriages, beneficial for nation, or even pleasant for women. Meilaender wrote that the "husband's headship is grounded in biblical revelation as well as in the character of human sexuality," yet the husband's headship is not based on "merit or worthiness" but on "the requirements of self-giving love" and "the dance of obedience."[89] The man's rule over the woman, however, is not simply to demonstrate "the

[84] Lewis to Neylan, April 18, 1940, in *Collected Letters Vol. 2*.
[85] Gilbert Meilaender, *The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978), 146.
[86] Meilaender, *The Taste for the Other*, 145–46.
[87] Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 113 [emphasis added].
[88] Meilaender, *The Taste for the Other*, 147.
[89] Meilaender, *The Taste for the Other*, 157–58.

hierarchical principle."[90] Certainly, Meilaender can emphasize the "opaque and mysterious" qualities of hierarchy, but the argument for the husband's headship does not require a diversion into the abstract metaphysics of the eternal masculine and the eternal feminine. It is much simpler than that. As Lewis wrote, husbands naturally rule over their wives because it will be good for the family and the nation:

> Your phrase about the 'slave-wife' is mere rhetoric, because it assumes servile subordination to be the only kind of subordination. Aristotle [could] have taught you better. 'The householder governs his slaves despotically. He governs his wife and children as being both free—but he governs the children as a constitutional monarch, and the wife politically' (i.e. as a democratic magistrate governs a democratic citizen).
>
> My own feeling is that the Headship of the husband is necessary to protect the outer world against the family. The female has a strong instinct to fight for its cubs. What do nine women out of ten care about justice to the outer world when the health, or career, or happiness of their own children is at stake? That is why I want a 'foreign policy' of the family, so to speak, to be determined by the man: I expect more mercy from him!
>
> Yet this fierce maternal instinct must be preserved, otherwise the enormous sacrifices involved in motherhood [would] never be borne. The Christian scheme, therefore, does not suppress it but protects us defenceless bachelors from its worst ravages! This, however, is only my own idea.[91]

In the context of marriage, females typically do not relate to the outer world within the framework of equal and impartial justice to all.[92] Lewis does not see this instinctual preference for one's own as inherently bad. Rather, it is good that wives and mothers prefer their own husbands and children, even to the point of acting unjustly toward outsiders: "A woman is primarily fighting for her own children and husband against the rest of the world. Naturally, almost, in a sense, rightly, their claims override, for her, all other claims. She is the special trustee of their interests."[93] Lewis employed a similar line of reasoning in *Mere Christianity*, and it is worth reiterating:

> The function of the husband is to see that this natural preference of hers is not given its head. He has the last word in order to protect other people from the intense family patriotism of the wife. If anyone doubts this, let me ask a simple question. If your dog has bitten the child next door, or if your child has hurt the dog next door, which would you sooner have to deal with, the master of that house or the mistress? Or, if you are a

[90] Meilaender, *The Taste for the Other*, 158.
[91] Lewis to Neylan, April 18, 1940, in *Collected Letters*, 2:395.
[92] Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 114.
[93] Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 114.

> married woman, let me ask you this question. Much as you admire your husband, would you not say that his chief failing is his tendency not to stick up for his rights and yours against the neighbours as vigorously as you would like? A bit of an Appeaser?[94]

Wives and mothers rightly and naturally prefer their own within the context of the household. Lewis did not explicitly apply this argument to political life, but it is necessary to rightly order the household—the strongest source of natural authority outside the state—to ensure that society and state function well. The recovery of traditional family structures represents an essential component of resistance to technocratic rule because strong families provide alternative sources of authority and meaning that could compete with the state's claim to manage all aspects of human life.

SPIRITED RESISTANCE TO EVIL

The transformation of the British government into a technocracy stemmed from the complacency of a non-believing public. Lewis believed the people's passivity could result in a complacent, slavish society or an unrestrained, resentful, and violent mob. In *Reflections on the Psalms*, Lewis claimed that Western society in its present state should fear the risks from continued passivity more than those from an increased hatred of injustice.

Lewis discussed the Jewish "spirit of hatred," which could serve as an antidote to the British people's excessive tolerance of injustice.[95] The anger, resentment, and hatred in the Jewish Psalms participate, according to Lewis, in something better than the toleration of evil: the recognition "that there is in the world such a thing as wickedness and that it is ... hateful to God."[96] When the Jews see evil and rage erupts in them, they come much closer to God's understanding of and feelings toward evil than the Pagans, who did not feel as "vindictive and vitriolic" toward evil and injustice as the Jews.[97] Yet, Lewis thought that the Jews, because their feelings more properly aligned with the hatred of evil, could fall into "bitter personal vindictiveness," a "profoundly wrong" and lower sin than mere moral indifference.[98] Christians cannot condone that "festering, gloating, undisguised" hatred, but they can learn

[94] Lewis, *Mere Christianity*, 114.
[95] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 2017), 23.
[96] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 38.
[97] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 32.
[98] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 30, 34.

from hatred that is fierce in due proportion to an act's wickedness.[99] In an essay written around the same time, called *The Psalms*, Lewis called all "resentment ... wicked" and sinful.[100] The Pagans, by comparison, did not respond as strongly to evil and injustice. Their sentiments did not recognize the height of God's moral law, and thus they felt neither the proper moral outrage against evil nor fell victim to that outrage's improper manifestation. The Pagan sentiments toward evil failed to align with God and the moral law's perfect expectations, so their response to it never reached the Jewish depths of resentment. Lewis praised the Pagans' freedom from vindictiveness as "good in itself" but not a "good symptom" because it reveals moral indifference.[101] The Jews had a clearer moral vision and "took right and wrong more seriously."[102] The British people, having lost the Christian faith and the belief in right and wrong, needed a renewed moral center so that injustice would arouse them to action.

Walsh viewed the book as a commentary on the "spiritual use" of the Psalms.[103] The lengthy discussions of sin, hatred, and violence led Walsh to the conclusion that the "hideous Psalms ... help us to recognize the vicious emotions inside ourselves. This is therapeutic. We come to know ourselves better."[104] The thing Lewis wanted to avoid, according to Walsh, was letting the "surface meaning" of the Psalms "seduce people into sub-Christian states of mind."[105] These are states of mind where Christians hate evil with such conviction that they plot to destroy it. The thing Lewis wanted to convey, according to Walsh, was that "hate" is "most often the by-product of oppressive relations between individuals, classes, or nations. Such Psalms may teach us to see the consequences of our own manipulation and domination of others."[106] Walsh read *Reflections on the Psalms* as a therapeutic text meant to reveal authoritarian personalities and get them to explore and then reject their oppressive tendencies, but the work is a galvanizing text meant to rouse potential rulers to action.

The Jewish people's historically unique emphasis on hatred had an unexpected corollary: a pre-Christian ethic that commanded love for one's enemies. Lewis thought that the Greeks

[99] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 26.
[100] Lewis, "The Psalms," from *Christian Reflections*, in *Timeless Writings*, 257.
[101] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 33.
[102] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 35.
[103] Walsh, *The Literary Legacy*, 223.
[104] Walsh, *The Literary Legacy*, 223.
[105] Walsh, *The Literary Legacy*, 223.
[106] Walsh, *The Literary Legacy*, 223–24.

and Romans lacked both the depths of Jewish hatred and the height of Jewish charity and humility. He quoted Proverbs 25:21, which foreshadows Christ's Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5:38-42: "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink."[107] A connection exists between Jewish righteousness and sinfulness. They exhibit "a cruelty more vindictive and a self-righteousness more complete" and more "fanatic and homicidal" tendencies "than anything in the classics," yet they "reach a Christian level of spirituality.[108] The descent into zealous hatred makes possible an ascent into charity. Their longing for justice, in some sense, must come out alongside murderous rage.

The Jews did not always respond to evil with appeals to reason; instead, the Jews forced evil men and nations to stop their wicked deeds. When faced with evil, the Jews turned to judges, a word which Lewis said "might also be rendered 'champions;' for though these judges do sometimes perform what we should call judicial functions many of them are much more concerned with rescuing the oppressed Israelites from Philistines and others by force of arms."[109] At some point, force must suppress evil, but men will not destroy evildoers if their misaligned sentiments never incline them to hate evil. Lewis wrote that the "knights in romances of chivalry who go about rescuing distressed damsels and widows from giants and other tyrants are acting almost as 'judges' in the old Hebrew sense: so is the modern solicitor ... who does unpaid work for poor clients to save them from wrong."[110] Charity must guide Christians' proper responses to evil, but Lewis sought to revive a core component of ancient and medieval charity: the need for champions, judges, and knights who fight evil and restore justice. The British stopped celebrating knights who would disarm criminals and tyrants and instead placed their trust in technocrats who would prescribe remedies and plans to cure social ills.

Good men cannot express righteous hatred in the modern world, a condition that Lewis thought revealed moral decline and portended worse atrocities and injustices. He wrote that in "Ancient and oriental cultures ... Hatred did not need to be disguised for the sake of social decorum or for fear anyone would accuse you of a neurosis."[111] In an article on punishment

[107] Proverbs 25:21 (KJV).
[108] Lewis, "Psalms," 254.
[109] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 14–15.
[110] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 15. Lewis's father, Albert James Lewis, was a solicitor.
[111] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 26.

and the natural law, Koritansky defended the idea that humans should feel angry when they see injustice. He wrote, "Aquinas considers the irascible, angry, or indignant response to injustice not as something to be overcome, but as something morally instructive in itself."[112] According to Koritansky's presentation of Aquinas, the inclination to feel angry about injustice is as natural as "the inclinations to eat, drink, and have sex."[113] In post-Freudian Britain, the mental health professionals had debunked all anger, hatred, and resentment as an irrational overflow from repressed sexual drives. Righteous moral indignation lost its place among the legitimate responses to wickedness; medicinal cures, behavioral correctives, and psychological therapies tried to eliminate or at least suppress the spirited soul's desire to destroy evil. Lewis feared that "the spirit which cries for justice may be dying out."[114] He insisted that the Jewish "spark" that identifies and despises evil "should be fanned, not trodden out."[115]

Lewis did not believe that righteous hatred—now treated as a disease—had disappeared in Britain or the West, but that the psychologists created a new, real repression. By debunking spirited opposition to evil, they repressed "hatred undisguised," the "*natural* result of injuring a human being."[116] Human nature cannot tolerate evil, and men cannot hide their anger forever because "the natural result of cheating a man, or 'keeping him down', or neglecting him, is to arouse resentment."[117] Hatred emerges in the downtrodden because the unjust man "tempted them ... seduced, debauched them."[118] Although excess resentment makes men "devilish," Lewis said, "we must also think of those who made them so":

> Their hatreds are the reaction to something. Such hatreds are the kind of thing that cruelty and injustice, by a sort of natural law, produce. This, among other things, is what wrong-doing means. Take from a man his freedom or his goods and you may have taken his innocence, almost his humanity, as well.[119]

[112] Koritansky, "Retributive Justice and Natural Law," 433.
[113] Koritansky, "Retributive Justice and Natural Law," 434.
[114] Lewis, "Psalms," 258.
[115] Lewis, "Psalms," 259.
[116] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 14.
[117] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 14–15.
[118] Lewis, "Psalms," 257.
[119] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 14–15.

The natural response to injury and injustice—which Christ's grace can temper—cannot be "disguised by self-deception" except by creating a "dangerous" situation. The danger comes from the buildup of surplus resentment, though Lewis would never earnestly use such clinical terminology. The "world of savage punishments, of massacre and violence, of blood sacrifice in all countries and human sacrifice in many" had not vanished from the Earth, according to Lewis, but had become "far more subtle," and men are still "blood-brothers to these ferocious, self-pitying, barbaric men."[120] Some men may let their resentment build until they become "really fiendish" or "an Inquisitor" or "a member of the Committee of Public Safety" and thus willing "to die for a cause" and "to kill for it."[121] Lewis predicted that repressed hatred would weaken man's moral conscience, dam the spirit's natural response to evil, and cause resentment to fester. The continued Western discipline of disguising hatred would make violent revolution more likely, but a return to undisguised, even public, hatred would contribute to the suppression of crime and tyranny.

An example demonstrates Lewis's fear of the consequences of disguised hatred. He believed that it would let deception and tyranny reign. Lewis recounted a conversation that he had during "the Second War in a compartment full of young soldiers":

> Their conversation made it clear that they totally disbelieved all that they had read in the papers about the wholesale cruelties of the Nazi *régime*. They took it for granted, without argument, that this was all lies, all propaganda put out by our own government to 'pep up' our troops. And the shattering thing was that, believing this, they expressed not the slightest anger. That our rulers should falsely attribute the worst of crimes to some of their fellow-men in order to induce others of their fellow-men to shed their blood seemed to them a matter of course. They weren't even particularly interested. They saw nothing wrong in it.[122]

The great defect in Britain's young men is their withered spirit, not excessive rage against injustice. The men did not see the "diabolical wickedness" in their rulers, recognize it as such, and forgive them nonetheless, which would have made them "saints."[123] Instead, they saw it as "ordinary" or did not "perceive it at all," and resentment did not even tempt them. In an article titled "Private Bates," Lewis told a similar story about British soldiers who

[120] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 27.
[121] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 32.
[122] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 34.
[123] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 34.

complied with their orders in World War II despite their belief that the government had lied to them about the enemy:

> In the last few years I have spent a great many hours in third-class railway carriages (or corridors) crowded with servicemen. I have shared, to some extent, the shock. I found that nearly all these men disbelieved without hesitation everything that the newspapers said about German cruelties in Poland. They did not think the matter worth discussion: they said the one word 'Propaganda' and passed on. This did not shock me: what shocked me was the complete absence of indignation. They believe that their rulers are doing what I take to be the most wicked of all actions—sowing the seeds of future cruelties by telling lies about cruelties that were never committed. But they feel no indignation: it seems to them the sort of procedure one would expect.[124]

Lewis believed that their "terrifying insensibility" proved that the young men "had no conception of good and evil whatsoever."[125] British men had lost their connection to both the natural law and the "Supernatural," which "opens" a "human soul ... to new possibility both of good and evil."[126] A great danger exists in the modern sentiment that treats tolerance of evil as an outgrowth of "Christian charity."[127] The Psalmists' "relentlessness" against perceived wickedness comes "far nearer to one side of the truth" and closer to "sanity" than the "total moral indifference of the young soldiers" and the "pseudo-scientific tolerance which reduces all wickedness to neurosis."[128]

Lewis contrasted the British and Jewish attitudes toward evil and argued that the former's passivity portends greater political disasters than the latter's open aggression. Lewis quoted several verses in which the Jews "hated" their enemies, "hated" idolaters, felt "hate" for those who "hate thee, Lord," and felt "hate" for God's enemies.[129] The emphasis on hate "is an extremely dangerous, almost a fatal, game," but, without it, society cannot preserve itself in moral virtue and peace.[130] The Jews could overcome their hatred with the advent of Christ's grace, with the "Light which has lightened every man from the beginning," and the British must return to Christ and their consciences to recover the right responses to evil.[131] British

[124] Lewis, "Private Bates," 54.
[125] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 34.
[126] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 36.
[127] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 37.
[128] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 37.
[129] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 77.
[130] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 78.
[131] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 31.

society eliminated ancient social conventions, like the once-obvious duty to prevent "a rascal," "a liar," a "tyrannical Jack-in-office," a wife-beater, and a "celebrity" with "a most vile and mischievous life" from entering into respectable circles. Psychologists debunked irrational moral discrimination and exclusion, leading to "the general rule in modern society ... that no one refuses to meet any of these people and to behave towards them in the friendliest and most cordial manner."[132] Lewis warned that a society in which "rascality undergoes no social penalty" cannot be "healthy."[133] Social exclusion should extend only to "'very bad people' who are powerful, prosperous, and impenitent," not to "'very bad people'" who are lowly like those to whom Christ ministered.[134] Lewis summarized the "new man" in Britain who had suppressed all open displays of hatred: "Like the psalmists he can hate, but he does not, like the psalmists, thirst for justice."[135] Whereas the Jewish society may have had excessive outbursts of righteous anger, the British society will have nothing but passive aggression until wickedness reaches cataclysmic levels.

With tolerance and passivity as the sacred values of a scientifically planned society, British citizens would not immediately redress evils. They would not prevent them from cascading into civilizational threats. Lewis questioned whether "the great evil of our civil life" might be "the fact that there seems now no medium between hopeless submission and full-dress revolution. Rioting has died out, moderate rioting. It can be argued that if the windows of various ministries and newspapers were more often broken, if certain people were more often put under pumps and (mildly—mud not stones) pelted in the streets, we should get on a great deal better."[136] Lewis thought the British people should stop letting a man receive "the pleasures of a tyrant or a wolf's-head and also those of an honest freeman among equals."[137] Reinvigorating society's men with spirited anger and resistance would come with "very great ... dangers," but "the present tameness" threatens "very great ... evils."

[132] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 79.
[133] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 79.
[134] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 80.
[135] Lewis, "Psalms," 258.
[136] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 79.
[137] Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, 79.

FRIENDSHIP AGAINST THE NEW OLIGARCHY

In addition to righteous anger, the British citizens needed friendships that would help them to resist the regime's culture and build small, local centers of culture and political power. Lewis argued that pockets of friendship must oppose the technocracy. He wrote that friendship is "like an aristocracy" that creates a "vacuum across which no voice will carry."[138] The first benefit of friendship is that it drowns out expert opinions and allows interests to develop organically. "Every real Friendship is a sort of secession, even a rebellion," Lewis wrote.[139] This is "why Authority frowns on Friendship."[140] To guard against the pride that comes with this rebellion, friendships must form from natural affection. As Lewis wrote, "We seek men after our own heart for their own sake and are then alarmingly or delightfully surprised by the feeling that we have become an aristocracy."[141] A friendship founded on shared interests and passions raises men to the "level of gods or angels." Friendship approaches a type of divine political independence that acts as "almost" man's "strongest safeguard against complete servitude."[142] Lewis even acknowledged that certain "forms of democratic sentiment are naturally hostile to it [friendship] because it is selective and an affair of the few."[143] For this reason, scientifically planned states want to prohibit friendship "by force or by propaganda about 'Togetherness' or by unobtrusively making privacy and unplanned leisure impossible."[144] Friendship serves as a "rebellion" against or "secession" from technocratic tyranny.

In "Lilies That Fester," Lewis described the resistance to the elite in similar terms. The elite uses "*culture*," an amorphous term that signifies the "art of simulating the orthodox responses." Those who can imitate the right responses can join the elite. But Lewis considered culture "a bad qualification for a ruling class because it does not qualify men to rule."[145] Instead, rulers need "mercy, financial integrity, practical intelligence, hard work, and the like."[146] Lewis warned against indifference to the culture of the ruling class: "I don't want

[138] Lewis, *Four Loves* (New York: Harcourt, 1991), 82.
[139] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 80.
[140] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 80.
[141] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 83.
[142] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 59, 80.
[143] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 60.
[144] Lewis, *Four Loves*, 80.
[145] Lewis, "Lilies That Fester," in *The World's Last Night and Other Essays*, 45, 49.
[146] Lewis, "Lilies That Fester," 49.

retreat; I want attack or, if you prefer the word, rebellion."[147] To attack the elite, men as individuals and as friends must free themselves from the "educational machine," pursue "unsponsored, uninspected, perhaps even forbidden, readings," and refuse the temptation to make "the right responses to the right authors."[148] He called on "Christians" as well as "atheists and agnostics" to defy the elite culture that hates friendship and free minds because "it is going to strangle all those things unless we can strangle it first. And there is no time to spare."[149]

The restoration of law and order depends on the removal of the psychoanalytic elite and the inauguration of a new ruling class adhering to the traditional view of justice, but Lewis asserted that it might also require the English people's willingness to punish their rulers. The retributive theory of justice demands a belief that crime deserves punishment, according to the law of nature, and that public opinion should shape the government's concept of just deserts. Lewis thought that the English ruling class—"the intellectuals"—had abandoned the first requirement: "As a result, classical political theory, with its Stoical, Christian, and juristic key-conceptions (natural law, the value of the individual, the rights of man), has died."[150] Right opinions about justice depend upon a well-educated elite, but the elite has abandoned traditional morality. The people's ordinary judgment about right and wrong can help keep elite opinion within its bounds, but a new ruling class must be the driving force.

In his article on "Democratic Education," Lewis wrote that education must primarily aim to teach "the boy who wants to know and who can know," i.e., the spirited and intelligent children.[151] Without their guidance, the people's opinions about justice cannot save the nation. Democratic education "must, in a certain sense, subordinate the interests of the many to those of the few" so that it can "be a nursery of those first-class intellects without which neither a democracy nor any other State can thrive."[152] Returning to retributive justice and traditional morality demands the formation of new opinions in the ruling class or the creation of a new ruling class; a populist uprising by itself cannot save a democratic nation. The technocracy rejected the concept of just punishment and replaced it with expert treatment,

[147] Lewis, "Lilies That Fester," 51.
[148] Lewis, "Lilies That Fester," 43, 46.
[149] Lewis, "Lilies That Fester," 46.
[150] Lewis, "Is Progress Possible?," 514.
[151] Lewis, "Democratic Education," in *Present Concerns*, 34.
[152] Lewis, "Democratic Education," 34–35.

so neither the natural law nor the people's opinions about punishment could enter into the government's criminal proceedings. "On the old view," Lewis wrote, "public opinion might protest against a punishment (it protested against our old penal code) as excessive, more than the man 'deserved'; an ethical question on which anyone might have an opinion. But a remedial treatment can be judged only by the probability of its success; a technical question on which only experts can speak."[153] To remain faithful to its own principles, England's ruling class must ignore the people's protests and act upon its superior technical judgment. The people must either accept that their views do not merit the government's consideration, or they must find a new way to force the English oligarchy to obey the conscience of the people. A popular uprising against the ruling class can only be a starting point; eventually, the ruling class must transform its education and its opinions to give the state a chance to survive.

Lewis's scattered comments on political restoration suggest a preference for hierarchy over populism. While he believed that ordinary citizens retained natural moral reasoning about justice, he argued that lasting political change required intellectual leadership from a properly formed elite. Popular resistance could provide the moral energy and legitimacy for change, but without educated leadership committed to natural law principles, such resistance would either fail or devolve into the same problems it sought to address. The goal was not to replace expert rule with mob rule, but to restore the proper relationship between moral reasoning and technical expertise, with natural law (individual rights, just deserts, equality under the law, the rule of law, etc.) providing the framework within which experts could legitimately operate. The creation of a new aristocracy, which emerges from friendships that rebel from the regime's influences, is essential to that goal.

THE APOCALYPSE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS

Some of Lewis' writings include statements against tyrants and hooligans that sound violent and revolutionary. The view I have presented of Lewis might call into question his reputation as a political moderate. But his warnings against violent revolution are not insincere caveats. Lewis persistently opposed utopian revolution because he believed in Christ. In "The

[153] Lewis, "Is Progress Possible?," 513.

World's Last Night," Lewis wrote that the doctrine of Christ's speedy and unpredictable return should discourage revolutionary political projects:

> I can imagine no man who will look with more horror on the End than a conscientious revolutionary who has, in a sense sincerely, been justifying cruelties and injustices inflicted on millions of his contemporaries by the benefits which he hopes to confer on future generations: generations who, as one terrible moment now reveals to him, were never going to exist. Then he will see the massacres, the faked trials, the deportations, to be all ineffaceably real, an essential part, his part, in the drama that has just ended: while the future Utopia had never been anything but a fantasy.[154]

Lewis's reasoning runs into the difficulty that the most fervent revolutionaries often reject the supernatural realm, the apocalypse, and the life of the world to come, hence their desire to precipitate violent regime change that brings heaven on earth. Atheist revolutionaries also deny Christ's final judgment of the world, so they believe that they risk nothing when committing crimes to bring about their ideal regime in which technology or a new political organization finally overcomes perennial human problems, such as exploitation, inequality, and poverty. Lewis argued against utopian revolutions based on the doctrine of the apocalypse, which constrains proper political action to a nearer horizon. There is no point in laying schemes to forcefully transform society. There is, however, a reason for organizing to stop the schemes of technocrats: the moral law and Christian duty demand it, and their rule will harm individuals, families, churches, and nations.

These reflections on the apocalypse would not restrain committed materialists, but a belief in the doctrine of the apocalypse should discourage Christians from pursuing utopian schemes. Lewis explained the proper Christian life that always keeps in mind an imminent yet unknowable end of the universe:

> Frantic administration of panaceas to the world is certainly discouraged by the reflection that "this present" might be "the world's last night"; sober work for the future, within the limits of ordinary morality and prudence, is not. For what comes is Judgment: happy are those whom it finds labouring in their vocations, whether they were merely going out to feed the pigs or laying good plans to deliver humanity a hundred years hence from some great evil. The curtain has indeed now fallen. Those pigs will never in fact be fed, the great campaign against White Slavery or Governmental Tyranny will never in fact proceed to victory. No matter; you were at your post when the Inspection came.[155]

[154] Lewis, "The World's Last Night," in *The World's Last Night and Other Essays*, 119–20.
[155] Lewis, "The World's Last Night," 120.

While the prospect of the apocalypse and judgment should keep Christians focused on preserving good government, utopian revolutionaries pursue their pseudo-religious longing to transform society. The doctrine of the apocalypse puts Christians in a defensive posture, but they can plan ahead to thwart "great evil." They can foresee prospective tyranny—as Lewis witnessed, envisioned, and then warned against a growing scientific tyranny—and lay the groundwork for counterrevolution against it. And Christians can offer the everyday goods of politics: a decent moral order, a military capable of defending the nation, and a government that punishes crime and protects the innocent. They pursue a government that manages and suppresses, but never eliminates, the permanent problems caused by the Fall.

Christians seemingly find themselves at a political disadvantage. These conventional political aspirations look pale in comparison to the utopian promises of communism or scientifically planned democracy. The hope of the end of injustice arouses revolutionary devotion, but men rarely conspire to bring about the competent administration of justice, the adherence to the rule of law, or other ordinary political aims. In a preface to *The Pilgrim's Regress*, Lewis wrote, "Every revolt against existing civilisation and conventions whether it look forward to revolution, or backward to the 'primitive' is called 'romantic' by some people."[156] He described Rousseau as an advocate of a "romantic" revolution that would restore mankind to its natural goodness. Communism allures prospective revolutionaries with its romantic vision of a stateless and classless society, and it keeps them with an assurance of the revolution's inevitable success.[157] In arguing with communists, Lewis found that "they tend, when all else fails, to tell me that I ought to forward the revolution because 'it is bound to come'. One dissuaded me from my own position on the shockingly irrelevant ground that if I continued to hold it I should, in good time, be 'mown down'—argued, as a cancer might argue if it could talk, that he must be right because he could kill me."[158] Romantic revolutionary dreams are inadmissible for Christians, yet the type of counterrevolution that Lewis described feels romantic in the sense that he calls Christians back to the political model of the knight, the judge, and the champion.

[156] Lewis, *The Pilgrim's Regress*, in *Timeless Writings*, 156.
[157] Lewis, *The Pilgrim's Regress*, 156.
[158] Lewis, "A Reply to Professor Haldane," 106.

Lewis thought that Christians should pursue ordinary goods in politics—morality, peace, and happiness—while they remain vigilant against tyranny and prepare to resist it. The necessity of being moderate and defensive, however, does not imply inactivity or indifference; instead, the opponents of tyranny must collaborate and machinate, not to spark a revolution, but to hatch "good plans to deliver humanity a hundred years hence from some great evil."[159] For Lewis, these plans imply constant counterrevolutionary activity. In modern times, Lewis's Christian counterrevolution would reverse the technocratic revolution by restoring property rights, opposing unjust wars, reviving spirited anger, reading good books with friends, resisting the culture's education, and by pursuing other simple, though neglected, goals. Cognizant of the moral and prudential limits of politics, Christians must perform the commonplace work of punishing crime and preserving order while conspiring to derail current and future tyrannies.

CONCLUSION

This analysis reveals Lewis as a more sophisticated political observer than traditionally recognized, though one who never developed a systematic political philosophy. Lewis's writings on crime, property rights, expert authority, and social order, when examined together, suggest a coherent set of concerns about the trajectory of modern politics rather than a set of explicit political reforms.

Lewis's enduring insight lies in recognizing that a fundamental political question concerns the proper relationship between moral reasoning and technical expertise. His critique of what Samuel Francis would later term "anarcho-tyranny" anticipated contemporary debates about administrative overreach, criminal justice reform, the role of expert knowledge, the fallout from women's emancipation and the sexual revolution, and the limits of political reform.

The counterrevolutionary elements that Lewis advocated—friendship as a form of cultural resistance, a return to a complementarian view of marriage, the cultivation of righteous anger against injustice, the defense of property rights, and the restoration of retributive justice—reflect an attempt to preserve space for moral judgment against the encroachment of purely technical solutions to human problems. His call for spirited

[159] Lewis, "The World's Last Night," 120.

resistance was always tempered by Christian moderation and a recognition of the dangers inherent in both revolutionary violence and passive submission to tyranny.

Lewis's claim that expert authority would displace public moral judgment has proven prescient, even as the specific forms of expertise have evolved. Today, it is possible to say that expert authority has become a kind of public moral judgment. When the experts decree something, it is imperative to believe it as a sign of good character. Lewis's political writings, which are found in difficult-to-combine fragments, remind us, when considered on the whole, that the preservation of a free government, which rewards virtue and punishes vice, requires more than good procedures or enlightened policies; it demands citizens capable of righteous indignation, willing to form friendships that can resist intellectual, moral, or political submission.

Path to Salvation

David Beer

Review: Thomas P. Harmon, *The Universal Way of Salvation in the Thought of Augustine* (T&T Clark Studies in Ressourcement Catholic Theology and Culture) (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024). 248 pp. Hardcover, $103.50; Ebook, $82.80.

After Augustine's conversion and shortly before his mother's death, the *Confessions* contains a touching scene where Augustine and Monica share in a conversation that leads them both to jointly experience an intellectual and spiritual ascent towards transcendence. To the casual contemporary reader this may suggest something sentimental about the relationship between mother and son, but for the late-antique Platonic intellectuals Augustine had formerly represented, this scene captures a philosophical and political revolution. Thomas P. Harmon seeks to convey this revolution in his fine book, *The Universal Way of Salvation in the Thought of Augustine*. Building on the political philosophy of Leo Strauss and Pierre Manent and the Catholic Augustinianism of Fr. Ernest Fortin and Fr. James Schall, Thomas Harmon reads Augustine as engaged with the problem of a universal way of salvation (the phrase directly appears in *City of God* 10.32) from his earliest philosophical investigations through his magisterial *City of God* and *Confessions*. Through this theme Harmon captures the political consequences of the impasse of Greco-Roman thinking before the advent of Christianity as well as solution of Augustine's two-cities theology and political philosophy that he bequeathed to the Middle Ages.

The issue of a universal way of salvation—a path of salvation available to all and not to be confused with the accomplished salvation of all—was a fundamental problem in the terms of Platonic philosophy's division between the few and the many. Augustine and his Roman contemporaries were steeped in this philosophy from their classical education and rhetorical training, and this approach fit well with their privileged positions in society. According to Platonism, all of humanity is divided between those few capable of philosophy and who can therefore rationally pursue transcendent participation with the *nous* or divine intelligence, and the many who are not so capable. Accordingly, philosophy is strictly the esoteric property of the few with souls capable of its pursuit of wisdom and who could through it achieve

happiness and true freedom separate from the body. Thus, Plato governs his ideal city with philosopher-kings while everyone else is governed through noble lies and management whose esotericism they cannot penetrate. For the remaining many, all that would be possible according to this fundamental hierarchy of humanity was a life focused not on virtue and wisdom, but on the use and maintenance of their bodies. But based on the Platonic terms of this division, what can be common between the few and the many or what hope can there be for shared lives and shared government? From the inheritance of this ancient philosophy, the Romans struggled as their political structure changed with their increasing power and position in the world.

Friends of the Ciceronian Society who appreciate the importance of place, tradition, and things divine will understand the difficulty that the Romans faced after their transition from a territorially defined city with a particular culture and divinities to an empire that contained vast and diverse multitudes. While they sought to overcome what Eric Voegelin would call the "mortgage of the polis," the Roman Empire—in its position as an "ecumenical empire"—could not make use of local divinities for unifying its empire but needed a universal religion for all people to serve as its civil religion. In the social turmoil of the third century, the Neoplatonism of Porphyry of Tyre gained imperial promotors as a solution to the problem of the few and the many by offering the possibility of a universal way of salvation that could provide order and peace. Even a religion that appears on its face as non-political in its pursuit of transcendence has political importance if it appeases the multitude. It is, therefore, because of Porphyry's contemporary prominence and his opposition to Christianity that Augustine deals in detail with Porphyry and the "Platonists" in the *City of God* and argues against their false way of universal salvation.

According to Porphyry's universal way of salvation, one can move beyond being an ignorant member of the multitude through purifying theurgic rituals and other aspects of traditional cultic practice whereby their lower parts are cleansed. From this first step in the universal way of salvation, there is then an opening for a middle step of neophyte philosophers and the final culminating stage of the mature philosopher as one separates from the pollution of the body. Once the lower soul has been purified in the first stage, the way is open for training the rational soul in continence and virtue which moves the beginning philosopher away from the attachments of the body. Once truly freed from the body, the

mature philosopher achieves salvation through the contemplative virtues focused on the *nous*.

This theory captivated public intellectuals, but from his own experience Augustine was keenly aware of the failure and frustration of this approach. Harmon's outline of the historical context helps the general reader understand why Augustine's *Confessions* does not culminate at his first conversion to the vocation of philosophy as a young man, and why he struggled so greatly with his will in attempting to pursue salvation through his own means and his own power. It is only through God's grace that Augustine was finally converted, and after he has abandoned his intellectual arrogance through Christianity that he is able to truly experience a transcendent ascent that Neoplatonism had sought--but this experience happens alongside his uneducated mother. Without understanding the context of Porphyry's philosophy, the reader misses the revolutionary character of Christianity's truly universal way of salvation. While Neoplatonism had paid lip-service to universality, the general populace at the lowest levels were only ever appeased and deluded through civil religion, and the only worthy aspect of humans at the higher levels of Neoplatonism is the human soul. The Christian way of salvation is truly universal because through the incarnation God becomes man, uniting transcendence and matter, and therefore salvation does not depend on humanity navigating their own way to divine transcendence or renouncing the materiality of their bodies.

Harmon structures this monograph in three parts and the text moves steadily through each part of his analysis and argument with clear and discrete steps. The first part provides the historical and philosophical context of Augustine's Roman predecessors and their development of the particular flavor of Porphyrian Neoplatonism as well as Augustine's engagement with the issue of a universal way of salvation in his early writings. The second part directly addresses Augustine's critique of Porphyry's soteriological proposals in the *City of God*, particularly Book 10, which makes for complicated reading without this context. The first two sections then allow Harmon to connect the insights of this critique of Porphyry's faulty universal way of salvation with Augustine's own difficult journey to conversation contained in the *Confessions*. Harmon, therefore handles two of Augustine's major works through his analysis of soteriology, and the focus on Augustine's dispute with Porphyry

provides a fresh means of unpacking Augustine's classic works. *The Universal Way of Salvation in the Thought of Augustine* is a fine book for those working in Augustinian studies or late antique political philosophy interested in the connection of Augustine's theology and politics.

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The Satirist and the Saint

Allen Mendenhall

Review: *Mark Twain's Joan of Ark: Political Wisdom, Divine Justice, and the Origins of Modernity* by Bernard J. Dobski (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024). 343 pp. Kindle, $129.99; Hardcover, $115.51.

It may seem extraordinary even to the discerning observer of American letters that Samuel Clemens, that inveterate satirist of the Mississippi, should have harbored such profound reverence for the Maid of Orleans—Joan of Arc—that he considered his pseudonymous work on her life his finest literary achievement. The paradox is positively delicious: that the American humorist celebrated for his caustic mockery of religious pretension should prostrate himself before the altar of a medieval Catholic saint.

Twain, with characteristic narrative ingenuity, employs the literary device of a fictional translator, one Jean François Alden, who presents to us the memoirs of Louis de Conte, Joan's page and secretary. This de Conte—a fictional construct of impressive verisimilitude—purports to offer his eyewitness account as Joan's childhood friend and later confidant during her meteoric rise and tragic immolation.

The structural conceit is rather brilliant in its execution. By framing the narrative through the eyes of de Conte, an octogenarian reflecting upon events of his youth, Twain achieves both intimate proximity to his subject and the nostalgic distance of retrospection. This literary legerdemain permits him to present Joan with a worshipful admiration that might have seemed cloying had it emanated directly from the pen of the author of *Huckleberry Finn*.

Twain's Joan emerges not merely as a historical personage but as an embodiment of transcendent virtue—a depiction that stands in marked contrast to the sentimentalism and naturalistic skepticism one associates with the American literary tradition of his era. Indeed, one detects in this work a fascinating tension between Twain's habitual American individualism and his evident capitulation to a medieval, hierarchical worldview in which divine providence manifests through chosen vessels.

The book divides itself into three acts of Joan's brief but incandescent life: her pastoral beginnings in Domrémy, her martial triumphs culminating in the coronation of Charles VII,

and her betrayal and martyrdom. Throughout these episodes, Twain's prose achieves a gravity and solemnity that one would scarcely have anticipated from his other works.

That Twain should have labored twelve years on this text, researched it with scholarly diligence, and published it initially as an anonymous serial speaks volumes about his personal investment in this most Catholic of subjects. One cannot help but conclude that in the pious peasant girl of Domrémy, executed before her twentieth year, Twain discovered a moral purity that served as a counterpoint to the venality and corruption that so often provoked his satirical ire.

The preceding backdrop proves indispensable should we wish to embark upon a judicious examination of Bernard J. Dobski's newly minted scholarly offering, *Mark Twain's Joan of Arc*, which announces its ambitious scope through the rather portentous subtitle: "Political Wisdom, Divine Justice, and the Origins of Modernity." The volume is part of Palgrave Macmillan's evidently aspirational series dedicated to "Recovering Political Philosophy"—a designation that prompts a certain raised eyebrow when one contemplates the inclusion of Twain within its purview. Indeed, the spectacle of Twain conscripted into the ranks of political philosophers occasions mild surprise, given that our Mississippi bard has traditionally been labeled as anything but a systematic political theorist.

The juxtaposition is, on reflection, quite marvelous: the raffish humorist and chronicler of riverboat America, whose pen typically dripped with satirical acid rather than metaphysical speculation, now enshrined alongside canonical political thinkers. One hesitates to imagine Twain's own sardonic reaction to finding himself thus elevated to the pantheon of political philosophy, he who so delighted in deflating the pretensions of the academically self-important. Yet Dobski's project suggests heretofore unplumbed depths in Twain's recounting of Joan—depths that resonate with significant implications for our understanding of political modernity.

Incorporating this text within such a scholarly enterprise invites us to reconsider our received understanding of Twain's corpus and intellectual concerns. If Dobski's analysis proves persuasive, we might be compelled to reassess the conventional wisdom regarding Twain's place in the American literary firmament—no longer merely as the frontier wit and social critic but as a contributor of substance to our understanding of politics, justice, and the seismic shift from medieval to modern conceptions of authority.

In Dobski's analysis, Twain's portrayal of Joan of Arc transcends mere historical biography to become a profound meditation on the transition from medieval to modern consciousness. His interpretation positions Twain's work as far more philosophically important than commonly acknowledged, suggesting that *Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc* may indeed represent the author's most intellectually consequential achievement.

At the core of Dobski's argument lies the assertion that "Twain, in dramatically portraying the emergence of modernity out of the Middle Ages, prepares his audience to adopt an older, pre-modern and pre-Christian conception of human freedom, one that has its roots in a sustained reflection on the soul's concern for justice" (1). This claim represents a remarkable intellectual pivot, positing that Twain's Joan facilitates a return to certain classical conceptions of liberty even while heralding modernism's dawn.

The work addresses one of the perennial tensions in Twain's literary body: the question of determinism versus moral agency. As Dobski observes, "Twain's interest in Joan gets at the heart of his interest in the tension between the conditions for moral agency and the evidence for psychological and material determinism, a tension that enlivens the bulk of Twain's *oeuvre*" (2). Joan herself becomes the crucial test case for Twain's supposed determinism, her extraordinary capabilities seemingly beyond environmental conditioning.

What results from Dobski's reading is a Joan who functions as a quasi-Machiavellian figure—a proto-modern political actor who deftly manipulates the medieval institutions she ostensibly serves. In this construal, "Joan's political and military leadership are informed by her marvelous study of human nature. Her uncanny powers of discernment allow her to read and understand the passions that inspire men and women to perform great acts of sacrificial devotion" (30). Through these talents, she effectively undermines the old medieval order while appearing to defend it.

The implications are substantial: "*Personal Recollections* presents Joan of Arc as the founder of modern France, and by virtue of that, in Twain's treatment, the very founder of modernity in the West" (30). This Joan becomes "a Machiavellian prince *avant la lettre*" (30), who initiates regime change by "intentionally exploiting the weaknesses inherent in the Church's insistence on being politically relevant to its believers" (31).

Yet Dobski identifies a profound irony in this transition. The freedom emerging from Joan's France "entails a radical break from the ethical and political authorities of throne and

altar in the name of the untrammeled will of the individual" (16). However, this nascent modernity "retains the same residual hope for a kind of wholeness or self-sufficiency that is promised by the spiritual and ethical virtues of the medieval Catholicism" it seeks to transcend (16).

This complex reading shows why *Personal Recollections* might indeed be Twain's finest work; it neither simplistically champions youthful independence nor merely wallows in deterministic cynicism. Instead, it charts a middle path that "prepares its readers for how they might liberate themselves from those moral, political, religious, and philosophic opinions that demand the kind of coherence and intelligibility that eludes humanity's grasp without also consigning them to epistemic despair or moral decadence" (16).

Accordingly, Twain is neither the simple humorist of popular imagination nor the brooding determinist of academic construct, but rather a subtle philosophical mind grappling with the fundamental tensions of human existence at a significant historical juncture.

Dobski reveals deeper philosophical tensions regarding authority, gender, truth, and the limits of human knowledge. He describes a symmetrical storm between these opposing forces: "What is true of Joan's storminess is equally true of her rival: the Church storms against the Maid" (289). However, instead of "modern artillery" (289), the Church deploys "an army of scholiasts whose arsenal consists in religious texts, books of law, histories, court records, and all of the rhetorical traps and logical tricks that their learning affords them" (289). This battle of wills reveals how "speeches, which can build noble edifices for some, can also create stormy confusions for others" (289), demonstrating language's capacity to both illuminate and obscure reality.

Central to Dobski's exegesis is Joan's transgression of gender norms through her male attire—a point Twain deliberately emphasizes beyond historical accuracy. As Dobski notes, "In drawing attention to Twain's trebling of references to Joan's male attire, we remind ourselves that Twain is deviating from the historical record of Joan's trial" (261). This transvestitism represents a profound challenge to medieval categorization, suggesting that "nature might not support categories that are always and absolutely distinct and clear" (289). Here we encounter a nuanced position that neither denies natural differences between sexes nor suggests complete social construction: "To say that someone like Joan can effectively manifest the natural capacities thought to belong to men and women ... is not to say that there

are no qualitative differences between males and females or that these categories are simply the product of human agreement" (289).

Both Joan and the Church, in Dobski's reading, struggle against "an intransigent reality" (289) that resists their quest for completeness. The Church "insists on material and moral orders" contradicted by Joan's existence, while Joan attempts to "re-order the world in a way that elevates the needs of the body over the longings of the spirit" (289). In this struggle, "each seems to deny to humanity what the other would provide" (289).

Dobski draws a fascinating parallel between Joan and Eve, suggesting that Twain "doesn't so much emphasize her sexuality as he points towards the original erotic temptation befalling man, namely the desire to know human good and evil for oneself" (274). Like Socrates, Joan demonstrates a commitment to truth that challenges established authority. She is willing to face death rather than abandon her principles. This comparison with Eve elevates Joan's struggle to a profound philosophical plane concerning human autonomy and the limits of knowledge.

The Church's failure to discredit Joan reveals another dimension of Twain's narrative strategy. Unable to prove her voices demonic—which "would not wipe out her very real political accomplishments" (250)—and unable to establish her as a fraud without acknowledging her remarkable prudence, the Church resorts to attacking her cross-dressing. This strategic failure underscores Joan's political triumph even in defeat. Joan's execution, described in poignant terms—"Wearing only a simple robe, weakened by persecution, pale from her sunless prison, and stripped of power" (78)—transforms her into a figure whose final words remarkably "urge them to think of the cause of France and to absolve the King who abandoned her" (78). This selfless death completes her political mission while exposing the Church's dilemma.

Dobski argues that "in Twain's hands, Joan's challenge to the Church becomes essentially a political one" (98), forcing an impossible choice: either abandon political engagement and risk losing adherents who "look to the Church for the satisfaction of the demand for an earthly power capable of acting on behalf of a divinely ordered cosmos" (98), or remain politically engaged but develop "a rational justification for customs like divine right of kings" (98) that might render divine authority "superfluous" (98). Through this conundrum, "Twain highlights the primacy of politics over faith" (98).

Arising from Dobski's analysis is a view of Twain's Joan as a figure who illuminates the inherent tensions between medieval categorization and natural complexity, institutional authority and individual conscience, and political necessity and spiritual aspiration. Her life and death reveal the birth pangs of modernity and the persistent human quest for wholeness that crosses historical periods—a quest that nature itself consistently frustrates.

One comes away from Dobski's ambitious book with the distinct sensation of having wandered through intellectual precincts rarely associated with Twain. The cumulative effect—this painstaking excavation of Joan as harbinger of modernity, as philosophical provocateur, as sly underminer of medieval certainties—produces a startling reappraisal of a figure heretofore consigned to the less rarified domain of American humorists.

Dobski's analysis reveals a Twain engaged in nothing less than a profound meditation on the transition between epochs—medieval to modern—wherein Joan functions as both catalyst and embodiment of this progression. Through a medieval Catholic saint, Twain articulates a vision of political modernity that challenges religious and secular orthodoxies. We are shown a Joan who exploits the Church's political vulnerabilities while simultaneously demonstrating the inadequacy of purely material determinism.

The chapters, it must be conceded, occasionally suffer from a certain episodic discontinuity that risks fragmenting the overarching argument. One detects in the organization a mild scholarly indiscipline that recalls the meandering Mississippi River rather than the architectonic precision one might prefer in literary analysis. The academic reader must occasionally ford turbulent waters connecting otherwise illuminating insights.

To be candid: this volume will find scant readership beyond the hallowed quadrangles of university humanities departments and the more recondite philosophical seminaries. The casual admirer of Twain's frontier wit will discover here no rollicking tales of riverboat gamblers or homespun aphorisms. Instead, one encounters dense thickets of analysis concerning "categorical 'crisis'" (275), the limitations of natural taxonomy, and the "pluripotential universals evidenced by the career of Joan" (289). Such terminology, while perhaps unavoidable in serious scholarly discourse, effectively restricts the audience to those already conversant in the particularities of political philosophy.

Yet despite these limitations—or perhaps because of the very intellectual ambition they represent—Dobski's fundamental assertion proves surprisingly persuasive: that in Twain we

find not merely a satirist but a genuine political theorist grappling with the most consequential questions of authority, freedom, and the human condition. By positioning Joan's transvestitism as a challenge to rigid categorization, by illuminating the symmetrical "storms" of both Joan and Church against an "intransigent reality" (289), and by revealing how both protagonists "pursue a wholeness that the world refuses to grant" (289), Dobski convincingly elevates Twain to the company of those who have thought deeply about the foundations of political order.

One closes this volume with reluctant admiration for the case Dobski has assembled. Despite its occasionally labyrinthine argumentation and its decidedly academic tenor, the work succeeds in its fundamental aim: to rescue Twain from the reductive classification as mere humorist and to establish him, against all expectation, as a momentous voice in our understanding of political modernity. For the patient student willing to navigate these intellectual waters, Dobski offers a compelling reframing of Twain's masterpiece—one that reveals the Dean of American Humorists to be, after all, a political philosopher of astonishing depth and enduring relevance.

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Classically Educated

Kevin Slack

Review: David Hein, *Teaching the Virtues* (Mecosta, MI: Mecosta House, 2025). 205 pp. Kindle, $9.99; Softcover, $16.95.

David Hein's *Teaching the Virtues* is the first imprint from the Russell Kirk Center's new publishing house in Mecosta, Michigan. The ancestral home of one of modern conservatism's intellectual founders, Mecosta has long been a pilgrimage site for conservative thinkers and friends from around the world. Hein is one such pilgrim and now serves as a Distinguished Teaching Fellow at the Russell Kirk Center. Many Ciceronian Society members have also found refuge and inspiration in Mecosta and its venerable "sage." Hein's book is affordable, brief, well-written, and memorable—ideal for Mecosta House's maiden voyage. Its audience is educators at "traditional church schools, in classical Christian schools, and in homeschooling settings," and beyond that, "school leaders, parents, and perhaps even a few students" (2). It is not a book *about* virtues or teaching, but rather "a primer on teaching the virtues," all to their end of "realizing one's best self" (2, 4). Seeking more than agreement from his readers, Hein wants engagement. He challenges teachers to either "rewrite this book" or to "produc[e] another book" that will carry the tradition (1).

Part one, "Schools," focuses on the institutions and methods of education, as opposed to perfunctory "schooling"—"strategic plans, assessment devices, external reviews, competitive rankings, diversity definitions..." (9). Schools should acknowledge the importance of virtue in education. Parents looking for a church-affiliated school, Hein reminds, want to know if it will educate the right kind of character for their son or daughter.

In the first chapter, "Politics and Ball Bearings," Hein lays the book's foundations with two analogies. The first is a political teaching of a "conservative-liberal politics" that promotes "ordered liberty," the moral foundations of freedom. "Our experiences teach us that liberty flourishes when joined with forbearance" (11). Politics must be rooted in tradition, an accretion of practical wisdom, yet open to prudent reform. This outlook includes both "a liberal understanding of fundamental human rights" and "equality before the law and equality

before our Creator. It embraces equal opportunity and basic fairness" (11). But rather than abstractions like natural rights or "a theoretical social contract," liberal values are understood as "commitments and practices rooted in the rich cultural soil of Athens and Rome, of Jerusalem and London." Hein adds two Philadelphias: the northern center of American Revolution and Philadelphia, Mississippi, a southern center of civil rights tragedy and protest. Authors in this tradition include Burke, Tocqueville, Oakeshott, Aron, Kirk, and Scruton.

Hein's conservative liberalism is both political *and* educational. "The most salubrious option for the polity at large, conservative liberalism is also the most fitting and helpful, the most workable and inspiring, stance for schools today" (12). It provides the conditions for the moral imagination enlivened by questions of virtue. Students should be encouraged to question everything: gay marriage, hate speech, trangenderism, and systemic racism (13–14). This questioning opposes ideology and conformity and extends to the school's own principles. Hein discourages religious litmus tests in admissions: "in no school is militant woke fundamentalism or militant Christian fundamentalism desirable as either policy or practice" (13). Church schools should embrace "receptive ecumenicism," an openness to new practices that "dovetail with our convictions but flesh out our principles" in unexpected ways (18–19). Thus, he seeks a balance: schools should deemphasize unfriendly dogma, but "each school should make it clear what it holds to be true belief and right conduct" (14).

Using a second analogy of ball bearings, Hein discusses this relation between the school's fixed principles of "institutional identity" and its "diurnal activity" (20). Ball bearings reduce the friction of rotation around an axle—in this case the student, around which everything revolves. The bearings' liberal inner ring consists of institutional life: "classes and chapel, games and the arts, extracurriculars and outings, rules and punishments, papers and labs and exams, together with correction and encouragement" (15, 17). The outer conservative ring is the "school's most profound commitments and character—its ethos as an orthodox Christian institution, its participation in the sacraments, its trust in and loyalty to Christ, not idols" (17). The ball bearings are the "habits of moral and spiritual excellence" (20) and their integration into every area of school life, not just a single class or chapel. "The ancient virtues mediat[e] between students' freedom and the institution's faith" (20). Schools should reintroduce the word *virtue*—"good habits conducing to good ends" (21)—and teach the theological and moral virtues absent in popular culture. Dialectic alone is insufficient for education. Teachers must

use rhetoric to awaken students' moral imaginations, enabling them to picture a future in which the virtues enhance human happiness. This education should facilitate deep roots, or habits, for a sound character. It will "enable survival, propagation, and the realization of our distinctive ends," namely, "living in society, loving others, being reliable contributors" (24).

Hein's example of the teaching method of the outer conservative ring is nineteenth-century educator Henry A. Coit, whose strengths included systematic knowledge, intense preparation, and high standards to prepare students for the ministry. But Coit needed ball bearings. "He bore down too hard on students' natures, pronouncing apodictically on what he would have been better off discussing invitingly" (32). Classical education advocates often forget that its older variant was not Socratic Method but a slog of Greek and Latin recitations. Coit's education was hindered by a confident absolutism, autocratic methods, and a refusal to engage with the outside world. Thus, Hein adds to Coit's methods "a dash of [John] Dewey," who viewed "students as active, not passive" (33). A teacher can meet students' passions by integrating the virtues into common subjects—history, science, mathematics, athletics, and "deep reading" (38). Hein gives special place to "writing as a moral act" (41). As a vigorous, demanding exercise, it begins not with prescription but description, followed by "intellectually alert and stylistically engaging commentary" on the assigned reading (43). Well-written essays do not consist in "isolated, undefended opinion" but in "rational analysis and informed judgment" that draw imagined respondents into a conversation (43).

Part one concludes with a project of building "university life and the community of honor" (76). Where *honor* properly includes "sturdy habits of self-discipline, moral courage, practical judgment, and commitment to fair play," today it is often equated with esteem, an unbending code, or female chastity (58). Moreover, it is seen as "expired" and even "morally flawed" (63). Hein critiques the ancient view of honor from the vantages of modern universal human rights and Christian ethics that uphold the dignity of every person. He advises an "updated version of honor" to "restore the mores of past cultures but also incorporate the modern commitment to human dignity and to freely chosen institutional roles" (65). Hein roots this reconstruction in concrete traditions, such as the University of Virginia's 1916 Senff Gate inscription. While honor means "living by right principles," an individual's excellent character is best drawn out in "a community that has a good purpose," one "with its own

distinctive places and time-honored rituals" (69). Thus the desire for honor is channeled into "appropriate self-esteem" according to duty rather than shallow interest or desire (70–71).

Part two focuses on the virtues themselves. Beginning with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, Hein exhorts teachers not to omit discussions of faith but to introduce it in neutral terms. Faith is accessed through our experiences of trust and our flaws of infidelity. The student is made aware that "communism, Nazism, and wokeism have all been identified as religions, with their own creedal statements, holy texts, moral codes, and sacred rituals" (76). Theology, by engaging with this center of "social faith," introduces the student to "radical monotheism" (78). One seeks eternal truths about the God beyond the many gods that he, consciously or not, already believes have worth. Faith provides not absolute certainty but meaning and consistent value. By this questioning, "Christians confront in the redemptive events of Cross and Resurrection the intersection of absolute love and absolute power," which reveals the possibility of restoring "friendship between God and humanity" (79). Students no longer view faith as a private affair "having little to do with the public realm," and God becomes a center of meaning that informs their discussions of the virtues (79). Hein provides examplars of the theological and the cardinal virtues (for example, he points to Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as models of prudence). He advises how to teach the virtues of justice, courage, and temperance, as well as gratitude, stability, and patience. One effective way to entice students into conversations about the virtues is translating them into modern English: temperance means "self-mastery"; justice is "fair play."

Hein's method shines in Chapters six and seven. He paints portraits of human excellence in George Washington's "patient power," Hannah More's "moral imagination," and Booker T. Washington's "prudent reform." He then shows how "exploring literature and film with students offers good opportunities to shape the moral imagination" (133). "Good films can incite interest, provoke questions, and create memories, which viewers might then employ as touchstones for future cognition" (143). Instead of recounting a film's events or their personal opinions, students should examine the characters' traits and impact. Hein illustrates this method in his own engaging interpretations of two books (*All the King's Men* and *Darkness at Noon*) and two films (*Ride the High Country* and *The Hanging Tree*).

Hein concludes with the virtue of piety. "The meaning of the virtues for members of the school community begins and ends in the chapel"—they are "embedded in the complete

narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and sanctification," lest they dissolve in a fragmented culture or serve the wrong ends (163). Piety is higher than justice—one's debts to God can never be repaid. It is the center of value that enacts the other virtues. Christian piety reorients virtue's ultimate end to "the alignment of our selfish and often misguided wills with the sovereign, holy will of God, conclusively revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ" (167). The virtues must then "leave that sacred space and enter daily existence" (167). Hein's exemplar of piety is George C. Marshall, "soldier and statesman of character" (168), who lived by the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer*. His life was one of "*pietas*: reverence toward God, country, and kinsmen" (175). As a "conservative internationalist," he initiated the "program for western European recovery that ... was wholly consonant with both his grand strategy as an American statesman and his practice as a faithful churchman" (170–71).

...

Hein's book is both enjoyable and useful, though not for everyone. Unless conservatives are willing to fight for public religious charter schools, church schools are reserved for concerned religious or wealthy parents in what is often an educational wasteland. But this is not Hein's fault. The beautiful St. James School pictured on the book's cover ranks among America's top twenty boarding schools (boarding tuition is $60,000 per year), with students from thirty different countries. Though an Episcopal school, it advertises, "From many backgrounds, faiths, and points of view, our students are broadly educated and deeply principled." In a nation often hostile to Christianity, Hein exhorts Christian educators to respond to criticisms of faith by way of experience. Don't circle the wagons; show Christianity's relevance. Christian students should debate their theology, or learn what it means to have one.

Hein's two grounding analogies do prompt questions. Without an outer ring of fixed principles there are just ball bearings. The axle spins endlessly without traction. Classical education is often sold as teaching students *how* and not *what* to think. Aside from facilitating classroom discussion and declaring a mission statement, Hein was a bit unclear as to whether schools should secure fixed principles with religious tests for teachers or require them to take a stand on some issues. Professionalization measured by credentials, research, and neutrality in the classroom requires no conservative orientation. We all have colleagues who brag about their 'objectivity'—that half their students think they're too liberal and the other half think they're too conservative. While a teacher might lead a seminar on gay marriage, it is difficult

and even job-threatening to take a public position. Conservative schools that tout openness and objectivity by hiring the spectrum of ideologies become beachheads for liberal takeover—over 90 percent of professors, in open partisan affiliation, are Democrats. There are teachers in almost every Christian high school or college who would bend their programs to become more like state-run institutions. Azusa Pacific University, Calvin University, and Wheaton College each knelt to wokism; only stalwart resolution saved Grove City College.[1]

Considering the progressive outer ring that has formed at many traditional institutions, it is worth considering to what degree classical education is itself easily coopted by liberalism. Modern gnostic religions, Hein points out, inculcate their own pieties. Without particular application, the virtues become abstract talking points. Considering Hein's now-common criticisms of wokeness, did classically-trained teachers and professors lead this fight? Did the recent shift in popular culture come from "conservative liberalism" or from a more radical conservatism? How did classical teachers and professors fare during the COVID-19 pandemic? Did their education help them to question the lies? Did they look to experience, with intelligence and courage, in assessing the dangers of the virus? These questions do not have simple answers, but I think they help us to assess the health of classical education.

Hein leans on "conservative liberalism" to educate a moderate attitude by resisting abstractions such as social contract theory (173). But it still seems somewhat disconnected from concrete issues. That regimes must both conserve and adapt is a truism, yet ironically the appeal to tradition easily becomes both a defense of any status quo and itself an abstraction divorced from real-world politics. For one hundred years, progressives, liberals, and radicals—including critical race and queer theorists—rejected social contract theory. The conservative appeal to tradition often means keeping one's head down—finding a safe target (like John Locke, 'abstraction,' or 'modernity') to attack; it becomes a safehouse for conservative teachers and academics to remain *above* the culture wars, tolerate progressive views, and punch to the right to virtue signal to their liberal colleagues. Moreover, Hein's traditionalism—conserving a people's way of life—now confronts Western traditions of a massive entitlement state, feminism, and gay rights that go back one hundred years. Conservatives must now explain why one tradition over another, or why tradition at all.

[1] See Josh Abbotoy, "Wide Awoke at Grove City College?" *American Reformer*, November 29, 2021.

The root of virtue is *vir*. Disaffected young men find more spiritedness (both mental and physical) in Joe Rogan's podcast than in American classrooms, which fail to appeal to both superiority and service to something higher. Yet Hein's book tends to soften the difference between male and female virtues. He gives a poignant description of courage, "A soldier may be loyal to her country—until the enemy pressures her to confess to made-up crimes or to spill military secrets" (92). To be clear, he does include male exemplars, and his use of the female pronoun is part of our scholarly tradition. But the hesitancy to appeal to manly noble sacrifice is what today's young men find derisive about Christian and academic education. I also think Hein could have better distinguished between justice for citizens and noncitizens, as well as a Christianity that, aside from Tocqueville's universalism, is compatible with human distinctions in excellence—the medieval knights and crusaders were Christians too.

Finally, and to his credit, Hein recognizes the importance of "intermediate institutions and traditional associations": "The modern administrative state and political realm bear all the hallmarks of ethical weakness that commentators on bureaucracy and the managerial revolution have identified" (90, 72). Yet some of his exemplars, such as FDR, introduced this administrative ooze. Hein cites George C. Marshall as an example of "conservative internationalism," but the addition of the word *conservative* does not make it so. Marshall's internationalism arguably failed to conserve American noninterventionist foreign policy. In the words of Russell Kirk, the United States is a republic, not an empire.

None of these thoughts are meant to detract from what is a thoughtful, well-written book. If you are a teacher, go buy it, and, as Hein suggests, rewrite it for your own students.

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The Triumph of the Traumatic

William Batchelder

Review: David Rieff, *Desire and Fate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2025). 260 pp. Hardcover, $100.00; Paperback, $24.00; Kindle, $15.00.

Thinkers who are themselves sympathetic to the left have in the past proven helpful in diagnosing what has happened when leftist movements corkscrew into purity spirals—e.g., George Orwell's blasts against Soviet totalitarianism. In our spring issue, and again in the fall edition, *Pietas* will offer a two-part consideration of critiques of wokeness written by such intellectuals. In our Spring issue we consider David Rieff's *Desire and Fate* (2025); in the Fall issue, we will review Musa al Gharbi's *We Were Never Woke* (Princeton, 2024).

We begin with David Rieff's outstanding *Desire and Fate*. Rieff is a public intellectual, policy analyst, and journalist who has, for decades, written about wars and humanitarian crises throughout the world. He has written a challenging work on the use of historical memory, *In Praise of Forgetting*.[1] He is also a memoirist who has written a powerful account of how Susan Sontag (his mother) faced her third and final bout with cancer.[2]

He is the son of Philip Rieff, a thinker the Ciceronian Society has come to venerate and whose theory many of us have explored in a recent volume.[3] Between father and son there are resemblances in form, if not in style. Like Philip Rieff's *Fellow Teachers*, David Rieff's *Desire and Fate* is not organized conventionally into sections or chapters and does not unpack one central thesis from beginning to end. Unlike *Fellow Teachers*, whose expanded argument was delivered in deliberately inaccessible prose and with key arguments hidden in the footnotes, *Desire and Fate*'s short, untitled essays are highly readable.

David Rieff is not sympathetic to what has come to be called "wokeness." He anatomizes it as a toxic brew of "authoritarian subjectivity most radically expressed by the conviction that

[1] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016).
[2] Rieff, *Swimming in a Sea of Death: A Son's Memoir* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).
[3] *The Philosophy of Philip Rieff: Cultural Conflict, Religion and the Self*, eds. William Batchelder and Michael Harding (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2025).

human beings are whatever they feel themselves to be" and a "lumpen Rousseauism" in which "'indigenous ways of seeing' are taken to be at least reason's equal" (11, Kindle). Genealogically, he argues "wokeness" owes a debt to the Communist desire to remake human beings; the Maoist hatred of the past, which must be publicly ratified by every private conscience; European fantasies about "primitive" societies; and what Philip Rieff called "the triumph of the therapeutic" (11).

Despite the book's loose organization as a long series of short essays, two overarching arguments emerge. The first is wokeness's "absolute intolerance of everything—White Supremacy, Patriarchy, heteronormativity, and so on—except for capitalism" (11). Rieff argues that conservatives fundamentally misunderstand what they have come to call "woke capitalism." In large measure, Rieff believes this is not because conservatives don't understand wokeness, but because they don't understand capitalism. Conservatives spent the twentieth century defending capitalism because they imagined an antagonistic binary between the free-market West and the communist East. In fact, Rieff argues, since the nineteenth century, high culture has been cooperating with capitalism to destroy everything traditional in the life of the west. Capitalism's very adaptability, which Schumpeter praised as creative destruction, should have made it as obvious to conservatives as it was to Marx that capitalism was the foe of tradition.[4]

If conservatives are pro-capitalist when they should not be, Rieff argues, the contemporary "woke" left conceives of itself as being anticapitalist when it isn't. While Rieff does not question the sincerity of the anticapitalist rhetoric of the woke left, their focus on identitarianism means woke leftists do not actually understand their relationship to capitalism any better than conservatives do (23). At times, this opens wokeness to very cynical uses by large corporations. Rieff writes that the corporate appropriation of wokeness makes perfect strategic sense: "the risk of not presenting everything as a social justice campaign is that there will be a real social justice campaign, meaning one that might actually threaten the economic status quo in which corporate America has everything its own way in every essential sense"

[4] In 1966, Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud*, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), 54, brushed off any real cultural difference between Communism and Capitalism, writing, "Both American and Soviet cultures are essentially variants of the same belief in wealth as the functional equivalent of a high civilization. In both cultures that controlling symbolism has been stripped down to a belief in the efficacy of wealth. Quantity has become quality. The answer to all questions of 'what for?' is 'more.'"

(32). Indeed, he shrewdly points out that if the proportional representation of all identities in powerful academic, philanthropic and corporate institutions which so obsesses the woke variant of leftism were to be fully realized tomorrow, "it would leave the economic structures of society utterly untouched" (52).

Less obvious to both left and right is how very easy it has been to graft wokeness onto capitalism: "identity politics and contemporary capitalism are an uncommonly close fit" (21). The "proliferating" forms of identity promote a mentality of customization with which market providers are not at all uncomfortable: "infinite variety of new identities means a potentially infinite number of new products" (141). The success of large-scale capitalism at absorbing antinomianism, commoditizing it, and expressing its thrilling sensations through advertising has rendered *Brave New World* outdated:

> Huxley imagined that, in the future, human beings would need to be discouraged from pursuing their own unique desires and interests in order to maintain social order. But in our world, maintaining it requires persuading them to believe that these desires make them unique rather than emblems of the new conformity of the simulacrum. This does not mean that contemporary capitalism is any less dependent on securing consent by conditioning people not only to accept, but to enjoy their fate. It is just that our conditioning rests on a different drug than Huxley's Soma, and it involves the cultivation of instability rather than stability. That instability may not seem pacifying (or enslaving) but that is, in reality, exactly what it is, for it's mistaking one's sense that one has the freedom to determine one's own fate for the reality that one is actually doing so. (141–42)

If the thesis of the book is the complicity of wokeness and capital, the heart of *Desire and Fate* is the author's alarm at the florid subjectivity untethered to any external reality which gives wokeness its emotional and social power. At times, he invokes an "authoritarian subjectivity," in which any individual *is* whatever or whoever he feels himself to be, and under which condition social sanction may be incurred for disagreeing with the subjective assertions of the individual. In the case of the trans movement, Rieff invokes "subjective essentialism," the idea that "by understanding the real nature of one's own feelings about oneself that one will be able to identify whom one is. And the idea that one could be mistaken about any of this is rejected out of hand" (183). Once subjectivity becomes "the new objectivity," public discourse descends into what he calls the "unfalsifiable fevers of the subjective," a horrifying impasse in American public life where what is really real is what is most deeply felt by any

individual subject (126, 177). This subjectivity itself remains comprehensively left-coded: "people have convinced themselves ... that, to sincerely believe something is proof of that belief's truth—assuming, of course, that the belief in question is in sync with the current identitarian wisdom" (38–39). Rieff writes:

> Now that it has become plausible to speak of 'my truth,' even when it is at odds with 'the' truth, there can be no more objective correlatives, only subjective ones. This is the reason why being offended by something is endowed not just with the ennobling aura of victimhood and martyrdom, but entirely determined by the feelings of those who feel themselves offended. The oppressed are always right, as it were..." (39)

Rieff observes another alarming cultural development intertwined with the extravagant subjectivity of the current moment: the confusion of metaphor for reality. Tongue firmly in cheek, Rieff sums up the (insane) argument made by Australian political journalist Frank Grant that contemporary Chinese imperialism is an artifact of whiteness inflicted upon them, in part, by the white project of Japanese imperialism: "Imperialism is a White Supremacist construct and, therefore, to be an imperialist power is to be a white power, even if you are, well, non-white" (56). In Grant's argument, whiteness serves as both a metaphor and a causative agent—*at the same time*. Rieff remarks, "It is this metaphorization of understanding that is the deepest intellectual, and in some ways, the deepest philosophical ill that afflicts us because it leads the culture toward a refusal to acknowledge any difference between the metaphorical and the real" (56).

If such "metaphorization" is silly when applied to foreign policy, it is alarming when paired with STEM disciplines. Rieff describes the efforts of prestigious publications such as the *Lancet* to convert racism to a public health crisis and the concomitant psychologizing of resistance to anti-racism training, where to be a doubter is to reveal oneself, in his delightful phrase, an "anti-vaxxer of the soul" (135). He cites a physician who wrote, in the *New England Journal of Medicine*: "If we white physicians are to heal others and ultimately the health care system, we must first heal ourselves" (83). This is a near-perfect example of metaphorization. A professional charged with the literal healing of patients not only conflates that healing with both health care reform and private moral exhibitionism, she makes a metaphorical/therapeutic use of "heal" rhetorically prior to the literal healing of her patients. Rieff writes, "Healing herself of her racism is not remotely as important as treating one of

her patients for leukemia. And yet, she seems to think the reverse is the case.... It is the difference between heal and 'heal,' but so complete has the triumph of metaphor been in this society that the distinction literally no longer informs adult judgment" (83–84). The disturbing professional implications of this language bring to mind, for this reviewer, Fan Shen's account of his training to be a barefoot doctor in China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Fan was told, "We would rather have a doctor with a Red Heart and little skill, than a doctor with a White Heart and better medical skills. A Red Heart will take care of everything else. You must be revolutionaries first, doctors second."[5]

Whence came this intense subjectivity and the public upheaval which has followed? Rieff dismisses the explanation often favored by conservatives (and besieged liberals), that this is the culmination of a Marcusian long march through the institutions. In part, Rieff contends, this is because "Americans never cared much for the life of the mind, anyway" (197). In part, it is because Rieff believes that the liberal consensus which governed the Anglosphere is in its death throes, and however violent the paroxysms of wokeness seem, at root we are watching activists pushing on an open door.

Instead, Rieff identifies one of the chief causes as the "the triumph of the therapeutic culture my father identified a half century ago" (160). Like his father, David Rieff sees the triumph of the therapeutic in part as the product of an exhausted culture: "even without Woke, the post-Protestant world would still never have been capable of resisting the therapeutic tide" (174). The subjectivity at the heart of wokeness had already been described by Philip Rieff in the middle of the last century: "each individual is the "actor-manager," as my father put it in *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, "of his own infinitely changeable identities" (206).

But David Rieff is no mere epigone of his father in this matter. In light of the events of the last decade, he offers a refinement of his father's concept—arguing that if the *root* of the "authoritarian subjectivity" at the heart of wokeness is the triumph of the therapeutic, its effective socio-political *deployment* lies with what he has called "The Triumph of the Traumatic." It is this focus on trauma which Rieff believes distinguishes the recent awokening from the mere political correctness of the 1990's. Rieff writes, "Therapeutic language has

[5] Fan Shen, *Gang of One: Memoirs of a Red Guard* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 96.

long been the lingua franca of US society (and increasingly that of the entire Anglosphere). And traumatic language is therapeutic language further weaponized and deployed" (177). Because what passes for the political now operates almost entirely at a subjective level, the prevention of subjective "harms" is reified as policy, from classroom trigger warnings to corporate sensitivity training. This is most visible in the "trans" iteration of wokeness: "Once you come to assume that not deferring to your subjective feelings will cause you physical—as well as mental—harm, anything less than full acceptance by society of the idea that what, subjectively, you feel yourself to be should be the beginning and end of the public debate, becomes a public health crisis, and, as it is becoming in law, also a matter of people's civil rights" (193). Trauma becomes, then, the *ultima ratio* of a therapized/medicalized rhetoric of public debate: "This 'grade inflation' of what constitutes trauma is the new normal for the educational, public health, and psychoanalytic and therapeutic bureaucracies" (203).

For readers of *Pietas*, it is interesting to note that David Rieff's downgrading of the animating importance of the intellectual, even philosophic roots of wokeness contrasts rather strongly with his father's approach to such matters. Philip Rieff's project, in his later work, was to confront the replacement of what he called the "second culture" of Judaism and Christianity with the godless "third culture" of modernity. Like David Rieff, he regarded the second culture as having become, in many ways, exhausted. Unlike his son, however, Philip Rieff was an almost obsessive genealogist of the philosophical origins of the third culture—to the point where, tongue firmly in cheek, he assigned it a "birth year" of 1882.[6] I suspect Philip Rieff, were he still with us, would be much more sympathetic than his son with arguments that wokeness has philosophical origins implemented in a "long march through the institutions."

On the other hand, I think the fate of high culture might be more central to David Rieff's frustration with the twin acids of capitalism and wokeness than high culture itself proved to be in Philip Rieff's developed theory of culture. David Rieff blames the creative destruction of capitalism for initiating high culture's decline, and wokeness only for finishing it off: "Schumpeter plus Fanon. Unimaginable. Yet once imagined, obvious; perhaps, even,

[6] The year Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God and Josef Breuer withdrew from treating Anna O, clearing the way for Freud to interpret her case. Philip Rieff, *My Life Among the Deathworks: Illustrations of the Aesthetics of Authority* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 129–30.

inevitable" (16). He doubts the woke culture which seeks to replace western culture will produce anything of lasting artistic value, arguing that "the fantasy that culture can be largely a representation of the historically unrepresented, or that testimony is art, is a consoling fiction" (19). Finally, he sees clear evidence that under the ideological spell of wokeness, representation has become far more important than quality in artistic and academic work.

Philip Rieff's depth of knowledge of high culture was astonishing, of course, but in many ways the function of high culture in his theory was illustrative, not central. He repaired to Mozart, Wallace Stevens, James Joyce, Marcel Duchamp and the like to show how the third culture aimed to subvert and replace the second. That said, for Philip Rieff, such high culture, however important, was not culture *in essence*. In its most important sense, culture was "the origin of order in the mental process," a dialectic between the individual and the group in which self-shaping prohibitions, which Philip Rieff called "the interdicts," were sunk into the individual at the pre-conscious level.[7] The social function of the cultured individual was to reinforce that process by translating sacred orders into social orders which could then be consciously obeyed by the group.[8] Philip Rieff believed that the triumph of the therapeutic marked an unprecedented moment in history, where an "officer class" of cultured individuals ceased to make this translation of sacred order into social order, concluding instead that it is "forbidden to forbid." Such an "anticulture" had never before existed, and his theory suggests that such an anticulture must fail at the fundamental level of the formation of the individual consciousness. It is for this reason that Philip Rieff regarded the passing of the second culture of the West as an unprecedented civilizational catastrophe which would very likely end with an apocalyptic bang and millions of deaths.[9]

Because David Rieff does not seem to subscribe to his father's "meta" view of culture, he can be more phlegmatic about the end of the western high culture, in particular. He suggests the next important high culture will probably emerge from Northeast Asia or India, and that the current dying high culture of the West probably needs to be put out of its misery. Indeed, if Philip Rieff prophesied a bang, David Rieff hears more of a whimper:

[7] See Batchelder and Harding, *The Philosophy of Philip Rieff*, 3–4.
[8] Philip Rieff, *My Life Among the Deathworks*, 2.
[9] Philip Rieff, *The Crisis of the Officer Class* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 167.

> It is simply a fact to say that the greatest days of Western culture are behind it. There is nothing unusual in this. Cultures and civilizations are as mortal as human beings. The great Renaissance historian and politician Francesco Guicciardini said that a citizen must not mourn the decline of their city. All cities decline, he writes. If there is anything to mourn it is that it has been one's unhappy fate to be born when one's city is in decline. (18–19).

This difference probably explains the difference of intensity between Philip and David Rieff on the question of the universities. Particularly in *Fellow Teachers*, Philip Rieff decried both the vulgarization of the academy by money and careerism and, especially, its politicization. He wanted the academy to take the place of the church, in our post-Christian age, and serve as a place where a cultural officer class of professors dedicated entirely to the quest for truth sought to make thick texts live in their re-reading by engaged students. This might preserve both culture in his more expansive theoretical sense, and Western high culture.

David Rieff is nearly as troubled as his father by what has happened to the universities. He writes that he was "unforgivably slow" in recognizing that conservative critics of the university such as Alan Bloom and his father were correct about the disaster (165). On the other hand, David Rieff dismisses his father's vision of the university as a temple of the intellect as "impermissibly romantic, both about the autonomy of the life of the mind, and about the sacerdotal role that should be the professoriate's right" (166). To David Rieff, "the liberal university has collapsed because liberalism as the governing consensus of US and Canadian society has collapsed" (167).

If he takes the view that true misfortune lies not in a civilization's decline, a phenomenon natural and inevitable, but only in living in a time in which one must watch one's own civilization decline, what could have motivated David Rieff to write *Desire and Fate*? Clearly, he is motivated in part by disgust that big capital will harness the destructive energies of the recent awokening while emerging not only unscathed, but stronger than ever. It is equally obvious that he is motivated by his concern with what is happening to the life of the mind, both within the university and without. Clearly Rieff feels genuine disgust at the unhinged subjectivity overtaking public life in which, in his memorable phrase, "the heart's moronic tyranny continues apace" (197). But I think the very title of the work, *Desire and Fate,* points us to a more deeply humane motivation, as well.

It was in *Swimming in a Sea of Death,* his 2008 memoir describing his mother's final battle with cancer, that David Rieff first invoked the binary between desire and fate. He did so in the context of his mother's intense desire to live—a desire so intense she inflicted terrible medical suffering on herself in spite of her almost certain fate at the hands of a virulent cancer. In working through this all too human problem, Rieff wrote: "The great British scientist J.D. Bernal writes somewhere that there is 'the history of desire and the history of fate and man's reason has never learned to distinguish between them.'"[10]

The radical subjectivity of wokeness has clearly provoked again Rieff's longstanding concern with this worrying aspect of our shared human nature. He attributes the mental health crisis in younger Americans in part to the fact that "the young have been sold a bill of goods: the fraudulent promise that their desires should be their fates" (205). Indeed, wokeness may be so dominant in America because of "the old American incapacity to distinguish between wish and reality" (197). He concludes the book invoking a tragic understanding of human nature very much in harmony with his father's:

> Andy Warhol's line that we would all be famous for fifteen minutes seems the height of sober caution. He did not see that people wanted more than to be famous, more than to able to communicate directly with their gods; instead, they wanted to be able to define themselves at will, which, when you think about it, is nothing short of a way of conferring godlike powers to oneself. The move is radical: from 'truth' to 'my truth,' and from the vicissitudes of fate to the supremacy of desire. Fate, though, will have the last word; it always has, and it always will. If on nothing else, on that we can depend. (206–207)

A book which takes on a topic as sensitive as wokeness while making anyone reading it—whether from the right or the left—in equal parts intrigued and uncomfortable, has more than succeeded. That having been said, I would offer two criticisms. First, if Rieff is right about how flexible and damnably adaptable capitalism is, shouldn't that make us more interested in discovering why it is that the last three major social upheavals capitalism has had to be damnably adaptable to—the New Left in the sixties and seventies, the outbreak of political correctness in the 1990's, and the Great Awokening of the last eight years—are all left-coded?

Second, while I admire the convincing argument Rieff makes about the surprisingly comfortable relationship between wokeness and capitalism, the historian in me always winces

[10] David Rieff, *Swimming in a Sea of Death*, 78, Kindle. Rieff invokes a similar concern in *In Praise of Forgetting*, 130.

a little when "capitalism" is said to *do* anything. Here and there in *Desire and Fate*, David Rieff does mention the Professional Managerial Class, but this is never at the center of his argument. In many ways, I think it is this particular stratum of capitalism—the too-numerous, status-anxious, box-checking strivers—who have done more to promote wokeness than any other group. To be sure, they participate in capitalism at a high level, but they are equally to be found in all institutions requiring credentialed managers, from government to foundations, and their relationship to wokeness, in my view, is by far the most intimate and the most self-serving. For this reason, in our Fall issue, we will supplement our consideration of David Rieff's work with a review of a study which places the professional managerial class at the center of the Great Awokening: Musa al-Gharbi's *We Have Never Been Woke*.

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